Anarchic update news all over the world - Part 2 - 21.06.2017

Today's Topics:

   

1.  Author Collective Rupture (RC): Anarchists mount barricades
      in Santiago de Chile in solidarity with Mapuche murdered
      weichafes (a-infos-en@ainfos.ca)
   

2.  Critical Discussion On Armed Struggle with Anarchists in
      Rojava (a-infos-en@ainfos.ca)


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Message: 1



June 14, Santiago de Chile. On June 14, a dozen hoodlums cut off traffic, dropped 
pamphlets and raised canvases outside the Metropolitan Technological University in 
Santiago de Chile, commemorated by the Mapuche killed in the south in the midst of a 
territorial recovery action. "The weichafes Luis Marileo and Patricio Gonzalez will be 
avenged with blood."
A pamphlet found on the spot said: "No action without response, resistance is not 
terrorism. Weichafes and subversives on the war foot against capitalism. POPULAR JUSTICE 
NOW! "
http://rupturacolectiva.com/anarquistas-montan-barricadas-en-santiago-de-chile-en-solidaridad-con-weichafes-mapuches-asesinados/

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Message: 2



At the end of March 2017, news spread that a new anarchist guerrilla group had formed in 
Rojava, the International Revolutionary People's Guerrilla Forces (IRPGF). Their emergence 
has reignited discussions about anarchist participation in the Kurdish resistance and in 
armed struggle as a strategy for social change. It has been difficult to communicate with 
comrades in Rojava about these important questions, as they are operating in wartime 
conditions and surrounded by enemies on all sides. Therefore, we are excited to present 
the most comprehensive and critical discussion yet to appear with the IRPGF, exploring the 
complex context of the Syrian civil war and the relationship between armed struggle, 
militarism, and revolutionary transformation.

The developments in Syria foreshadow a rapidly arriving future in which war is no longer 
limited to specific geographical zones but becomes a pervasive condition. State and 
non-state actors have been drawn ineluctably into the conflicts in Syria, and those 
conflicts extend far beyond its borders; today, civil war is becoming thinkable again in 
many countries that have not experienced war within their home territories for 70 years. 
Proxy wars, once geographically contained, are spreading around the world as religious 
denominations, ethnicities, nationalities, genders, and economic classes become proxies in 
the struggles between various ideologies and elites. As capitalism generates intensifying 
economic and ecological crises, these struggles are probably inevitable. But while they 
offer new opportunities to challenge capitalism and the state, they hardly point the way 
to the relations of peaceful coexistence and mutual aid that anarchists desire to create.

Is it possible for anarchists to participate in such conflicts without abandoning our 
values and principles? Is it possible to coordinate with forces pursuing different 
agendas, while retaining our integrity and autonomy? How do we organize to confront these 
situations without turning into a militarized war machine? From the vantage points of 
Europe and the United States, we can only develop limited perspective on these questions, 
though it is necessary to form our own critical hypotheses. We are grateful for the 
opportunity to engage in dialogue with those who are fighting in Rojava, and we hope to 
facilitate conversations on this topic across blockades and battle lines all across the world.

Kurdish forces have been calling for international supporters to fight alongside them for 
years now. How does this play out in practice? Do you consider yourselves to be equal and 
autonomous participants in both the fighting and the transformation of society? Or you 
feel your role to be allies supporting their defense?

First, it is important to realize that not all international supporters come to Rojava, or 
for that matter to the broader region of Kurdistan, for the same reason. As you are aware, 
there has been a steady flow of international supporters joining the ranks of the 
Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) for decades now. Additionally, international support has 
come from neighboring countries as well as other parties and guerrilla groups like the 
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of 
Armenia (ASALA).

More recently, however, international supporters have come to the region mostly as a 
result of the growth of Daesh (ISIS) and its full-out assault in both Iraq and Syria. A 
few years ago, during the period of the battle of Kobanê and the genocidal campaign by 
Daesh in Rojava and Shengal, various international groups and individuals came to struggle 
for a myriad of reasons. For example, the Lions of Rojava attracted those with more 
militaristic, right-wing and religiously motivated ideologies and perspectives. At the 
same time, the Turkish militant Left, namely the Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP) 
and the Turkish Communist Party Marxist-Leninist (TKP/ML) had arrived in Rojava (to later 
include the United Freedom Forces, or BÖG, which would be formed after Kobanê) and joined 
the armed struggle in an effort to assist Kurdish forces and aid the struggle not only in 
Rojava but in Bakur (Northern Kurdistan - Turkey) and broader Turkey.

Thus, simultaneously during those pivotal months in Kobanê, there were Christian 
fundamentalists, fascists, and Islamophobes fighting alongside Turkish and international 
communists, socialists, and even a few anarchists. That is not to say that all Western 
fighters are either fascists or leftists. On the contrary, in fact, quite a few 
international supporters have simply identified as anti-fascists, supporters of the 
Kurdish struggle, liberal feminists, democracy advocates, and those with a fascination 
with the democratic confederalist project unfolding in Rojava. While the situation has 
changed on the ground and many of those with right-wing or religious convictions are no 
longer fighting with the People's Protection Units and Women's Defense Units (YPJ/G), 
there is still an eclectic and far from monolithic mix of international supporters here.

In practice, international supporters are placed in different units depending on certain 
criteria. For example, prior military personnel who come to Rojava may have access to 
Kurdish units that would, for the most part, be closed off to those who do not have prior 
military experience. Those include sniper (suîkast) and sabotage (sabotaj) units (taburs). 
Internationals who come to fight for ideological reasons, for anarchism, communism, or 
socialism, could choose to go to one of the Turkish party bases to train and fight as an 
attached member of their guerrilla units. Most international supporters, however, join a 
Kurdish unit within the YPJ/G and fight alongside the Kurds, Arabs, Ezidis, Armenians, 
Assyrians and other groups within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

The social position of international supporters in relation to the local and indigenous 
members of the military forces is of course complex. For the people of Rojava and for the 
broader Kurdish liberation movement, it is an honor for them to have international 
supporters come to defend them when they feel that the international community, for almost 
a century, has abandoned their struggle for autonomy and self-determination. Yet, there is 
this almost celebrity atmosphere around some Westerners who come here to fight, as well as 
a tokenizing and sometimes paternalistic atmosphere on the part of some elements of the 
local political and military establishment. Of course, this changes depending on the 
international supporters' reasons and motives for coming to Rojava. For example, some 
international supporters take great pleasure in showing their faces, posing with weapons 
and gloating about their "accomplishments." Others choose to hide their faces and 
identities for both political and practical reasons.

