Anarchic update news all over the world - Past 1 - 11 Dec 2016

Today's Topics:

   

1.  A-Radio Berlin, Anarchist Black Cross Czech: Antifenix
      Presentation 4. Dezember 2016 (a-infos-en@lists.ainfos.ca)
   

2.  anarkismo.net: Misunderstanding syndicalism by Tom Wetzel
      (a-infos-en@lists.ainfos.ca)


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Message: 1



In the end of November of 2016 we had the opportunity of recording a presentation in 
Berlin by the Anarchist Black Cross in Czech Republic on the topic of Operation Fenix. The 
talk comprised the following topics: a short review of what had happened, the use of the 
term "terrorism", the topic of solidarity in Czech Republic and in general, a reflection 
on mistakes and how to deal with repression and police infiltrators, and finally the 
current development of the anarchist movement in that country. ---- Length: 1:11 h ---- 
You can hear / download the audio at: archive.org (mp3 | ogg).
https://archive.org/download/A-radioBerlin_abcCzech_antifenixPresentation_161125_en/A-radioBerlin_abcCzech_antifenixPresentation_161125_en.mp3
https://archive.org/details/A-radioBerlin_abcCzech_antifenixPresentation_161125_en

------------------------------

Message: 2



Debate ---- TIM GOULET'S review of Ralph Darlington's Radical Unionism ("Syndicalism's 
lessons") makes a number of mistaken claims about revolutionary syndicalism, based on 
fundamental inadequacies in Darlington's book. ---- The claim that "syndicalist unions 
broke off from mainstream federations to form 'purely revolutionary' unions, cutting 
themselves off from the mass of workers" doesn't hold up, though it does conform to the 
Leninist orthodoxy of "Left-Wing" Communism: An Infantile Disorder. There were many 
countries where the syndicalist unions were the majority--such as Portugal, Spain, 
Argentina, Uruguay, Peru and Brazil. Syndicalist unions in South Africa, such as the 
Industrial Workers of Africa (modeled on the Industrial Workers of the World), were the 
only unions that organized native African workers, who were excluded from the white craft 
unions.

At the time of the mass occupation of the factories in Italy in September 1920, the USI 
(Italian Syndicalist Union) was claiming 800,000 members, and the factory councils formed 
throughout Italy in those events were mostly organized by the USI. Moreover, it was the 
anarcho-syndicalists who initiated a militia movement ("arditti del popolo") to fight 
Mussolini's fascist squads. But the Communists didn't cooperate, and the Socialist Party 
capitulated to fascism.

Darlington makes the usual mistake of supposing the IWW went into decline with government 
repression in 1917. Actually the IWW continued to grow in the early 1920s, reaching its 
peak in 1923. The IWW mass unions were in industries where there either was no American 
Federation of Labor (AFL) union or a competing AFL union that was no larger than the IWW 
union. Moreover, in industries where IWW was a minority they often worked as a "dual card" 
pressure group within the AFL unions.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

MOREOVER, THE claim that revolutionary syndicalism "rejects politics" contradicts the 
criticism that syndicalists have an unrealistic ideal of a highly politicized unionism 
that can play a revolutionary role. You need to make up your mind which criticism you want 
to make: Did syndicalists advocate a narrow focus on merely economic issues ("economism") 
or did they have unrealistic expectations of the political role unionism could play? These 
two traditional Leninist criticisms are logically inconsistent with each other.

In Spain at present, the two syndicalist unions, the CGT and CNT, often work to develop 
alliances with social movements (women's groups, ecologists, housing squatters) as in 
general strike mobilizations. The CGT has separate encuentros (meetings) for its women 
members to develop campaigns--as for example their current campaign for free abortion on 
demand, against the right-wing government's efforts to criminalize abortion. These are 
examples of how the unions do develop political strategy and focus.

Moreover, it was Marxism that historically proposed a division of labor, with "politics" 
being reserved for the party and the union relegated to "the economic sphere." In 
practice, this has always been used as an excuse by union le

http://www.anarkismo.net/article/29819
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http://www.anarkismo.net/article/29827
Trump and the myth of the progressive but misled 'white working class' voters
  north america / mexico | migration / racism | opinion / analysis  Tuesday December 06, 
2016 17:36 by andrew - WSM
Once it became clear that Trump was going to become the president of the USA, my Facebook 
feed became cluttered with attempts to understand how that could possibly happen.  How 
could a white supremacist, misogynist and utterly transparent snake oil salesman 
accumulate so many votes?  Those on the left both inside and outside the borders of the 
USA struggled to understand what had happened.
[Listen to the audio of this entire article]

A common conclusion in too many of these pieces is that the left needs to reach out, and 
listen to the concerns of, those who voted for him as a priority.  In a similar fashion to 
how sections of the left evaluated Brexit, they see a working class anti-establishment 
rebellion in the Trump vote from what they term the ‘white working class'. They believe 
that component was won by Trump because it has been neglected by the left - often, they 
will assert, because the rest of the left was distracted by what they call identity politics.

This is a simple explanatory story that is particularly attractive to those sections of 
the left that have a nostalgic yearning for an imagined past of pure class struggle, shorn 
of internal concerns around oppression.  But the concept of masses of otherwise 
progressive working class voters opting for Trump on economic grounds is a myth.  The 
attractiveness of that myth and its promotion has more to do with the hostility of that 
section of the left towards the influence of intersectional feminism than anything more 
substantive.  That hostility has caused them to seek out anecdotes and exceptional regions 
and present them as the typical story that defines the election just as liberal Hillary 
Clinton campaigners have focused in on Facebook false news stories as the cause of her defeat.

It's this simple story that I'm examining at length in this piece, it's not an overview of 
what the election means.  It's addressing a particular debate on the left that I have 
characterised as one between two poles of the modern left.  A backwards looking Nostalgic 
Left dreaming of a mostly fictional past when a united (white male) working class was not 
distracted by what they term ‘identity politics'.  And a forward looking Intersectional 
Left ambitiously trying to understand how class interacts with the intersections of white 
supremacy and heteropatriarchy.  You can tell where my sympathies lie from that 
description but for the most part I'm going to be concentrating on the facts that can be 
gleaned from the exit polls after a few much needed opening disclaimers, in particular 
about the historical and current role of white supremacy in the US.

Below I show that while it is true that Trump attracted ‘white working class' voters it's 
also the case that the number is small in proportion to the US working class.  And exit 
polling shows us that, in both opinions and demographics, those Trump voters are not our 
audience.  For the most part they are not people who voted Trump in spite of his racist 
policies but people who share those racist policies.

The ‘sound on the economy but willing to vote for a racist' fraction are not even that 
large a proportion of Trump voters, I'll demonstrate this  below.  But what is really 
important to the story is that they are a tiny segment of the US working class.  That is 
missing from almost all accounts of what happened that I've read, almost all proceed on 
the deeply misleading basis that half of the US population went for Trump.  The error has 
arisen because most of the left, the electoralist left, is too used to speaking of voters 
as if they were representative of the population.  So you will see lots of commentary that 
refers to the Trump vote as almost half the population when in fact it was about 20%. 
That's because not everyone votes, more importantly not everyone can vote, and most 
importantly who votes is shaped by class, race and the intersections of both.

