World Europe Search and rescue in the Mediterranean… a.k.a. the militarisation of migration‏

http://www.x-pressed.org/?xpd_article=search-and-rescue-in-the-mediterranean-a-k-a-the-militarisation-of-migration

Author: Anna Papoutsi 

Search and rescue in the Mediterranean… a.k.a. the militarisation of
migration

Cartoon by Rainer Hachfeld, 2011

An interview with Apostolis Fotiadis, freelance journalist and author of
the book “Border Merchants”

In only one week more than 1,200 migrants drowned in the Mediterranean,
thus bringing the total number of the officially registered deaths from
the beginning of the year to 1,750. In other words, within four months
the number of casualties is already half of that of 2014, which was a
record year so far. How do you explain this rapid growth?
Statistically speaking, this can be explained by the political
developments of the last year or even less, of the last nine months,
particularly since Italy and the EU made an agreement replacing an
operation aimed to rescue in the Mediterranean region with another,
whose priority is to control the external borders. The absence of forces
that previously made a difference by saving loads of people has been the
main reason for this statistical increase. Overall, this is a manifested
dynamic within the EU and its institutions which is trying to block the
expansion of search and rescue, with the argument that it functions as a
pull factor for migratory flows to Europe.
In the book, you explore this turn of the European migration policy from
search and rescue towards the security doctrine. On the occasion of the
latest deadly shipwreck off the coast of Libya, this shift is clearly
reflected in the joint statement of the emergency summit of April 23.
Can you summarise the published action plan in this context?
The image of the last summit pertains to something that has happened
again in the past, following the first big shipwreck south of Lampedusa
in October 2013. The European leaders then addressed the tragedy with
the same humanitarian discourse, whereas, behind the scenes, they
promoted a policy that could be described as security doctrine and whose
result is the militarisation of the region. The recent summit has
similar characteristics. While originally and during the time leading up
to the summit, the EU leaders spoke about human tragedies and EU
responsibilities, in the 10 points of the Action Plan that resulted from
the Summit, as it was published by the European Commission, one sees
that neither rescue operations nor any other measure, such as the
opening of legal crossings to Europe for those who want to get here and
ask for protection, were adopted. Conversely, one sees that measures
pushing towards the opposite direction are regularly introduced. It is
impressive, for example, that the word ‘rescue’ does not appear anywhere
in the text of the Commission, as published following the summit, while
various measures related to the externalisation doctrine, ie the
tendency to push migration flows outside the EU limits of liability –key
project of the conservative forces this moment– are strongly present in
the action plan.
As you have just described, it is now clear that the EU’s target is to
externalise its border control. Indisputably, in practice this is
already happening: essentially through bilateral agreements, in exchange
for funds and other incentives, usually under the guise of education and
technology transfer, our neighbouring countries exert border control on
behalf of Europe, doing effectively the ‘dirty work’. What is the
rationale behind the externalisation of borders and what are the risks
that this implies?
The logic of externalisation exists also in an intra-European level, ie
between the member-states, and it is manifested mainly through the
philosophy of the Dublin Regulation – not so much the Regulation itself.
It is a regulation which would ideally externalise the responsibility
for the management of asylum-seekers to the country of entry, ie to the
countries of the south. On a second level, externalisation exists
between the EU and third countries. This is a word which has often
become pertinent during the last 15 years. So, there is the historical
precedent. Currently, it becomes very relevant again because, in the
minds of those making policy –conservative policy– for the external
borders and migration, it gradually becomes evident something very
specific: that the entire infrastructure of the European migration
policy, which has been based on the European Pact for Migration and
Asylum from 2008 onwards, is virtually unable to follow the
developments. That Pact created an infrastructure that would manage
mixed flows and would return populations outside the EU, leaving only a
small proportion of those entitled to protection inside to be managed.
But condition have changed since 2008, when there was no Arab Spring,
there was no Middle East crisis, nor the Syrian war– and, thus, the
system now is faced with almost purely refugee flows. Therefore, the
externalisation rationale, as it has been incorporated in the Pact,
cannot function very efficiently towards a conservative direction. And
that’s why the conservative agenda in the EU has started again to search
for a new paradigm which will substantially restrict all this reality
outside the EU so as to become manageable again. This is the fundamental
contradiction of the period on which the externalisation doctrine is
emerging.
You have extensively researched the operation ‘Mare Nostrum’ and its
shadow side. How do such operations contribute to the militarisation of
border control? What can you tell us about the parallel-to-the-rescue
goals of such operations, their hidden sides and the cooperation of
civilian and military personnel that these operations often bring about?
The positive effect of ‘Mare Nostrum’ was that it literally catapulted
the number of people rescued in international waters. The downside that
I identified during my research is that it simultaneously created a
framework in which the distinction of responsibility between the
political field and the military field is tempered to such an extent
that the military got diffused into the political. There was, namely, a
passive militarisation, even though the targets may have been positive
in this case. All these descriptions of civilian personnel offering
services on board military vessels are substantially in this direction,
trying to explain this trend. The result of this trend, I believe, is
that nowadays the debate on what measures will be taken for the security
and the control of the region, is basically conducted by sources of a