There is no doubt that some international supporters have used the conflict in Rojava as a 
vehicle for personal advertising, which is of course part of the "age of the selfie" and 
social media. This has allowed some of them to make a small fortune writing books and 
using the revolution for their own gain. This is opportunism and adventurism at its worst. 
This is a small minority of the international supporters here and in no way indicative of 
the motives or actions of the much larger population of foreign fighters. While there is 
an appreciation for those who have brought the conflict and revolution to a much wider 
audience, there is also the fact that those who struggle here can, in most cases, forget 
the struggle and have the privilege to go back to their comfortable lives. There are also 
the war-tourist types who come here for the love of combat and fighting. They gloat about 
their military experiences and many even have served or attempted to join the French 
Foreign Legion. When asked, they often express a desire to travel to Ukraine or to Myanmar 
to continue fighting after leaving Rojava.

This brings us to an important theoretical position that we hold as the IRPGF. For us, we 
believe that many of the international supporters, specifically most Westerners, reproduce 
their privilege and social position here in Rojava. We want to introduce the concept of 
the "safe struggle." That is to say that, since this war is supported by the United States 
and Western powers, it is safe to fight against the enemy and not face the repercussions 
for being in an organization whose ideology is Apoist (Apo is an affectionate nickname for 
Abdullah Öcalan, one of the founding members of the PKK), and therefore linked to a 
declared terrorist organization. There is no real penalty for involvement in Rojava except 
if one has direct links to some of the more radical groups here. For example, Turkish 
nationals who fight with the groups here are declared terrorists by the state of Turkey 
and even the comrades of the Marxist-Leninist Party (Communist Reconstruction) were 
arrested and imprisoned leading to their offices being closed across Spain on charges that 
they had links to the PKK. These unique cases aside, the vast majority of international 
supporters who come to fight Daesh and help the Kurds are safe from prosecution.

Additionally, in some cases, this reproduces the often-cited example of Western 
intellectuals and activists applauding a conflict beyond their borders but not willing to 
sacrifice their comfort and privileges to increase the fight at home. Some international 
supporters can come and be revolutionaries for six months or a year, they can be applauded 
and self-congratulatory and return back to their complacency and normal existence. This is 
not the majority of cases, but it is still an issue here. Also, coming for a few months or 
a year is in no way something we want to downplay or ridicule. In fact, every 
international supporter does put their life in danger by simply choosing to come to an 
active war zone. Concordantly, international supporters can learn skills and new 
perspectives while risking their lives here in the struggle and then go back to their 
homes and continue struggling there in a variety of ways.

Some international supporters have even changed their ideological positions in both 
directions. Mostly in a positive direction, seeing women's liberation and 
self-organization to be key components to a more liberated life. A small minority have 
changed their opinions for the worse, claiming that the Kurds are incompetent fighters, 
that the revolution has failed or will fail and that coming to Rojava did not provide the 
unrestrained combat and war that they desired. With all of this in perspective and as we 
will discuss, what will happen when the international powers turn their backs on the 
project in Rojava and have no more use for the revolutionary forces? Will the vast 
majority of international supporters be willing to fight against Turkish forces or, for 
that matter, even US forces? This remains to be seen.

In contrast to the aforementioned group of international supporters, there are those who 
have come here with a profound depth, clarity, and analysis of their ideological 
positions, the regional geopolitics, and guerrilla warfare. The mixture, quality, and 
amount of communist, socialist, and anarchist guerrilla fighters is unsurpassed in any 
other armed conflict around the world. This provides new opportunities and has led to some 
unique innovations, like the International Freedom Battalion (IFB), as well as joint 
training and operations, but also raises the specter and danger of repeating history.

In the final analysis, those who have come for ideological reasons or to support the 
people of Rojava and their struggle feel that they are equal participants in both the 
fighting and social transformation while others, at this time a growing minority, who have 
come with their military experience or a war-tourist type attitude aren't and in some 
cases don't want to be considered equal, claiming to know more about warfare than the 
local forces on the ground. This can make for tense exchanges and sometimes physical 
confrontation and intimidation.

We, as the IRPGF, are both equal and autonomous participants and, of course, we are allies 
supporting the people's defense. We do not see them as mutually exclusive. Yet, our 
autonomy is in some ways limited, since we are a part of a much larger struggle with a 
semi-formalized military structure and set of alliances. We are under the YPG, which means 
we are under the SDF which at this point cooperates with some US military forces and those 
of other Western countries in attacking Daesh. We see this as pragmatism and, of course, 
this does not change our opinions that the United States is as much our enemy as Daesh or 
any state for that matter. Yet, we also recognize that since it is the foreign policy of 
the United States that eventually led to the creation of Daesh, they ultimately must be 
responsible for combating them.

With the complex set of alliances and international powers aside, this struggle contains 
both indigenous and international characteristics, which makes it all the more important 
and necessary to defend. What we are currently investigating and learning, through 
(self-)criticism, theory, and practice, is the relationship of internationalist 
revolutionary anarchists to an indigenous struggle which sees itself as part of an 
internationalist revolutionary movement that will spread beyond its "borders."

Since the majority of our energy is focused on armed struggle, we at present have limited 
projects in civil society. We are presently working to support anarchist initiatives and 
capabilities within civil society. Yet, social transformation is not exclusive to projects 
in civil society. For example, local Arab villagers who neighbor the base we are stationed 
at come every other day to give us milk and yogurt they produce, while we provide them 
with sugar or other commodities they do not have in an act of mutual aid. This creates a 
bond of solidarity and collective life. We also have a positive relationship with a few 
Armenian families in the region. The simple act of drinking chai with someone and kissing 
them on the cheek is the first step towards building relationships which in the long term 
can help lay the foundation on which to build projects leading to social transformation.