Some numbers to illustrate this.  At the time of the 2010 Census the population of the US 
was 309 million, it has risen since, the UN now estimates it at 325 million.  At the time 
of the election there were 231,556,622 eligible voters.  Just 135 million of those voters 
actually voted and of those about 64 million voted for Clinton, 62 million for Trump and 7 
million for other candidates.  The slow count of the remaining votes and that some voters 
voted in referenda and / or local elections but did not vote in the presidential election 
account for the shortfall between the candidate votes so far and the total votes cast, it 
appears 133 million cast a vote for president.

Who doesn't get to vote?

There is a shortfall of 94 million missing voters between the 231 million who could vote 
and the 325 million total population.  The largest component of this is people under 18, 
around 75 million, but there are three other very important blocks
A) 6 million people who are excluded from voting because they have been imprisoned for 
more than one year. Al Jazeera breaks the numbers down in their article on prisoner 
disenfranchisement  One important figure is that while 1 in 13 African American are 
excluded from voting in this manner only 1 in 25 whites are.
B) Homeland security estimates there are 11.4 million people in the US without the 
paperwork required for them to be there, about 74% of these are from central America with 
5% from Europe and Canada.
C) 14 million legal migrant residents can't vote.

I was unaware of the size of this last group until I read the excellent piece on American 
Electoral Apartheid by Konstantin Kilibarda identifying 30-40 million in total excluded 
from voting, he includes those in de facto US colonies and recently deported, which is why 
his total is higher than my figures suggest, which are based on those inside US borders.

A very systematic detailed state by state breakdown which doesn't count some of these 
exclusions has a shortfall of just under 20 million and in its detail and small print 
demonstrated why this is such a complex calculation.  The final number being determined by 
political considerations as well as the difficulty of obtaining and grouping data.  I've 
used their estimated final turnout figures as it includes where states release the 
information people who voted but did not vote in the presidential election.

Remember this is 62 million voters in a total population of 325 million and there were 75 
million too young to vote.  It's hard to factor this in as we'd not expect a 1 year old to 
have an opinion on Trump but we would expect a 17 year old too have one.  We do know from 
exit polls that he'd have massively lost the election if it was confined to under 25s, of 
which only 35% voted for him.

Another factor is that the votes cast in this election include a number of US citizens not 
living in the US, 5.7 million of whom were entitled to vote.  So if anything this means 
the proportions of Trump voters in the adult population calculated below will be a slight 
overestimate.

67% of voters reported earning less than 100k per annum so of those 133 million voters 
about 89 million were in that 0-100k bracket which we will treat as enumerating the 
working class.

However workers were less likely to vote in the election.  2014 data suggests that in the 
US population overall about 74% of people (185 million) are in households that earn less 
than 100,000 which is 7% more than that found in the voter sample.  The gap between votes 
and population is starker when expressed the other way around, only 26% of the population 
earn more than 100k but 33% of voters earned over 100k.  So those earning over 100k were 
about 24% more likely to have voted.

The reasons why the voting population is more representative of wealthier people are 
important. The migrants and ex prisoners excluded from voting that we mentioned above are 
likely to overwhelmingly earn less than 100k.  But it's also the pattern in most countries 
that wealthy people turnout in elections at much higher proportions than poorer people 
because the wealthy know that politicians represent them and the poor know they will be 
ignored.  53% of the US working class did not vote (including the many who could not). 
Unusually the New York Times gave voice to some of them.

It's worth noting in passing that just as Brexit could only pass because almost all the 
migrants affected by it were excluded from voting so too Trump only won the election 
because these millions of people were excluded from the eligible voters.  This can be said 
with confidence because most of these people excluded from voting are people of colour, 
which is systematic of the structural racism that continues to be at the heart of the US 
system.  This also illustrates why you can't assume those who voted are somehow 
representative of the population never mind the working class.  They are not, in terms of 
the legal exclusions above, barriers to voting, and the passive boycott by almost half the 
electorate, the voting population leans very much towards the more privileged section of 
the US population.  In terms of this election and the Trump vote it's almost certainly the 
case that that he pulled out additional voters motivated by white supremacy, misogyny, 
homophobia, transphobia and the sort of snobbery that hates others who receive state 
payments.  And that some economic right wingers who found him too much on these issues 
stayed at home.

On the other side it's clear that Clinton failed to mobilise millions of voters who turned 
out for Obama.  Her campaign strategy was based on winning over moderate republicans 
horrified by Trump - they mostly held their nose and voted for him.  She managed to 
increase the Democratic party share of votes among the wealthy - although Trump won the 
majority there.  But her share of the working class vote fell sharply, including amongst 
black and latino working class voters whom the Democratic Party presumed the very presence 
of Trump would be enough to drive to the polls.  Clinton was correctly seen as the 
representative of the neoliberal capitalism that has eroded wages, conditions and security 
for most workers in the US.  She gambled that Trump would be seen as the same but that his 
racism and misogyny would mean that she'd maintain if not build on the vote Obama received 
from women and people of colour.  It was a gamble that almost worked, she won the popular 
vote, but the nature of the US electoral system and Trump's successful appeal to a bigoted 
slice of the ‘white working class' meant he took the presidency.

On whiteness in the US and the use of ‘white working class' by the left

This is a good moment to insert a disclaimer on the use of the term 'white working class', 
in  particular in relation to the US.  The most brutal aspects of US capitalism were built 
on a premise of bringing poor migrants on board a colonial project that was genocidal 
towards the existing population of native americans.   Many of these migrants did not have 
much in common with those running the colonial project, in some cases like the Irish they 
were victims of the same colonial masters back in Europe. Often they found themselves in 
America only because of the conditions of warfare, poverty and starvation the colonial 
project created that drove them from their homes.  And significant numbers were forcibly 
transported after becoming prisoners in colonial wars or falling foul of a legal system 
that set traps everywhere.

In the initial period of colonisation in particular it was not that unusual for such 
colonists to desert and flee to the interior.  In some cases common cause was made with 
the indigenous population although the fact that such colonists were illiterate means that 
we only have fragments of a record of the extent of this.  For those interested in more 
The Many Headed Hydra provides an excellent introduction.

The entire project of creating the United States was one where the existing population 
were violently removed from the lands where they lived in a process covering hundreds of 
years, into the 1880s certainly and in terms of consequences right down to today and the 
Standing Rock struggle. Essential to the success of that project was the ability of elite 
Europeans to retain control over poor new arrivals.  This wasn't necessarily an easy task, 
often the relationship back in Europe between these two groups was hostile and conditions 
in the ‘new world' were such that the settlers had a lot more power and autonomy.