purely military background; this means that military people are talking
about the management of migration, which is not a military issue, we are
not at war. It is also evident from the use of jargon that originates
from people who have that kind of mindset, a militarised approach and
philosophy on the subject, as well as from the fact that the means
proposed, without any criticism, may be purely military. For example,
during last week, Germany through a nebulous mandate framework, decided
and committed two military vessels to assist the rescue operations that
informally occur following the last tragedy in Lampedusa, because there
is a need for political management. This means that, in this moment,
Europe implements policy with purely military means on the issue of
migration. This happened because, I believe, operations bringing
together these two characteristics, such as ‘Mare Nostrum’, have paved
the way to get there. This is essentially a passive militarisation.
What exactly do we mean by militarisation of the European migration policy?
By militarisation we mean many things. What we have been talking about
so far is the militarisation of policy-making and its implementation.
There is another level of militarisation which concerns the relationship
of the military industry with the policy-making centres.
Which brings us to the relationship between the borders industry and the
European Commission. Following the money in the book you persistently
end up in the European Commission. How did the burgeoning of this
industry come about? Who decides on European R&D? What has the role of
the former Commissioner Cecilia Malmström (currently Commissioner for
Trade) been in the intensification of the militarisation of migration?
Which are the lobbies, companies, entrepreneurs and countries who are
pushing towards the militarisation of migration? Who enriches the
security industry?
The relations between the military industry and the European
policy-making centres are another level of the same process and are
perhaps the foundation upon which the image that we see in the
Mediterranean is being built. It is a relationship that is created over
time, a decade ago, it is a relationship of discourse and collusion
between, on the one side, the vested financial interests and their
representatives, and, on the other, the European leaders who implement
policy in a space which is far away from the regular control of European
societies. This is a problem described by the term ‘democracy deficit’
used by many when talking about the EU. The winners in this process are
two: politicians and the industry. Politicians promote their careers
essentially siding with vested economic interests, co-shaping reality.
This relationship is clearly seen in how, for example, the EC’s
framework for research and innovation on security is organised;
according to research done by the Civil Liberties Committee of the
European Parliament (LIBE), a relationship of interlinkages between
industry and policy is fostered, and all the critical voices that could
considerably raise counterarguments have not been invited and have not
received any space in this process. It is a research conducted by
academics and published last year by this committee of the European
Parliament, which concludes as follows: “the security research places
research at the service of the industry instead of the society”. This
becomes even more evident if we look at the support enjoyed by the
industry because many politicians believe that, in this way, they will
create jobs and growth in many sectors of the economy. However, the
issue of the protection of basic freedoms and democratic guarantees is
reduced to a matter touched upon through talks on economic issues and is
usually treated as an obstacle to market development and product
improvement. Essentially, it describes a relationship in which, whenever
an issue of democratic guarantees and political freedoms emerges in the
conversation, it is viewed as a problem that needs to be addressed.
You have researched the role of Frontex, which is the main European
agency in border security and is expected not to depart from the acquis
communautaire. How is it then that Frontex manages, while playing such
an important coordinating role between member-states, to avoid control
and to remain unscrutinised?
The issue with Frontex is that it is a complex mechanism, which many
mistake for a European border police, when in fact it is an agency that
analyses data and feeds the policy-making centres with information. It
is rather an intelligence agency that is actually also active in the
field. It is protected from being exposed to liability -as described
very well in the investigation of the European Ombudsman- by existing in
a legal limbo, calling itself and always regarded as an institution that
advises member-states on how to act in the field and does not accept
responsibility for human rights abuses and the wrong-doings that
constantly occur in the field. There are many cases in which this
particular institution seems to be exposed in relation to these issues,
but, unfortunately, the political support through the EC and the
European institutions in general, as well as the support of the vested
interests of the military industry is so strong that nobody is bothered
to look into the legal vacuum and to seek responsibilities about it.
Within this context, what are the possibilities and options for a small
country like Greece and the coalition government of Sy.Riz.A-ANEL? In
the case of Italy, as you explain in the book, ‘Mare Nostrum’
demonstrated that it is possible for a large member-state, if it invests
political capital and financial resources, to make policy, even in
issues normally regulated at the European level and even overturn the
balance of forces.
In the case of Greece, in a period in which a new government is trying
to change the terms under which migration policy is being implemented,
it is clear that we are talking about a rather limited capacity both in
terms of influencing policy at the central lever and in terms of
applying a radically different model of migration management. On the one
hand, the government is to a large extent alone in its effort to promote
the humanitarian side against the security issues. And this is a balance
that will not change. Obviously it t is important that there is a
landmark on which any counter-proposal can be built. However, one must
understand the limitations in relation to the potential of this
government to influence the central political scene offering a