International fighters, particularly anarchist and communist fighters, have been 
organizing separately in Rojava for some time already. Why is that? What is your relation 
to other Kurdish structures?

As we alluded to in the first question, most international anarchist, Apoist, socialist, 
and communist fighters in addition to other fighters who identify more as anti-fascists 
and anti-imperialists have been attempting to organize separately in Rojava for some time. 
This is not something new. Answering this question will require a description of the 
historical situation of the Turkish Left and the numerous armed groups that operate within 
the region.

For the Turkish Left, specifically the Left that is involved in armed struggle and that 
maintains guerrilla units, the relationship between the groups is one that has changed and 
adapted over time. There was a time when Turkish Left parties would see each other as 
enemies as much as they would see the Turkish state or the capitalist system. This led to 
inter-party violence and even deaths. Yet, as history has revealed, the Turkish state has 
proved much stronger and more resilient than many have expected. Previously, the vast 
majority of Turkish society did not advance the struggle as many of the parties, being 
traditional Marxist-Leninists, dogmatically believed would naturally happen as result of 
historical necessity. In fact, with the referendum in Turkey nearing, and Erdogan 
practically secure in an "evet" or "yes" victory, the parties saw a necessity to unite and 
struggle together. This is not to say that they had not done so before. In fact, many of 
the parties, the largest one being the PKK, had worked with other guerrilla groups in the 
vast mountainous regions of Turkey, sharing resources and training and even conducting 
joint operations. It was on March 6, 2016, when history was made in Turkey with the 
formation of the People's United Revolutionary Movement (Halklarin Birlesik Devrim 
Hareketi). This united front brought 10 of the major parties involved in the armed 
struggle under one structure and banner to fight against the government of Erdogan and the 
Turkish state.

Of course, one must also look at Middle Eastern history in general to understand how the 
various Turkish parties operated within various countries and participated in various 
conflicts. For example, The Communist Party of Turkey/Marxist-Leninist (TIKKO), ASALA, and 
the PKK operated in Lebanon (Beqaa valley) and trained alongside the PLO and various 
Palestinian, Lebanese, and international guerrilla groups, even conducting joint 
operations. In Syria, the PKK set up its headquarters and opened up party offices and 
training facilities in Rojava in the 1980s until the mid-'90s. Abdullah Öcalan was able to 
operate relatively freely with the support of the Syrian regime, who saw Turkey as an 
enemy. Turkish-Syrian tensions and the threat of war would force Hafiz al-Assad to cut all 
ties with Öcalan and expel him from Syrian territory. The collapse of the Soviet Union 
forced many Turkish and international guerrilla groups underground and limited their 
mobility, resources, training, and operations. The Syrian Civil War and the start of the 
revolution in Rojava provided another opportunity for Turkish parties which were illegal, 
clandestine, and in the mountains to come to set up operations and bases in Rojava by 
which to support the struggle as well as organize and communicate more freely and 
effectively. This led to multiple parties setting up karargahs (headquarters) in Rojava.

With the struggle in Rojava intensifying and the parties needing to share resources, 
intelligence, and military operations, the parties, with the lead of MLKP, formed the 
International Freedom Battalion in Rojava. This experiment in joint management and 
command, unifying the various parties and groups under one banner to fight, was the first 
experiment of its kind in Rojava and preceded the formation of Peoples' United 
Revolutionary Movement (HBDH). This experiment has had mixed results. For example, the IFB 
is run on the principles of democratic centralism, which we, as the IRPGF, disagree with. 
We would rather it be horizontal and equal for all groups and members. Additionally, the 
vast majority of the groups, parties, and fighters within the IFB are Turkish, leading to 
the international character being skewed. Even Kurdish forces refer to the IFB as "çepê 
turk" or "Turkish Left." Yet, this aside, we would argue that it has had positive and 
symbolic value as well as various military successes. It has shown that the various 
parties and groups, including the IRPGF, can work, train, and fight together against a 
common enemy, uniting our energies and forces to achieve victory both in combat as well as 
in civil society.

The International Freedom Battalion, though it is directly under the command of the joint 
leadership of the various parties and groups, is ultimately under the command of YPG and 
SDF forces. While we are autonomous in terms of our military structures, unit 
organization, and individual movements, we await orders and directives directly from YPG 
about our position and movements on the battlefield, as does the rest of the IFB. This 
situates us directly under the command of YPJ/G and therefore we, too, share their 
alliances and the battlefield with those they conduct joint operations with. Yet, the 
parties and groups maintain their autonomy as separate entities outside the structure of 
the IFB to disagree with the positions of Kurdish forces and even to criticize certain 
policies and decisions. Yet, while part of the IFB, we are careful about the positions, 
views, and perspectives we express while using the IFB name and structure. Ultimately, the 
IFB has proved to be a unique experiment and laboratory to bring (far/ultra-)leftists and 
radicals of all colors and persuasions to fight under one unit and command structure.

Considering that the alliance between Kurdish and US forces is not likely to last 
indefinitely or to create space for radical projects to grow in Rojava, how can anarchists 
position themselves in this struggle? Can you maintain autonomy from decisions made by 
others in Rojava who are involved in this alliance?

The word "alliance" here is very misleading, indeed it is a strong and implicit word. The 
US and its coalition allies, for totally unrelated political and economic reasons, have 
made a project of eliminating an armed group (Daesh) from which the Revolution must defend 
itself and which YPJ/G would also like to eradicate. YPJ/YPG are on the same battleground 
as US forces. Since they share the same enemy, and since the inherent political, 
ideological, and economic antagonism between the two is, by a certain priority of 
interests, delayed from igniting, military cooperation is not surprising. There is no 
political alliance between the US and the revolutionaries of Rojava.

Indeed, we believe that the cooperation between revolutionary forces and US forces is not 
likely to last. Of course there exist forces here in Rojava that would seek a nation-state 
or have used nationalist sentiments to stir up support. Right next door is the US 
supported Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) under the leadership of Masoud Barzani, who 
is yet another US puppet in the region. The KRG has a virtual embargo on Rojava. Barzani 
and the KDP are seen by many as traitors for allying themselves with Turkey at the expense 
of the Kurds and the Ezidis of Shengal. Additionally, the KRG seeks to "stir things up," 
both politically with groups like the Kurdish National Council (ENKS) and KDP within 
Rojava as well as militarily with the Rojava Peshmerga. The enemies of this revolution are 
countless.