The glue that allowed this was the deliberate development of white supremacy.  Being white 
was what meant one set of people fought something close to a war of extermination against 
the ‘not white' Native Americans.  Being white meant you were given the land that the 
Native American population was living on and if they resisted the army turned up and 
killed them.  Perhaps more insidiously being white was what the settlers had in common 
and, in often hard frontier conditions, the common mark they bonded under.

Within that project was the capture, transportation and enslavement of millions of black 
people, also over hundreds of years.  There are moments in that history when poor whites 
stood with Native Americans and enslaved people, but for the most part the ideological 
bedrock of the USA was white supremacy and the granting of privilege to the section of the 
poor judged white enough.  Particularly in later years becoming white was often a key 
breakthrough moment for populations including Irish catholics and European jews who were 
initially received with hostility and suspicion.

Where common rebellions happened the near universal lessons drawn by those who ruled was 
that they had become careless in ensuring that white privilege and needed to restore it to 
the lower orders.  A lesson carelessly echoed in the current way some on the left talk of 
the abandoned white working class.  The expected privilege of whiteness is a concept that 
often appears but as often is not remarked on in anecdotal accounts of working class Trump 
voters.

The big problem with that line cutting metaphor

A common metaphor used and reported on is the idea of a line of people queuing for the 
American dream.  Working class white voters are reported as expressing their discontent 
that others are now being allowed to skip the queue, that they are stuck in place while 
‘line cutters' move in ahead of them.  So their outrage is a product of this unfairness 
and resulted in a vote for Trump.  But lets look at that line a bit more critically.  It's 
not a newly formed line, but one that has been shuffling along since the formation of the 
US.  Those towards the front owe their position to white supremacy, it was their reward 
for denying access to the line to the black population, taking the line off the Native 
American population and keeping others including Chinese and Latinos at the back.  Their 
outrage is that they have been ‘cheated' of the reward because suddenly not everyone ahead 
of them is white, and they know that means those people have somehow got there from their 
rightful position behind them.  And in neoliberal America the line hardly moves at all so 
there is a sense that perhaps they are being backed up.

The problem with the approach some on the left have argued to center this unhappy section 
of the white working class in order to avoid (in their terms) class disunity is that it 
amounts to the demand that everyone accept their current position in line on the promise 
that ‘come the revolution' the line will be abolished.  With no sign of the revolution in 
sight that's a very unattractive proposition to anyone not near the front who has no hope 
of shuffling over in the meantime.  And even the most pro revolutionary worker understands 
that ‘the meantime' may be longer than their lifespan.

The exit polls tell us that Trump's voters were overwhelmingly white, 55 million of his 62 
million voters were white. If there was no bias in relation to the overall voting 
population it would instead have only been 43 million.  They also tell us he did much 
better amongst higher earners, and in particular those earning over 100k, but there is no 
denying that many white people earning less than 100k also voted for him, mostly those in 
the 50-100k bracket.  This is the Trump voting portion of the ‘white working class.'

The legal enforcement of the whiteness boundary was only removed in the 1960s and the 
structural basis of it remains strong, reflected in everything from police killings to 
average family wealth.  So there are enormous dangers to the left in returning to a 
language that seeks to specifically single out and redress the grievances of the white 
working class as a distinct body, separate from the rest of the working class.  For the 
purposes of this discussion I'm forced to reluctantly use the term because so many of the 
left rushed to uncritically embrace the idea of the rebellion of the ‘white' section of 
the working class.

As far as possible I'm going to talk in terms of the working class as a whole as the other 
huge problem is that talk of the white working class so easily slides over into erasing 
the rest of the working class behind a ‘representative' figure of a white male industrial 
worker.  One excellent example of what I'm arguing against is provided in the article What 
so Many People don't get about the US working class.  It's certainly not the case that the 
‘white working class' is the section of the working class hardest hit by neoliberalism, 
see the article A reality check on 2016's economically marginalised.

Voters - a minority of the population

Within hours of polls closing it was clear that Trump would win the electoral college but 
two weeks later when I did these calculation Trump had got 62,513,667 votes and Clinton 
actually got more at 64,818,930. Roughly 7 million votes went to other candidates.  Trump 
won because the election takes place on a state by state basis and in most states the 
‘winner takes all' of the votes that are then cast for president.

So of 251 million adults some 62 million or nearly 25% voted for Trump and nearly 26% for 
Clinton. 2% of the adult population voted for other candidates.

Who were these people voting for Trump?  A section of the left has argued that they were 
white working class voters rebelling against neoliberalism.  It's then argued that these 
are people the left should be organising and fresh effort needs to be made to reach them. 
And finally some on the left argue that the left is too distracted on the way race, class 
and gender intersect and so has neglected the white working class voters.  They want the 
left to ditch what they call ‘identity politics' and return to focusing primarily on class.

In practise because they want to talk about class without centering how it is intersected 
by race and gender they end up focusing on the interests of largest segment of the US 
working class, white males, and treating those interests as typical rather than sectional. 
  Far from creating unity this approach creates division as the fault lines imposed by 
white supremacist patriarchal capitalism reassert themselves.  More on this later.

It's this set of arguments from what I characterise as the Nostalgic Left that I address 
here.  This piece isn't about  who is to ‘blame' for the Trump victory.  As an anarchist I 
wouldn't have voted for Hillary even if she wasn't such an establishment candidate so I've 
no interest in finding excuses for her failure to get elected.  It's clear there were 
multiple reasons for this, those who try to present it as a simple single factor story 
tend to be those who are seeking excuses on the one hand and hammers to batter their 
opponents with on the other.

Even in Democratic Party terms looking across the recent elections it's very clear the 
reason she wasn't elected was that 4 million people who found something to vote for in 
Obama in 2008 did not find the same in Clinton.  It's not hard to see why that might be, 
in 2008 Obama mobilised people on the promise that things were going to be better, Clinton 
mostly said things were already OK and relied on the horror of Trump to mobilise the vote. 
  Trump marginally increased the Republican party vote, the number of additional voters he 
mobilised mostly being wiped out by the drop in the republican white women vote.

We can certainly say that the calculated gamble that the orientation the Democratic Party 
once had to industrial workers could be dropped and replaced by appeals for an identity 
plus ‘decency' based vote didn't work out. But to a large extent this wasn't a tactical 
decision, Clinton's neoliberalism was at the center of her politics and the central plank 
of neoliberalism in the US was the sacrifice of relatively well paid blue collar jobs. 
Clinton made rhetorical statements about defending such jobs as part of her election 
campaign but no one could take that seriously.  She was widely and correctly understood as 
the Wall Street candidate.  The only remarkable aspect is the possibility that Trump's 
similar promises were taken seriously by some workers, but perhaps that is more a measure 
of desperation than anything else.