successful alternative management model. It is very difficult to know
how this effort will develop now at a local level because this year
there is a burst of refugee flows and there is no sufficient
infrastructure that works. Administratively and bureaucratically, the
change of model and its coordination with the European centres and the
new European funds is a lengthy process and something that will delay
the process. The lack of cooperation between the authorities in the
country is another issue that should be addressed, and, of course, the
organisation of a new ministry and new political infrastructure is
another challenge still to be overcome. Thus, generally speaking, it is
very difficult to create tangible results which will then be promoted as
something which will provoke the central planning by showing that there
is an alternative. However, the better it goes and the more successful
it is, then the more important it will be for the overall conversation
conducted in Europe. However, things are not easy and one cannot be very
optimistic in this regard.
In October 2013, after the shipwreck in Lampedusa, the European
Parliament voted in favour of the implementation of EUROSUR as the
ultimate rescue tool. As you show in the book, EUROSUR has nothing to do
with search and rescue; on the contrary, it is an expensive centralised
panopticon for border surveillance and policing that is being silently
planned since 2006. What is the role of EUROSUR in the development and
use of drones and the militarisation of migration?
EUROSUR is a tool, a mechanism to collect data from the European
external border and to process it locally before it becomes available to
the central administrator, which is Frontex in Warsaw, and to the other
member-states. The objective is to create a live image to monitor the
Mediterranean basin and beyond, almost in real-time. However, as a
system it is still underdeveloped in relation to this goal. The politics
around EUROSUR and the ways in which this, as a project, has been the
justification for the Commission to develop drone acquisition programmes
for the countries of the European South or to promote other surveillance
systems and to deepen its relations with the military industry and so
forth is a much more interesting topic in terms of politics. I say this
because the tool can be presented as a politician wants; it is just a
system, anyone who wants will use it for the reasons they want. Nobody
condemns technological innovation per se, the goal is not to demonise
it. The question is in which regulatory framework and with what
political objectives these systems are developed, and here, it is clear
that the Commission has made a choice to essentially adopt the
militarisation agenda, as is has been contemplated by the industry, and
EUROSUR is a key objective within that process. The then Commissioner
for Home Affairs and Immigration, Cecilia Malmström, had presented it as
a system -and there are plenty of articles recently published on the
website of Frontex- that will help search and rescue, which may even be
partly true but the whole reality behind it says it was a key argument
for the EC to rapidly promote and handsomely fund the whole security
doctrine and the militarisation of migration and external border policy.
Tell us a little about your book and your research: how easy or
difficult was the access to information?
The two main issues in relation to this work is that a big chunk of
these developments and information is dispersed within the products of
the European bureaucracy, which is a real maze in which, quite often,
deliberate or not, many things disappear; thus, searching is really
tedious and it is an exercise of mental endurance. The second issue is
the access and cooperation with people who are near or within the
information centres. Usually, it is said, when you are not given
information, you are on the right track and, when you are actively
prevented from having it, you in an even better track. In the course of
this investigation, the trickiest point was somewhere between the two.
Unfortunately, representatives of political ideas, who would be expected
to be allies in this process, were not allies, either because of
indifference or lack of understanding of the subject, or sometimes
because political thought is far more complicated than the clear-cut
journalistic approach of simply disclosing the information. Generally
speaking, it was cumbersome. Many times, it was surprising that people,
who would expected to be qualitatively worse interlocutors, because of
disagreements and disputes, proved to be better during this
investigation than others who were expected to be allies.
Would you like to add anything else?
In the coming days, it will be crucial to see the new strategy on
migration as this will be articulated by the Commissioner for Home
Affairs and Immigration, Dimitris Avramopoulos, and which will express
the direction to which the Juncker Commission wants to take things.
Generally speaking, a huge political game is being played all this time,
with centres pushing this externalisation doctrine and striving to set a
precedent for Europe to further close its borders. This is something
that is important to monitor and on which, if it happens, this whole
complex of vested financial interests described before will take its
next step for further militarisation. So it is a crucial period; even
though we only see the humanitarian part and the corpses in the
Mediterranean, in the backstage in Brussels and behind closed doors in
the capitals, there is a lot of talk about where this whole thing will
go. The more we do to expose it the better.
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About the book: The official European migration policy is increasingly
interpreted as a matter of security and is being rapidly militarised.
This is a doctrine that the EU technocrats have digested fully and its
practical implementation is co-shaped with the vested interests of the
industrial complex that produces products and security services. On this
basis, EU’s R&D framework adapts to the needs of this industrial
security complex, ignoring the institutional separation and the control
of powers at the national and the EU level. The lack of political and
democratic control of the plans of this post-democratic elite is
certainly troubling. What is shocking, however, is the ignorance of
Europeans about the developments at the confines of their societies, at
the borders of Europe. For this reason, this book is an invitation to
every European to be informed and take part in the discussion.
Countries:
Greece Europe