It is often noted that some anarchist thinkers like Murray Bookchin contributed to this 
social revolution in the first place, which led Abdullah Öcalan to move away from 
Marxism-Leninism and create his theory of "Democratic Confederalism." Regardless of how 
accurate that is, ultimately anarchists both in the armed struggle and in civil society 
can make an impact on this revolution. Through dialogue and joint projects, we can work 
with local communities and develop relationships that can further entrench the gains of 
the revolution while pushing it forward. The more influence anarchists and anarchist 
philosophy have in dialogue with the people and structures in Rojava, the more we can 
build something new together and focus on transformation not only in Rojava but around the 
world. That is the importance of connecting the struggles as we have done so far regarding 
Belarus, Greece, and Brazil. The struggle in Rojava is the struggle in every oppressed 
neighborhood and community. It is the struggle for a liberated life and that is where 
anarchists can have their biggest impact.

As anarchists, we are uncompromisingly against all states and authority. That is 
non-negotiable. While we fully acknowledge the role of the various parties in struggling 
and fighting to liberate territory both in Rojava and in the broader mountainous regions 
of Kurdistan, we believe that critical solidarity allows us to work, fight, and possibly 
die alongside the parties while having the autonomy to remain critical of their 
ideologies, structures, feudal mentalities, and numerous policies. We can maintain 
autonomy in the sense that we can disagree with the positions or choose not to fight 
should the alliances the revolutionary forces make be beyond survival and pragmatic 
geostrategic necessity. In the final analysis, should the revolutionary forces make formal 
alliances with state powers and Rojava be turned into a new state, even if that state is 
social democratic, the IRPGF would leave and move our base of operations elsewhere to 
continue the revolutionary struggle. Anarchist projects within civil society would still 
be able to operate and function so long as they were allowed to do so, and they should, 
but, it is most likely that anarchist as well as communist guerrilla groups would no 
longer be allowed to operate in Rojava.

Have you experienced a tension between engaging in armed struggle and developing social 
projects in Rojava? In what ways do they feed into each other and reinforce each other? In 
what ways are they in contradiction?

Our group is only in the beginning stages of developing social projects in Rojava. It is 
difficult for a unit to organize and maintain social projects while engaged, at the same 
time, in armed struggle if it lacks the resources in terms of personnel and 
infrastructure. This requires more people to be here; we must reach the critical mass 
necessary to develop a successful project. Some of our comrades have worked in civil 
society before and are actively working on creating new initiatives that are both 
sustainable and achievable. This will allow us to achieve our respective commitments to 
the armed struggle and the social revolution.

Has the war effort in the Rojava community subjected other structures to its imperatives? 
Are there spaces or spheres of life in which control is centered in the hands of 
militarized groups, contributing to de facto hierarchical relations? How do we prevent 
military priorities from determining who has power in a community at war?

Certainly the war in Rojava and the broader Syrian and Iraqi Civil Wars have drastically 
changed the relationship between civil society and military forces. What is currently 
going on in Rojava can be aptly described and characterized, as some hevals[comrades]have 
put it, as "war communism." The current situation in Rojava has subjected much of the 
economy and civil society to the war effort. However, this is not surprising. Rojava is 
surrounded by enemies who seek to destroy the nascent revolutionary experiment. Daesh is a 
highly lethal and efficient para-state actor with tremendous resources, both financial and 
military, as well as a fighting force numbering in the tens of thousands. As such, it is 
one of the most brutal and capable threats against Rojava itself. Had it not been for the 
massive war effort on the part of large segments of the society, most notably the 
resistance of Kobanê and its subsequent victory which was a pivotal turning point, Daesh 
would have been victorious and continued its rapid expansion.

While the war has turned and Daesh is now on the run both in Iraq and Syria, Turkey 
entered the war seeking to stifle YPJ/G efforts to secure contiguity between the Kobanê 
and Afrîn cantons. One must be cognizant of the fact that almost daily, Turkish forces on 
the borders of Rojava bombard targets within its territory, killing scores of civilians 
and military forces. Likewise, to the east in Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government 
(Bashur) under the leadership of Masoud Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) 
continue to impose a virtual blockade and embargo on Rojava in addition to attacking 
People's Defense Force (HPG) and The Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) positions in Shengal 
using the Peshmerga. Additionally, Barzani and the KDP collude with Erdogan, the fascist 
Justice and Development Party - Nationalist Movement Party (AKP-MHP) government and the 
Turkish state, sharing intelligence, resources, and conducting joint military operations.

Without a doubt, war leads to de facto hierarchical relationships and seriously hinders 
horizontal relations and community power. In fact, multiple layers of hierarchical 
relationships exist. There are hierarchies within the party structures which permeate 
social structures and extend into the broader civil society. Those tend to be, for 
example, whether someone is a cadre or not, how long they have been in the movement for, 
their ideological formation and knowledge, their influence and contacts in addition to 
their combat experience. This can be perceived as a system of rank, privilege, and 
advancement. It does in fact exist, but it is something that operates in tension with a 
party which is self-critical of this and an ideology that seeks to transcend these 
relations in the midst of a real existing social revolution. While the cadre members of 
the militarized groups do in fact have a de facto social position which would be above 
other people in society, they ultimately answer to the people through the commune 
structure and the larger framework of the Northern Syrian Federation. Ultimately, these 
hierarchical relations exist as a military necessity in the midst of one of the most 
brutal wars. As anarchists, we see them and understand why they are necessary while being 
critical of their existence and seeking to challenge these relations of centralized 
authority and control. It is positive that these relations can be criticized using the 
tekmil process (a directly democratic assembly for critiquing a commander or others in a 
unit), a serious, vital practice of criticism-self-criticism and self-discipline which has 
its roots in Maoism.