Both the main candidates were so unconvincing that a fair few people went to the voting 
stations, voted on referendums or local elections and then just didn't vote at all for 
president.  In the key state of Michigan MSNBC Morning Joe reported that 90,000 voters 
left the presidential slot blank on their ballots.  And in the rustbelt most of the drop 
in the Democratic vote in comparison with 2012 saw a possibly equivalent rise in the vote 
for the third party candidates with the right wing Libertarian Party in effect offering an 
opposition to trade deals not coupled to Trump's racism.

The Democratic party hoped that Trump was so terrible that who they saw as ‘their voters' 
would turn out to vote for their less terrible candidate.  They lost the election because 
too many of those voters either stayed at home or voted third party.  Across the country 
there was a massive increase in the 3d party vote from 2 million in 2012 to close to 7 
million in 2016, indeed in percentage increase terms the 3rd parties had a fantastic day 
with a trebling of their vote.

My interest here is also not to discover what best predicted whether or not someone would 
vote for Trump.  For the curious the Economist has looked at this and it appears that the 
answer is poor health, even when controlled for obvious related factors like age.

The key question under examination here is what was the extent and nature of Trump's 
working class vote.  The nature of the vote is my key interest and to measure that we will 
look at what opinions did that section of voters espouse on questions that span the 
progressive V reactionary divide?

How big was the Trump working class vote?

Who were these people who voted for Trump?  And more importantly what proportion of the 
working class are we talking about?

We can try to answer that question using the data available in the exit polls that asked 
voters a wide range of questions about their circumstances and their attitudes.  I use the 
CNN presentation of the Edison exit poll data  below.  The same Edison data was used by 
the New York Times and a number of other major news sites.  For these purposes it doesn't 
matter that the exit polls failed to predict the result, its enough they were right within 
a couple of percent.

As with the Ashcroft vote poll taken during the Brexit vote we face the frustration that 
the exact questions we'd want are seldom asked so we have to make do with less precise 
approximations.  The class positions of voters is particularly tough to capture but with 
the CNN poll the most useful indicator is how much voters earn and in particular the 
0-50k, 50-100k and above 100k brackets.

Some left sources have used whether or not someone has a college degree to assign class 
but I don't think that is as useful as income, not only because workers these days often 
have college degrees but also because older bosses of small and medium business often do 
not, even in 2003 almost half of managers didn't have degrees.  In that 2003 US census 
only 10% of those who were in the 25-29 age bracket in 1960 had college degrees, by the 
time of the survey nearly 30% in that bracket at that age did.  Since Trump's voters were 
very weighed towards voters over 45 this effect will be magnified further.  College 
degrees in that age group are very rare.

That fact that across the board Trump did worse among those earning less than 50k 
subdivision of those earning less than 100k is further evidence that having a college 
degree does not map as well onto class as some have assumed.  If it did we would see the 
reverse of that trend as those under 50k are less likely to have degrees.  Income provides 
a far better approximation as few workers earn over 100k and few medium and high level 
managers or business owners earn below it.

A very detailed study that looked at incomes and education levels in comparison with how 
counties voted indicates that the Trump vote was predicted by low levels of education as 
distinct from low levels of income. That is that relatively high formal education but low 
income counties voted Clinton while high income but low formal education counties voted 
for Trump. /  High income but low education Suffolk county, New York swung strongly for 
Trump (average income 88,000) but 22 low income, high education counties with average 
earnings of less than 50,000 swung to Clinton.

Of those voters earning under 100k only 45% said they voted for Trump, of those earning 
less than 50k his vote dropped to 41%.  If we take that 100k/45% Trump voter segment this 
calculates his 62 million voters into 40 million that on income terms might be called 
working class, this is 64.7% of his voters. This is crude, there are certainly small 
business owners who earn less than 100k and some workers who earn more than this.  But as 
an approximation of class positions it is the best available and tells us that no more 
than 40 million workers voted for Trump.  While there are certainly managers and small 
business owners who earn less than that there are very few workers who earn more.

About 185 million adults are in households earning less than 100k so the Trump 40 million 
working class vote was about 22% of the working class in the US, slightly more than one 
worker in five.

Right away this figure on its own shows why a left concentration on winning over those who 
voted for Trump would be a mistake,  Why focus on the 22% of the working class that voted 
Trump rather than the 78% of the working class who did not?

How reactionary were Trump working class voters?

But this ‘left' strategy gets worse when we dig deeper.  Being working class doesn't 
automatically result in progressive attitudes, if it did we'd have won long ago, the 
working class is always the majority in the pyramid scheme that is capitalism.  There are 
no shortage of working class reactionaries either scheming to get ahead in life by taking 
advantage of others or prone to scapegoating other more marginalised people for the real 
barriers they face.  22% is not a very big segment, in fact it's small enough that it 
could almost entirely be composed of reactionaries, those who are the hardest and least 
likely to be won over.

There has been a lot of online speculation with those most inclined to put a silver lining 
on the Trump vote arguing that a lot of his working class voters were really voting 
against trade deals or the establishment.  One measure of people voting for Trump despite 
what he has said and done is people who voted for him even though his treatment of women 
bothered them.   The exit poll tells us almost half, 27 million, of Trumps 62 million 
voters were bothered by his treatment of women but still voted for him.  So if we were 
just talking of misogyny there'd be an argument to entertain that half the working class 
Trump voted had done a bad thing against their better instincts.

Is this also true of his racism - did a lot of the ‘white working class' who voted for 
Trump did so despite his racism? Or did they vote for him because they agreed with it, as 
an assertion of a need to ‘Make America great Again' by enhancing the privileges expected 
from white supremacy?

A theoretical case can be made that because he said so many contradictory things he left 
space for people who saw themselves as progressives to self-justify what was actually a 
vote for racism.   Listening to Trump by Christian Parenti provides a useful reading of 
the contradictions he provided in his speeches that might have allowed some to decide his 
racism wasn't to be taken seriously.

At this point a lot of the left falls back on anecdote to prove their case.  There are 
many many anecdotal accounts of Trump voters as unhappy but otherwise progressive blue 
collar workers or on the other hand as deep seated racists.  My impression is that the 
best predictor as to which anecdotes any particular author relates is determined by their 
pre-existing approach to the intersections of class and race.  I'll look in more detail at 
some of this anecdotal material later but it's clear that the stories of a few dozens 
votes among millions can't answer the question as to what the nature of Trumps white 
working class support was.

It's also the case that probably both stories are at least somewhat true, that's why both 
sets of anecdotes exist.  But we can do better than that statement, we can actually get a 
pretty good impression as to what extent Trump voters were straight up racists and to what 
extent some may have been people willing to sacrifice more marginalised people in the hope 
of economic advantage.  The exit poll of people who voted included responses which tend to 
place people very firmly in the progressive or reactionary camp.