Hierarchical relations of power, while sometimes necessitated by military realities and 
priorities in the context of combat, must exist as something which we want and desire from 
one another in order to act effectively. When there is time for deliberation, we can 
discuss, criticize, and make collective decisions. In combat, one expects immediate 
guidance, instruction, protection, certainty, and accountability from comrades more 
experienced and knowledgeable, because there are many decisions and tasks affecting the 
group that one cannot deal with and should not be burdened with. This applies to training 
and secure recruiting as well. But these relations can ultimately have the potential to 
harm the autonomous, horizontal, and self-organized nature of communities if they are not 
understood and practiced in accordance with other ideological principles. How can we, as 
anarchists and members of the IRPGF, prevent kyriarchal relations in this context-that is, 
in these overlapping contexts? The complexity of this question additionally reveals an 
inherent problem with how the question is framed. That is to say, that somehow the 
military priorities or defense of a community are separated from the community itself; 
imposed from without by some non-community actor. While it is true that military 
priorities are imposed on some communities, for example, evacuating villages that are on 
the front lines, in danger of attacks and using people's homes for temporary military 
outposts, the fact is that in Rojava, local communities, neighborhoods, and 
ethno-religious communities are responsible for their own defense.

This is not something new. In fact, it goes back to the Qamishlo riots of 2004 (an 
uprising of Syrian Kurds in the northeast) that led to the creation of community defense 
initiatives and the precursor to the YPG. To protect against the larger defense structure, 
the YPG, should it seek to impose its will in a military style coup and take power away 
from the communities, communities have their own defense forces, the HPC (Hêzên Parastina 
Cewherî). While the YPG represents the people's guerrilla army of Rojava, there are 
smaller forces-for example, the Syriac Military Council which is comprised of Syriac 
Christians and works to protect that community. Defense itself is decentralized and 
confederalized while at the same time retaining the ability to deploy rapidly, to call on 
troops and even conscription, which does occur in Rojava.

We believe and affirm that communities at war must be responsible for their own defense. 
Yet, with large state, para-state, and non-state actors attacking these communities in an 
effort to wipe them out, there is a necessity for even larger military forces. This may 
necessitate certain processes that, in a time of war, curtail the autonomy of a community. 
This reality is one that we are forced to live with. Ultimately, there is a dichotomy and 
tension between communities at war and the military forces which confront enemies 
sometimes many times their size. We are tasked with ensuring, as much as possible, that 
communities retain their autonomy and decision-making processes while simultaneously 
protecting them and ensuring their survival. Communities are ultimately responsible for 
their defense; when the need arises, all the unique and diverse communities can come 
together to form a larger military force for their collective protection. This means that 
each community constitutes a fundamental component part of the much larger force whose 
task is the protection of all the communities. This tension, between the community and 
military, is but another aspect of the philosophical tension between the particular and 
the universal. Our task is to ensure that this imbalance is minimized as much as possible 
so that communities can remain autonomous and ultimately have the final say as to their 
priorities and defense.

What is it that distinguishes anarchist armed struggle formations and strategies from 
other examples of armed struggle? If you oppose "‘standing armies' or ossified 
revolutionary groups" but grant that armed struggle may be necessary until it is 
impossible to force hierarchical institutions onto anyone, what is the methodological 
difference that can keep long-term anarchist guerrilla forces from functioning in the same 
way that a standing army or ossified revolutionary group does, concentrating social power?

A question often asked of us is how we are different from other armed left-wing groups? 
What are our distinguishing characteristics? As an anarchist armed struggle formation, 
along with other anarchist groups around the world, we strive for liberated communities 
and individuals based on fundamental principles within anarchism. We are not dogmatic nor 
orthodox in our understanding of anarchism, but perpetual iconoclasts and innovators. 
Anarchism is an ever changing and growing ideology that cannot be separated from life 
itself. While other non-anarchist left-wing groups may want some version of socialism 
and/or communism, we are ultimately distinguished from these armed struggle formations by 
our understanding of authority, both within the group and beyond. We have no leader. There 
are no cults of personality and no portraits of ourselves hanging on the wall. We take 
inspiration from the Zapatistas who cover their faces and focus more on the collective 
than on individuals, for we, as a collective of individuals, represent many unique 
identities and social positions. We make decisions by consensus, and when we are on the 
battlefield we agree on one or more comrades who will be responsible for the operation. 
There is no permanent command structure within the IRPGF. There are rotating positions of 
responsibility and assignments, the logic being not to reproduce military ranks or 
technocratic class structures.

Anarchist armed struggle formations are not new. For example, there are anarchist groups 
around the world including the Conspiracy of Cells of Fire, FAI-IRF (Informal Anarchist 
Federation - International Revolutionary Front), and Revolutionary Struggle. We do not 
necessarily agree with all the positions of these groups or their members. For us, we do 
not seek to be elitist or to be mountain guerrillas who leave the world to focus on 
people's war in the countryside, though that is an important aspect of the struggle. We 
seek to bring the mountains to the cities and vice versa. It is important to connect all 
the struggles around the world, for they are interconnected by nature due to the various 
systems of oppression and domination which exist. We too "shit on all the revolutionary 
vanguards of the world" as Subcomandante Marcos once said. We do not see ourselves as 
anarchist vanguards. We are anything but this.

The IRPGF feels it is necessary to be with the people and to understand the social 
character of the revolutionary process. There is no revolution without all of the 
communities, neighborhoods, and villages participating. We do not seek to glorify the arms 
and weapons we possess, though we do see them as a vehicle towards our collective 
liberation. Yet liberation is not possible if the social revolution is not present. 
Therefore, we are not another urban guerrilla group that seeks only to destroy without 
building anything social and communal. Of course, having arms and engaging in armed 
struggle carries with it a tremendous responsibility and great danger, not only for 
ourselves but for the power we possess. We agree with the guerrillas who often repeat the 
Maoist principle of not even taking pins from the people. We are revolutionaries guided by 
principles, not a marauding gang of mercenaries. This is the foundation by which we, as 
the IRPGF, seek to develop a collective ethic and understanding of armed struggle.

Knowing full well that armed struggle may be necessary for many years and decades to come, 
and realizing that as the years progress, structures become more entrenched and rigid, we 
are concerned about the creation of certain group dynamics that could lead to various 
hierarchies and a concentration of social power wherever we are based. In order to 
minimize this risk, we feel that it is necessary to not only be professional full-time 
revolutionaries but equally members of a living community. That means that we must be 
involved with local struggles and projects within civil society. Whereas a standing army 
or an ossified revolutionary group see their position as either professional work or 
lifelong dedication to struggle, they both maintain their distance and remoteness from 
communities and everyday life.

Anarchist guerrilla groups must remain horizontal entities and resist the temptation or 
structural necessity to centralize and concentrate social power. Should they fail to do 
this, they would no longer be liberating nor anarchist, in our perspective. As the IRPGF, 
understanding this danger, we feel that developing projects and developing relationships 
within civil society is the main way to withstand the creation of social hierarchies. It 
is a process that will be fraught with contradictions and errors. Yet it is through these 
contradictions and shortcomings coupled with our criticism-self-criticism mechanisms and 
horizontal self-organized structure that will challenge the creation of an ossified 
revolutionary group that has centralized its own authority and concentrated social power.

As you say, the conflicts in Syria, Ukraine, and elsewhere are only the beginning of what 
will be a protracted and messy period of global crisis. But what do you consider the 
proper relationship between armed struggle and revolution? Should anarchists seek to 
commence armed struggle as soon as possible in the revolutionary process, or to delay it 
as long as we can? And how can anarchists hold our own on the terrain of armed struggle, 
when so much depends on getting arms-which usually means making deals with state or 
para-state actors?

First of all, there is no general formula for how much armed struggle is necessary to 
initiate and advance the revolutionary process, nor at which point it should commence, if 
at all. For the IRPGF, we recognize that each group, collective, community, and 
neighborhood must ultimately decide when they initiate armed struggle. Armed struggle is 
contextual to the specific location and situation. For example, whereas throwing a Molotov 
cocktail at police is fairly normalized in the Exarchia neighborhood in Athens, Greece, in 
the United States the person throwing it would be shot dead by the police. Each particular 
local context has a different threshold for what the state allows in terms of violence. 
However, this is not an excuse for inaction. We believe that armed struggle is necessary. 
Ultimately, people must be willing to sacrifice their social position, privilege, and 
lives if necessary. Yet we are not asking people to go on suicide/sacrifice missions. This 
struggle is not for martyrdom but for life. Should it require martyrs, like the struggle 
here in Rojava and Kurdistan, that will be part of the armed struggle and revolutionary 
process as it unfolds.

Armed struggle does not necessarily create the conditions for a revolution and some 
revolutions may occur with little to no armed struggle. Both armed struggle and 
revolutions can be spontaneous or planned years in advance. Yet, local or national 
revolutions, which in some cases have been peaceful, do not create the conditions for 
world revolution nor challenge the hegemony of the capitalist world-system. What remains 
our fundamental question here is-when should one commence armed struggle? To start, we 
think that one has to analyze their local situation and context. The creation of local 
community and neighborhood defense forces which are openly armed is a critical first step 
to ensuring autonomy and self-protection. This is a powerful symbolic act and one that 
will certainly attract the attention of the state and its repressive forces. Insurrection 
should happen everywhere and at all times, but it doesn't necessarily need to happen with 
rifles. Ultimately, armed struggle should always be done in relation to living communities 
and neighborhoods. This will prevent vanguard mentalities and hierarchical social 
positions from developing.

Revolutions are not dinner parties and, what's worse, we do not choose the dinner guests. 
How can we, as anarchists, remain principled in our political positions when we have to 
rely on state, para-state, and non-state actors to get arms and other resources? Firstly, 
there is no ideologically clean and pure revolution or armed struggle. Our weapons were 
made in former Communist countries and given to us by revolutionary political parties. The 
base we are staying in and the supplies and resources we receive come from the various 
parties operating here and ultimately from the people themselves. Clearly, we as 
anarchists have not liberated the kind of territory we would need to operate on our own. 
We must make deals. The question then becomes: how principled can our deals be?

We have relationships with revolutionary political parties that are communist, socialist, 
and Apoist. For us, we fight against the same enemy at this point and our combined 
resources and fighters can only further the struggle. Yet, we remain in critical alliance 
and solidarity with them. We disagree with their feudal mentalities, their dogmatic 
ideological positions, and their vision of seizing state power. We both know that should 
they one day seize state power, we will be enemies. Yet for the time being, we are not 
only allies but comrades in the struggle. This does not mean that we have sacrificed our 
principles. On the contrary, we have opened a dialogue on anarchism and criticized their 
ideological positions while affirming the principles and theoretical positions we share in 
common. This exchange has transformed us both and is part of what some of them refer to as 
the dialectical process: the necessity of both theory and practice to advance both the 
armed struggle and the social revolution.

For the IRPGF, making deals with other leftist revolutionary groups we can find common 
ground with is a reality we live with. Yet, we also must acknowledge that the larger 
guerrilla structure that we are a part of does make deals with state actors. While we once 
again reaffirm our position against all states, which is non-negotiable, our structure 
makes pragmatic deals with state actors to survive another day to fight. For the time 
being, all of our supplies and resources come from revolutionary parties that we are in 
alliance with, who also make concessions and deals with state and non-state actors. We 
recognize this as a contradiction but a harsh reality of our current conditions.

Anarchists must choose, depending on their particular context and situation, what kind of 
deals they can make and with whom. Should they need to be pragmatic and make deals with 
state, para-state, or non-state actors to acquire arms, to hold on to their terrain, or 
to, at the very least, survive, that will be addressed and critiqued when the time comes. 
Ultimately, collectives and communities will make decisions for how to advance in the 
revolutionary process and how to use the various state and non-state actors for their 
benefit, with the goal of eventually not needing them and destroying them all. In the 
final analysis, armed struggle is necessary for the revolutionary process and the various 
alliances we make we deem necessary to achieve this goal of a liberated world. We, as the 
IRPGF, believe and affirm the often-repeated phrase from Greece that the only lost 
struggles are the ones that weren't given.