As an example 26% of voters described themselves as ‘white born-again or evangelical 
christian?' From the Reagan years on in particular = these categories form the religious 
base of a range of reactionary politics in the US, in particular in relation to abortion 
and LGBT issues.  81% of those voters went for Trump. Unfortunately unlike the Ashcroft 
Brexit exit poll the questions as published by CNN aren't also cross referenced against 
other responses. So we can't see what percentage of people earning less than 100k went 
with each answer. But for the most part the Trump V Clinton differences in response is of 
such huge magnitudes that this wouldn't change the story told. Incidentally I'd love to 
examine that breakdown if anyone reading this happens to have access to the data.

View of building a wall along the entire mexican border

Take Trump's plan to build a wall along the entire Mexican border, it would be very hard 
to see anyone who supported such a scheme as being progressive. They clearly would be hard 
people to win over to a socialist view of the world.  In fact 41% of those voting said 
they supported the wall and a massive 86% of these voters voted for Trump.  That 41% is 55 
million voters, 47 million of whom were Trump voters.

If their spread across his vote is not affected by class then 64.7% or 30 million of his 
40 million working class voters support the wall, leaving only 10 million working class 
Trump voters who don't support the wall or didn't respond.  10 million is a little over 5% 
of the US working class.  There are more undocumented migrants, about 11.4 million, than 
working class Trump voters who do not favour building the wall.  If the left is going to 
listen to the concerns of the working class which bloc should we prioritise?

This illustrates another major problem with the ‘forgotten white working class' left 
narrative, the inbuilt tendency to not see other sections of the working class so that the 
interests of the working class as a whole somehow become represented behind the figure of 
a white male worker who is taken as typical.  Undocumented migrants are overwhelmingly 
going to be working class, in 2007 their median household income was 36,000.   A later 
study published in 2013 estimated average undocumented migrant household income earnings 
state by state as averages from 23,000 for Kentucky to 44,000 for Alaska.

Deportation of undocumented immigrants working in the u.s.

A related question was whether these undocumented migrants already working in the US 
should be given legal status or deported.  25% of voters wanted them deported and 84% of 
these voters opted for Trump.  So that's 33 million voters wanting deportation and 28 
million of these being Trump supporters.  This would translate into 18 million of those 40 
million working class Trump voters leaving 22 million working class Trump voters who are 
not openly racist on this issue.  In this case that's about 12% of the working class.

Does the country's criminal justice system treat black people fairly

43% of voters thought that the criminal justice system treats all equally which is 58 
million.  74% of these were Trump voters, which is 43 million.  In this case 28 million of 
his 40 million working class felt all were treated equally by the criminal justice system, 
that at a time when police shooting and the #BlackLivesMatter protests have made the 
alternative viewpoint very visible.  Again the number of working class Trump voters 
willing to recognise that the criminal justice system might be a tiny bit racist, 12 
million, is roughly the same as the number of undocumented migrants.

Should the next president be more conservative

Perhaps most directly 48% of voters thought the next president after Obama should be more 
conservative and 83% off these opted for Trump.  That's 64 million voters, 53 million of 
whom voted for Trump and 34 million of whom were probably working class voters.  That 
leaves a rather tiny 6 million working class Trump voters who do not want a more 
conservative president, just about 3% of the US working class.  There are 2 workers facing 
deportation under a Trump presidency for every potential working class Trump voter who 
didn't want a more conservative president.

Voters could also respond to that question saying they wanted a more liberal president. 
Only 17%, the equivalent of 22 million did but it is interesting that 23% of these were 
Trump voters.  This is probably the most direct measure provided of how many ‘progressive' 
Trump voters there were who voted for him despite his racism & sexism, there were a little 
over 5 million of them total and the working class component would have been a little over 
3 million.  Three million is a lot of people but it's also not even 2% of the US working 
class.

Should the Trump voting working class really be our priority?

This really doesn't leave much space for a left intervention directed at working class 
Trump voters as most of them are ideologically hostile to progressive politics. They are 
not progressives who voted for him despite his racism, they overwhelmingly agreed with his 
racism.

When sections of the left tell us we can't assume all white working class Trump voters are 
racists they can't be talking of those who want to build the wall or support mass 
deportations.  So at best there appear to be 3-12% of the working class population of the 
US who voted for someone putting forward racist policies on grounds of economic self 
interest but may not have agreed with his racism.  Yet a growing cacophony of voices on 
what I've called the Nostalgic Left insists that in order to win this section over the 
rest of the left has to abandon any major focus on other sections of the working class, 
including the equally sized segment that Trump was promising to deport!

It's a minor aside but the Trump voting segment of the working class may also be the 
hardest demographic for the left to reach.  As we've seen they are disportionately of 
retirement age meaning they are not even clustered in workplaces but they are also not in 
the cities.  Only 16 million of Trumps voters lived in the cities as against 14 million in 
rural areas even though twice as many people live in the cities in the US.  Most people 
leave in suburbs which are very often very segregated and most of Trumps voters were in 
the suburbs, 33 of the 62 million.

Much of rural America is very, very white and in that context the rural v urban divide in 
the vote provides a somewhat positive message.   Trumps proportionally far larger rural 
vote may well indicate how much easier it is to sacrifice the interests of your fellow 
workers of colour when you don't actually know many of them.  In the cities, where workers 
were more likely to know those facing the racist reality of a Trump victory, it appears 
they were much less likely to ignore that cost to others in the hope of benefit for 
themselves.  This is a common pattern in other countries where the far right vote tends to 
concentrate in areas where migrants are few or very recent.

This may also explain the strong link between low levels of formal education and voting 
for Trump.  Higher level education institutions tend to be relatively diverse and often if 
you live in a rural area but have a degree this means you moved to a city in the past to 
obtain it.  So rather than voting for Trump being a measure of stupidity, the liberal 
assumption from the education figures, it may instead once more illustrate that it's much 
easier to sacrifice people you've never had any contact with in your own self interest 
than those you've studied beside.

Was the rust belt different?

The left has paid the vast majority of its electoral analysis attention to the ‘rust belt' 
states and especially the ex coal mining belt of West Virginia. In part because some of 
this area swung the electoral college vote for Trump and in part because it provides the 
most fuel for the idea of an otherwise progressive ‘white working class' that opted for 
Trump.  Indeed when you dig into the numbers it's very likely that this very small group 
nationally was concentrated in these areas and may well have given him the election in the 
key swing states.

Here the Republican vote increased in real terms (elsewhere it was pretty flat) and the 
Democratic Party vote fell further than elsewhere.  This has been interpreted as white 
workers who were willing to vote for Obama - sometimes presented as proof they are not 
hard core racists -  switching to vote for Trump. The asserted reason is that he opposes 
the trade deals that are blamed for decimating well paid employment in the rust belt or 
opposes the climate change legislation that has greatly reduced coal production.

But while this is a plausible story that can be constructed from the numbers it's not the 
only one.  For the most part the claim is made on the basis of previously Obama voting 
counties switching to Trump as if this was the equivalent of Obama voters switching. While 
it's true the Democratic vote decreased and the Republican vote increased this doesn't 
necessarily mean this was people switching from Obama to Trump.  It could also be Obama 
voters staying at home while Trump energised a set of racists who didn't vote last time 
around.

A close examination of the state by state exit polls in comparison with the national polls 
might provide clues.  Do the rust belt states have a higher proportion of self described 
liberals voting Trump or union families voting Trump?  Do Trump voters there have a better 
opinion of Obama?  I had a peak at Ohio  and the answers on what voters thought of Obama 
seem too close to the national average to favour the switching story.  There is however 
more hostility to international trade 48% saying it took away jobs against 42% nationally. 
  Another important difference is that while nationally 51% of union households voted for 
Clinton in Ohio it was only 42% with Trump taking 54%.   Both these might indicate some 
Obama last time voters switching to Trump.

In the closest measure of what would actually be switchers 12% of voters in Ohio who 
identified as Democratic Party said they had voted for Trump as against 9% nationally. For 
comparison purposes the reverse republicans who voted for Hilary was 8%.  In Pennsylvania 
it was 11% Democrats for Trump with 9% of Republicans flipping to Hilary.  In Michigan 9% 
and 7%.  These aren't the huge percentages differences like those we saw for building the 
wall or deporting migrants but they aren't insignificant and because they are in what 
because the swing states may have decided the election.

In the Ohio case where 23% of the voters were from union households this resolves to about 
1.2 million union householders voting of whom just under 650,000 voted for Trump, 130,000 
more than expected from the national average.  This is not a large number in a voter 
turnout of 5 million but Trump only took Ohio by 400,000 so 650,000 union household votes 
would have been enough to give it to him.

Ohio is the example where the union household Trump vote was at its greatest in percentage 
terms.  Where the responses to the union household question was reported on by CNN in 
other rust belt states Trump lost.  On the income measure Trump won amongst voters earning 
more than 100k in all five states and generally lost or at best drew with those earning 
less than 100k so even in the rust belt working class voters did not give a majority to him.

Generally across the 5 rust belt states the Democratic party did lose close on 2 million 
working class votes in comparison with 2012 but many of these votes may have gone 3rd 
party or abstained rather than to Trump. The Myth of the Rust Belt Revolt looked in detail 
at the numbers.  The small increase in the republican working class vote may include those 
who had previously voted for Obama but it's also likely to be made up of of energised 
racists and misogynists who hadn't voted last time but got out to vote this time.  There 
isn't strong data for the story that huge numbers of ‘white working class' voters switched 
from Obama to Trump.

A final note on this, the argument that someone isn't racist because they voted for Obama 
last time isn't a very strong argument.  Yes it indicates they are probably not a card 
carrying, hood wearing, KKK racist but having voted once for a black man isn't a magic 
‘not a racist' card.  It's promotion by some on the left to excuse the Trump vote is no 
more than a update of the old ‘I'm not a racist but..' to ‘I voted for Obama but ..'  In 
fact ‘I'm not a racist but I voted for Trump' sounds like a ready made self-justification 
that many will hear at their family Thanksgiving dinner this year in the mouths of their 
relatives who they know to be a little bit racist.

Beware the power of anecdote

Journalistic anecdotal stories of the election do a lot to shape people's understanding of 
what happened. By this I mean those countless pieces where a journalist goes somewhere and 
reports on what they are seeing and what they've been told.  The problem with over 
emphasising these as a source is that journalists will tend to write about the most 
interesting story they can find.  And interesting stories by definition are those that are 
unusual and at the extremes, so the opposite of being representative.  A republican who 
has always voted republican and voted Trump this time makes for a poor headline grabber in 
comparison with a life long democratic party voter who voted Trump this time.  Read that 
story enough times and it becomes proof of mass defections rather than what it is, the 
individual stories of some tens of voters in 135 million.

It is worth noting how many of the white working class people who voted Trump are 
described either as of retirement age or a bit younger but still described as retired 
because they are unlikely to find the sort of work they previously did.  As with Brexit 
Trump's election relied on the votes of those at and around retirement.

Coal mining country-  McDowell county

The anecdotal approach is all the more powerful if rather than an individual the story can 
be about an entire geographic division.  And sometimes with the smaller subdivisions you 
find results that do seem to reflect the Democratic voters becoming Trump voters 
interpretation.  The most convincing one I‘ve found is for McDowell county, the 
southernmost county of West Virginia.

McDowell County is coal mining land which means, as with most coal mining regions in the 
global north, it's story is of huge numbers of  once well paid if dangerous jobs vanishing 
to be replaced with poverty, unemployment and alienation.  The fossil fuel industry has 
done a powerful PR job in blaming this on Climate protection laws although the reality is 
that by the time any climate protection with teeth was introduced employment had already 
been devastated by automation and related new technologies to the extent that renewable 
energy tends to offer considerably more employment, but not in the same places or for the 
same people.  Under neoliberalism the old mining communities were more or less abandoned.

McDowell County is typical of this story, the population peaked at 100,000 in 1950 but 
with the collapse of coal mining the population has also collapsed to only 20% of that 
peak.  There is large scale unemployment with over  1/3  of the population below the 
poverty line and the 2nd lowest male life expectancy of any county in the US at 63.5 years.

In McDowell 2600 people voted in the Democratic Party primaries as opposed to only 860 in 
the Republican one but in the election itself the Trump/republican vote was just under 75% 
of the total.  The story of Democratic voters switching appears all the stronger when you 
dig into the detail of the primary and see Saunders won the democratic primary by a very 
large margin indeed he had double the vote for Trump in the republican primary.

It gets a bit more complex though once you dig further into the story.  The Democratic 
Party vote has declined election by election and the county flipped not in 2016 but back 
in 2012 when the vote went 64% republican.  Trump did add 10% to the republican share but 
in the context of a very low turnout of 36%.

In 2012 2086 votes went to Obama, in 2016 this was just under 1429 to Clinton so there are 
600 ‘missing' votes to allocate. The Libertarian Party candidate Johnson got 90 which is 
perhaps some of those were the ‘missing' 600 democratic party votes, the rest are 
therefore Democrats who stayed at home and Democrats who voted Trump.

At least 1100 of those who voted in the Democratic party primary didn't vote Democrat in 
the election, did lots of Sanders voters opt for Trump in the hope of restoring employment 
or did they stay at home?  As Sanders got 1488 primary votes to Hillary's 817 and together 
that's 86% of primary votes cast if you want to go with the Democrats voting Trump 
interpretation it has to mostly be Sanders voting Democrats switching to Trump for the 
election.  Trump was promising to get coal mining going so a common left interpretation 
(often from afar) is that this is proof of an otherwise progressive working class voting 
for Trump on economic grounds.