Sooner or later, every revolution divides into its constituent parts and necessary 
conflicts ensue. These conflicts determine the ultimate outcome of the revolution. Has 
this already begun in Rojava? If it has, how have anarchists dealt with this? If it has 
not, how can you prepare comrades around the world for the situation we will be in when 
the internal conflicts in the revolution rise to the surface, and it is necessary to 
figure out what the different positions are? Some comrades outside Rojava have been unsure 
how to understand some of the reports from Rojava, because in our experience there are 
always internal conflicts, even in the strongest periods of social revolution, and people 
reporting on the experiment in Rojava have been hesitant to articulate what they are. We 
can understand why it would be necessary not to speak openly about such conflicts, but any 
perspective you can offer us will be very useful, even if it is abstract.

The simple answer is yes, these conflicts have begun in Rojava. Within such a large party 
and confederal structure, contradictions and different factions have emerged. There are 
those who seek to carry the revolution to the end and others who are ready to make 
compromises on certain aspects of the revolution in order to secure whatever has been 
achieved up until now. There are those who still dream of a Marxist-Leninist Kurdistan and 
others who are ready to open up to the West and ally themselves with the "forces of 
democracy." Within the armed struggle, there are some who want to unleash an all-out 
people's war while others claim that the time for armed struggle is nearing its end and 
that we should slowly cease hostilities. Within this chaotic political arena, with what is 
a seemingly endless array of acronyms, how do we as members of the IRPGF navigate these 
murky and often dangerous waters?

As anarchists, we navigate within these complexities and contradictions with the goal of 
trying to claim as much ground as possible for anarchism. We align ourselves with the 
sections of the revolution and the party that are closest to us. The alliances we forge 
are ones that are most facilitating and the least assimilating. We try to keep ourselves 
safe from assimilation both ideologically and as a group. Being in an autonomous space 
that supports our goals provides us with tremendous opportunities. There is free space 
that the party gives to groups such as ours for training, to develop projects and outright 
space for revolutionary experimentation. The more anarchists come here to Rojava to help 
us build anarchist structures, the more we will influence and make our goals a reality in 
society. For example, the youth, who are more critical of their feudal and traditional 
past, are at the forefront of tremendous social changes and advancements. We want to work 
with the youth to form educational cooperation and, as anarchists, to focus on anarchist 
theory and even address queer, gender, and sexuality (LGBTQ+) issues which are still very 
taboo in the majority of society.

There is a vast space to experiment and build the anarchist structures that will continue 
to revolutionize society and further liberate all individuals and communities. We believe 
that our work as anarchists, both in the armed struggle and in civil society here in 
Rojava, will be valuable to the entire anarchist community worldwide. We look forward to 
sharing our results, to everyone's continued solidarity, and to the anarchists who will 
join us out here.

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Critical debate with the anarchists of the armed struggle in Rojava - Part 2



This brings us to an important theoretical positions held as IRPGF. In our many foreign 
supporters, mainly from the West, here in Rojava reproduce their privileges and social 
position. We then introduce the concept of "safe fight." It means that when this war is 
supported by the United States and Western powers, it is safe to fight against the enemy 
and necelit consequences that are in an organization whose ideology is apoistická (Apo is 
affectionate nickname Abdullah Ocalan, one of the founding members of the PKK), and and 
not to be associated with a declared terrorist organization. There is no real punishment 
for involvement in Rojava, if a person does not have a direct link to some of the more 
radical groups. For example, Turkish citizens who struggle with these groups, are declared 
as terrorists by Turkey, and even comrades Marxist-Leninist Party (Communist 
Reconstruction) were arrested and imprisoned, which led to the closure of their offices 
throughout Spain over allegations that they were linked with the PKK. Leaving aside these 
exceptional cases, the vast majority of international fans who came to fight Daeshem and 
help the Kurds is from prosecution safe.

In addition, in some cases reproduces frequently cited example of Western intellectuals 
and activists who applaud the conflict across the border, but are not willing to sacrifice 
their comfort and privilege to intensify the fight at home. Some foreign supporters can 
come and be revolutionaries for six months or a year, they can congratulate and pamper 
confidence and return to his satisfaction and normal existence. This is not a majority of 
cases, but it is still a problem. Also, the arrival of a few months or a year is not 
something we want to belittle or ridicule it. In fact, every international supporter 
risking his life just that decides to come to an active war zone. Accordingly, the foreign 
fans can learn skills and new perspectives and risk their lives there in the fight and 
then return to their homes and continue in various ways in fighting there.

Some foreign followers even changed their ideological positions, in both directions. Most 
in a positive direction when they saw that the women's liberation and self-organization 
are key components of a liberated life. A minority opinion has changed for the worse by 
claiming that Kurds are incompetent fighters that the revolution has failed, or will fail, 
and the arrival in Rojava provides unlimited fight a war that they want. All this can 
reasonably be included in further discussions about what happens when the international 
powers to turn back the project in Rojava and will no longer use the revolutionary forces? 
A vast majority of international supporters willing to fight against the Turkish forces, 
or even US forces? We will see.

In contrast to the aforementioned group of international supporters are those who have 
come here with deep sincerity, clarity and analyzing its ideological positions, regional 
geopolitics and guerrilla warfare. Diversity, quality and quantity of communist, socialist 
and anarchist guerrillas is unmatched when compared to any other armed conflict around the 
world. This provides new opportunities and it led to a number of unique innovations, such 
as the International Flag of Freedom (IFB) as well as joint exercises and operations, but 
also raises the fear and danger of history repeating.

Ultimately, those who came for ideological reasons, or to support the people of Rojava and 
their struggle, they feel that they are equal participants struggle and social 
transformation, while others at this time growing minority who came with military 
experience or attitude of the military-tourism type, and they are in some cases do not 
want to be regarded as equivalent to a claim to know about the war more than local forces. 
This can cause stress and sometimes even physical confrontation and intimidation.

We as IRPGF are both equal and autonomous participants and of course we are allies who 
support the defense of the people. According to us, it's not mutually exclusive. Still, 
our autonomy is limited in some ways, because we are part of a much larger resistance with 
semi-formalized military structure and a set of alliances. We are under YPG, which means 
that we are under the SDF, which at the moment is working with some of the US military 
forces and other Western countries in the attack on Daesh. We see it as pragmatism and of 
course it does not change our view that the United States is for us the same enemy as 
Daesh or any other State. Yet we also recognize that it is a US foreign policy that 
actually led to the creation Daesh, and be ultimately responsible for the fight against them.