There are two problems with the story.  The first is that while McDowell used to be the 
heart of mining country today almost no one works in the industry, both because of 
closures and because modern mining no longer requires huge numbers of workers.  The second 
is that Sanders wasn't promising to reopen the mines.  An anarchist familiar with the area 
told me it was much more likely that gun control was the key difference between Sanders 
and Clinton and the key common ground between Sanders and Trump. Unusually for the 
Democratic Party Sanders does not favour major restriction on gun ownership, he is elected 
from Vermont which is a rural state with a high rate of gun ownership and during the 
primaries Clinton repeatedly attacked him on just this issue.   The story of white workers 
voting for the racist because they wanted to hold onto their guns is likely to have less 
purchase for a left seeking an ignored ‘white working class.'

Can the left win over Trump voters?

At this point it's useful to remind readers that the purpose of this piece is not to give 
advice to the Democratic Party or to answer a ‘what Clinton should have done' question. If 
it was then the nature of the winner takes all college system means the small percentages 
of rust belt workers might have been enough to tip the vote if Clinton had orientated 
towards their concerns.  But that's not my interest, my interest is whether they formed a 
large enough segment of the working class to take seriously the argument that listening to 
their concerns should be the primary concern for the left. My conclusion is no, for every 
worker who voted for Trump holding their nose to his racism there were four that embraced 
that racism but far more importantly 15 that didn't vote for Trump, most of whom stayed at 
home.  In numbers and attitude it makes far more sense to concentrate on that last group 
rather than sifting through the Trump tailings hoping for the gleam of the occasional 
overlooked progressive proletarian nugget.

There are some nuggets there so that said it makes sense for the left to make use of 
opportunities to win Trump voters over in the course of struggle.  In particular if you 
are already living in smalltown USA it's possible you will have little choice other than 
to focus on and win Trump votes in order to build anything that can last.  In the past 
white supremacy coupled with a ‘red-scare' has been very successful at smashing working 
class organisation which hadn't inoculated itself against the reassertion of white privilege.

In particular workers with some reactionary opinions are often rapidly moved left if they 
are involved in strikes or other struggles that involve conflict with capital.  So I'm 
certainly not presenting these numbers to argue against using making use of such 
opportunities, where and when they arise.  Nor am I arguing against supporting comrades 
already living in areas where Trump voters are concentrated or working alongside them in 
their efforts to erode what is at best an indifference to racism.

The British film Pride provides an excellent example of how struggle can shift opinions 
radically.. If you haven't watched it make sure to do so but essentially it's about how 
during their 1984 protracted strike ‘Lesbians & Gays Support the Miners' overcame 
homophobic attitudes amongst British miners to the level that Miners unions banners were 
subsequently sent to Pride marches.

But this was in the context of a titanic class struggle where the state was openly 
battering the miners off the streets week after week during their year long strike.  And 
the media was publishing ludicrous hit piece after ludicrous hit piece on them. An 
experience that it would be almost impossible to go through without questioning all 
repressive aspects of the society around you and being open to anyone expressing 
solidarity.  That sort of opportunity to challenge preconceptions though solidarity in 
struggle at that scale is exceptional.  Finally while British coal miner in the 1980s may 
not have started off with great views of the LGBT community it's not like they were open 
reactionaries across a range of issues in the manner of Trump voters.  Finally those who 
were hardened reactionaries were where the ranks of those who scabbed on the strike were 
initially drawn from.

Outside such struggles how do those on the left advocating ‘take the concerns white 
working class Trump voters seriously' see it working out.  Our plan after all can't start 
with ‘Trigger a massive year long strike with multiple police attacks on workers and a 
transparent media conspiracy against them'.  Would the strategy be sending college 
students from the cities to the rural areas to leaflet the houses of the workers in their 
50's and 60's who voted for Trump?  It's very hard to see that delivering very much, 
indeed it could very well be counter productive.

The marxist concept of ‘false consciousness' is a barrier here as it often results in the 
idea that all that is needed is to expose such workers to reality to dispel these ideas. 
In fact white supremacy ties them into reproducing our racist reality because historically 
it rewards them in ways that are not just economic. What was the America Trump wanted to 
make ‘Great again'?

The cost of winning over Trump voters?

I am presenting the figures above to say a strategy of seeking out and convincing working 
class  Trump voters would be an enormous waste of resources that could much better be used 
to convince and organise the 240 million who did not vote for him.  And further that a 
Trump voter outreach strategy would be very very vulnerable to making compromises that 
would re-enforce the very problem of white supremacy and misogyny that helped him win the 
election in the first place.  Beyond that a left that puts that section of the working 
class in the centre of its messaging will rightly lose everyone else.

As I concluded from my analysis of the similar Brexit vote the figures do not support 
returning to some sort of leftism centred on the feelings of the ‘white working class' and 
unhindered by the considerations of ‘identity politics'.  This false lesson is being 
promoted by the same sections of the left, what I've called the nostalgic left, who spun 
the same message out of Brexit.  The disaster that is Trump was precisely born in part 
from the encouragement of resentment among the white working class, a sense that they were 
doing badly because those who once ‘knew their place' were doing well.

His campaign slogan ‘Make America Great Again' suggested a greatness located when exactly 
in a society that is only one generation removed from legally enforced racial segregation? 
  By re-enforcing white supremacy Trump may well deliver some gains for some sections of 
the ‘white working class' - if everyone else gets kicked downwards or deported then the 
sense of at least being at the front of the line once more will be restored.

The #alllivesmatter and #notallmen sections of the white working class need to be 
challenged and if need be isolated rather than normalised.  Certainly reactionary workers 
don't like being called racists but even more the rest of the working don't want to be 
subjected to racism.
We can't go forward together on the basis of some economic unity that involves turning a 
blind eye to white supremacy, misogyny and homophobia.  And at its crudest this is what 
the Nostalgic left argument amounts to,  for an example that will make you cringe see the 
Mother Jones article see ‘Let's be careful with the white supremacy label.'

This isn't to say all tactical nuance should be abandoned.  On the one to one and small 
group level very often there is space and time to spend moving fellow workers without 
jumping straight into confrontation. But in many other circumstances, in particular where 
there are large audiences, rapidly calling out racist ideas for what they are is an 
essential part of isolating those trying to normalise them.  Yes sometimes people are 
repeating racist myths out of ignorance and can be dissuaded but sometimes they are not 
and it's a conscious strategy that can rapidly do harm.
.
What has to be rejected is the idea at the mass level that the left backs away from 
confronting prejudice in the interest of preserving what we have historically then found 
to be a weak class unity that lasts only as long as the high tide of struggle.  That 
section of white workers who decided it was OK to vote for Trump on the grounds of 
economic self interest, even though his campaign was built on hate of people who don't 
look like them, were not just terrible human beings, they also betrayed their class. After 
all a scab also chooses their own economic self interest above that of their fellow 
workers and their class.  The momentary and hidden betrayal in the privacy of the ballot 
box can't carry the lasting emotional impact of watching someone cross a picket line day 
after day but it's still a betrayal that destroys the very class solidarity we need to build.

The changing nature of the working class

Fundamentally the position advanced by the nostalgic left that we have to focus on the 
concerns of ‘the neglected white working class' has to be rejected.  It has to be rejected 
because it is factually wrong but it also has to be rejected because it in no way can 
build class solidarity when it's historic role is to destroy it.  Focusing on the 
particular grievances of white workers is how the capitalist class created and maintained 
working class divisions.

For the working class to win it has to come together as a class despite the very real 
divisions in a common struggle to overthrow capitalism.   That sort of unity demands a 
solidarity that is not restricted to those who look like us but that extends to everyone 
in the working class.  In particular while white workers might well be the largest bloc in 
the US  unity of the entire class can't be built around the interests of the largest bloc. 
  All the more so where there exists a long and deep history of the concerns of that bloc 
being deployed to undermine class unity through white supremacy.

Those sections of the left that have tended in practise to assume the interests of white 
workers stand in for the working class as a whole need to abandon that practise.  This 
means getting away from an outdated approach that saw the working class vanguard as being 
that core of white male skilled workers located in the industralised belts of the planet. 
What became the rust belt in the US and the European equivalent, the Blue Banana running 
from North West England through Alsace, the Rhineland and Switzerland to Northern Italy.

That section of the working class had considerable trade union strength principally 
because before automation incredible numbers of workers were concentrated under very 
similar conditions in a few workplaces. Ford's biggest factory concentration at the Rouge 
Complex once employed 100,000 workers, today although it's still has the largest plant 
Ford plant but it only employs 6,000.  The car assembly plants in particular were hotbeds 
of worker radicalism before the replacement of most of those workers by robots. 
Historically they were the ‘low hanging fruit' for a union movement which could recruit 
large numbers at relatively low cost.  But while that sort of focused organising did win 
real wage improvements for that section and some of that trickled down to other workers 
when it came to bigger struggles about the nature of society those sections proved to 
isolated too win.  Even if at times like the British miners strike they put up incredible 
fights.

At the end of the 1960s and into the 1970s these huge concentrations of workers led many 
left organisations in the US to adopt ‘into the factory' strategies. Under these they sent 
a lot of their members into the Detroit car plants in particular in order to try and 
radicalise large concentrations of workers whose working conditions already gave them 
power in confrontations with capital.  This paid large dividends in the short term with 
Detroit becoming a hotbed of radicalism but in the medium and long term it isolated the 
left and capital was able to move the factories to the anti-union southern states.

‘Identity politics' in the good old days of industrial struggle

It's worth pointing out that this organising was not as the nostalgic left appear to 
imagine free of ‘identity politics'.  Mass migration of both black and white workers from 
the south and racist hiring practises meant the car plants, the unions and the communities 
where the workers lived were dominated not just by pure economic struggles but also by the 
need to organise against white supremacy.  At its height this saw a wave of wildcat 
strikes largely organised by black workers and opposed by a white union leadership in 1969 
and in 1970 to the formation of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers.

In 2008 I spent a couple of days being shown around Detroit by an anarchist who had been 
active in the early 1970s.  As well as telling me of the strength of the left he talked of 
the strength of the white supremacists of that period,  often in the organised form of the 
KKK and the battles that took place when black families moved into white communities. 
Hundreds of racist pipe bombings of black family homes took place as the white 
supremacists fought to maintain segregation, sometimes with significant local support from 
white workers.  I visited many of the major rust belt cities on that trip, staying with 
and talking to anarchists in each of them so the idea that there was a significant racist 
presence in the white working class wasn't news.

Indeed for all the hatred the Nostalgic left has of the Intersectional left any 
examination of US history shows that ‘Identity politics' developed out of the shortcomings 
of the left they are nostalgic for.  The left's failure in that period led to defeat of 
the working class in the Reagan period as he mobilised white supremacy as a counter weight 
to the influence of the left and the unions.  Regan expressed that through the ‘war on 
drugs' and a generalised panic about crime.  The later development of the intersectional 
left is an attempt to put the pieces back together in a way that tackles white supremacy 
from the onset, rather than leaving it as a rotten foundation which will later bring down 
any new building.

The old (‘white') working class identity a barrier to the ones we need

In any case conditions have changed, the mass factory where thousands or tens of thousands 
of workers carrying out near identical tasks have been abolished by automation where much 
smaller numbers carry out more differentiated work.  In the traditional core this process 
has almost been complete at the level where tiny fractions of previously mass workforces 
produce as much steel or as many cars as hundreds of times more workers did in the past. 
Elsewhere, particularly in ultra low wage economies, mass factories still exist but the 
left that is concerned with the interests of the ‘white working class' has not uprooted 
itself to the garment factories of Indonesia.

The working class in most of the global north and in particular the USA today is 
incredibly diverse and at the same time very fragmented in terms of workplaces and 
practises.  This is not going to be overcome through Nostalgic left call's that amount to 
recentering the white male industrial worker of the past.  There is a need for the 
creation of a new class identity, a class identity that contains many identities. The 
needs exists because the revolutionary transformation of society requires that we move 
from a position where we are objectively workers because of our relationship to the means 
of production to where we also define ourselves as working class because of our common 
networks of solidarity & struggle. The networks create that identity and in turn the 
identity creates the networks. We already are workers but forging common identities as 
workers does not automatically arise from that, it has to be created, just as it was in 
the past.

We need to once more become aware of ourselves not as a stale throwback to a rose tinted 
past but as the present reality, a reality in opposition to the rulers whether they be the 
neo far-right around Trump or the neo-liberal elite around Clinton.  Those identities will 
be forged where class exploitation intersects with the myriad of oppressions both the 
neoliberal and far-right false choices inflict on us, not just today but across our shared 
history.

It will be forged in opposition to much of that history, a history where as often as not 
they used the tools of white supremacy and misogyny to ensure some of us could be 
persuaded to police the rest.  Those who would act as police have always been amongst us, 
the attitudes of the 22% of the working class that voted Trump reveal many of them to be 
in that category.  Indeed in a literal sense Trump obtained the backing of police and 
prison warden organisations.  There are a million police officers and half a million 
prison officers in the US almost all of whom would earn under 100k.

The answer to Trumpism and the equivalent far right forces unleashed by Brexit and festing 
across Europe is not a return to the neoliberal status quo.   That status quo was killing 
us slowly through climate change and ruled over a society where police killings of black 
men were routine and deportations were escalating, Obama almost managed to deport three 
million people, more than any other US president and part of a pattern of escalation that 
Trump will certainly build on.

What we need is a coming together to tear down what has been and what they are trying to 
bring into being.  There is a new world in our hearts and if for now a shadow has fallen 
over our dreams we have the power to banish it through solidarity and struggle.

Words: Andrew Flood ( Follow Andrew on Twitter)

Headline image: Modified from photo by Noopy420 (Own work)[CC BY-SA 4.0 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0)], via Wikimedia Commons

Related Link: http://www.wsm.ie/c/about-workers-solidarity-movement

Working class Trump wall voters as part of total working class

Working class Trump more liberal next president voters as part of total working class

http://www.anarkismo.net/article/29827

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