Along with a comprehensive set of alliances and international powers has this struggle 
both local and international characteristics, which makes it even more important for the 
defense and nutnejším. What we investigate and learn through self-criticism, theory and 
practice, the relationship internationalist revolutionary anarchists to the indigenous 
struggle which is considered part of the international revolutionary movement that will 
spread beyond its' borders. "

Since most of our energy is focused on armed struggle, we currently limited projects in 
civil society. We are working to promote anarchist initiatives and capabilities within 
civil society. Yet social transformation does not concern only projects in civil society. 
For example, a local Arab villagers from the neighborhood base in which we are placed, 
come every other day to give us milk and yogurt they produce, while we supply them with 
sugar and other commodities, which have, as an act of mutual assistance. This creates a 
bond of solidarity and collective life. We also have a positive relationship with several 
Armenian families in the region. The simple act of drinking tea with someone and kiss on 
the cheek is the first step toward creating relationships, which in the long run can help 
lay the foundation on which arise projects leading to social transformation.

International fighters, mainly anarchists and communists, with some time in Rojava 
organized separately. Why is this so? What is your relationship with the other Kurdish 
structures?

As we mentioned in the first answer, most international anarchists Apoist, socialist and 
communist militants, among others, who are more identified as anti-fascists and 
antiimperialisté, with some time trying to organize separately in Rojava. This is not 
something new. The answer to this question will require a description of the historical 
situation of the Turkish left and the numerous armed groups active in the region.

As part of the Turkish Left, particularly the Left, which is engaged in an armed struggle, 
and that keeps the guerrilla units, the relation between time change and adapt. There was 
a time when the Turkish Left perceived each other as enemies, as well as the perceived 
Turkish state or a capitalist system. This has led to violence between the parties, and 
even death. Yet history has shown that the Turkish state is much stronger and more 
resilient than many expected. Previously, the vast majority of Turkish society in the 
fight progressed, as many parties that are traditionally Marxist-Leninist, dogmatically 
believed that it naturally happens as a result of historical necessity. Only when 
approaching referendum in Turkey and Erdogan had a choice of "yes" or "yes" practically 
secured the victory party saw the need to unite and fight together. That does not mean 
that they did not have before. In fact, many political parties, the largest of which was 
the PKK, cooperate with other guerrilla groups in the vast mountainous areas of Turkey, 
shared resources and training, and even implement joint operations. It was March 6, 2016, 
when Turkey began the history of the creation of a unified People's Revolutionary Movement 
(Halklarin Birlesik Devrim Hareko). This united front brought ten major political parties 
engaged in armed struggle into a single structure that, under the banner of fighting 
against the government of Erdogan and the Turkish state.

Of course, we must also look at the history of the Middle East in general, to understand 
how various Turkish parties operate in different countries and how they participated in 
various conflicts. For example, the Communist Party of Turkey / Marxist-Leninist (Tikka), 
ASALA and PKK operating in Lebanon (Beqaa Valley) and trained together next to the PLO and 
the Palestinian, Lebanese and international guerrilla groups, and even led joint 
operations. In Syria, the PKK based its headquarters and opened offices and training 
facilities in Rojava, from the 80th to the mid-90s. Abdullah Öcalan was able to operate 
relatively freely with the support of the Syrian regime, which saw Turkey as an enemy. 
Turkish-Syrian tensions and the threat of war prompted by Hafez al-Assad, to annul all 
relations with Ocalan and expelled him from the Syrian territory. The disintegration of 
the Soviet Union forced to leave many Turkish and international guerrilla groups 
underground and limit their mobility, resources, training and operations. The Syrian civil 
war and the beginning of the revolution in Rojava provide another opportunity for the 
Turkish side, which were illegal, secret and in the mountains, came to set up bases in 
Rojava to support the fight, as well as looser and more efficient organization and 
communication. This led to the fact that in Rojava were based karargahy (headquarters).

With the growing struggle in Rojava and the need to share resources, information and 
military operations have created these pages with the leadership of the Rojava 
International MLKP single battalion (International Freedom Battalion, IFB). The experiment 
in joint command and control, which united the various parties and groups under one banner 
to fight, was the first of its kind in Rojava and prevent the emergence of a single 
People's Revolutionary Movement (HBDH). The experiment had mixed results. IFB example, 
guided by the principles of democratic centralism, with whom we disagree as IRPGF. We 
would prefer it to be horizontal and egalitarian for all groups and members. In addition, 
the vast majority of groups, parties and militants within Turkey IFB, which leads to a 
distortion of international character. Even Kurdish forces indicate IFB as a pin or a Turk 
"Turkish left." Nevertheless, we believe that it had a positive and symbolic value, as 
well as various military successes. It turned out that the various parties and groups, 
including IRPGF can work together to train and fight against the common enemy, combine 
their energy and force to achieve victory, both in combat and in civil society.

International banner of freedom, even if it is directly under the command of the joint 
management of the various parties and groups, is ultimately under the command of YPG 
forces and the SDF. While we were autonomous in terms of our military structures, 
organization units and movement, we expect orders and directives directly from YPG on our 
position and movements on the battlefield, as well as the rest of the IFB. It situates us 
directly under the command of YPJ / G, and therefore we share their alliance and battle 
with those with whom they engaged in joint operations. Parties and groups, however, retain 
autonomy as a separate entity outside the structure of IFB in order to express 
disagreement with the positions of Kurdish forces, and even to criticize certain policies 
and decisions. Even though we are part of IFB, we care about the positions, opinions and 
perspectives that we express in the use of the name and structure of the IFB. Ultimately 
IFB proved unique laboratory experiment that delivers (extreme / ultra) lefties radicals 
and beliefs of all colors and possibility to fight under one unit and command structure.

(Continued interview with anarchist guerrilla group IRPGF.)

Zdroj:

To be continued.

https://itsgoingdown.org/critical-discussion-on-armed-struggle-with-anarchists-in-rojava/

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