(en) France, Organisation Communiste Libertarie CA #226 - African policy Holland: a trompe l'oeil .. until when? (fr)


It's been over six months since the Socialists and their green allies settled in their 
seats ministries. Among the promises displayed different policies compared to those 
conducted by the right that included an overhaul of Franco-African relations. However, 
despite some statements and some symbolic gestures, we can only conclude that nothing 
decisive is likely to change in this policy. ---- The end of the Fran?afrique, a story 
that stutters ... For those who have forgotten, the discourse of "rupture" with the policy 
FranCafrican are nothing new. This is almost 30 years promoted the new power in France 
have made ??such a statement. It was first with Jean Pierre Cot to the Ministry of 
Development Cooperation after the victory of the left in 1981, but had to resign in 
December 1982 for trying to make this ministry neocolonial else one of the pillars the 
"backyard" of France in Africa (at a time when the term Fran?afrique was not used).

More recently, in August 2007, shortly after the arrival of Sarkozy who stated his desire 
to "break" with "networks of another time," we still remember the tragicomic episode of 
ejection Bockel the Secretary of State for Cooperation after claiming proclaim "the death 
certificate of Fran?afrique." Even the Jospin government came to power in 1997 did nothing 
more than retail reforms such as a system of cooperation in decline in the 1990s and the 
reduction of the military presence with the closure of two bases while in Central 
socialists like Quiles, at the head of the commission information on Rwanda in 1998, had 
constantly to overlook the French complicity in the genocide of Tutsis.

Promises break variable geometry ...

In the months before the election of Holland, we have read a number of contributions from 
the "experts" of PS on the issue of African politics to come. Among the points of rupture 
with the system Fran?african announced, there were some key issues including: the 
permanent military presence (with the maintenance of French bases in Africa or the 
Epervier Chad in place since 1986), that the franc zone (which involves a fixed exchange 
rate system and a renunciation of monetary sovereignty for African States), or the amount 
and content of official development assistance. During the presidential campaign, it is 
Koffi Yamgnane who was responsible for bringing the discourse of rupture. He announced the 
next program after the election in May 2012: "Taking stock uncompromising 50 years of 
ambiguous relationships, illustrated by Fran?afrique; launch a truth about the politics of 
the French public aid to development, refounding the relations with Africa on a sound 
basis (...), take into account the democratic imperative on the continent participate in 
strengthening the collective security in Africa, even if the definition of the 
architecture of continental defense comes first organizations regional and subregional 
organizations. "For its part, the PS candidate announced March 11 at a press conference 
that it would implement" cooperation rid of old forms inherited from the post-colonial 
period. " We can already note that these positions have focused on stand management legacy 
Fran?african Sarkozy and they remained in the dark when it came to define the precise 
contours of another policy.

Symbolic gestures that have not been through ...

After the election of Holland, the first African head of state has been received Yayi Boni 
of Benin in the head who also chairs the African Union. Contrasting with the campaign 
speech of PS bursting with Fran?afrique, Holland merely advocate for "good governance, 
growth and economic development and stability and security." Moreover, if the receiving 
Yayi Boni appeared consistent with campaign promises not to receive the Elysee 
French-African dictators or visit them, we saw later that promise was worth with the 
receipt of Ali Bongo at the Elysee Palace on July 5. Then, in October, the first African 
trip to Holland seems to have been designed to restore some credibility to this concern of 
stand management FranCafrican its predecessors. He chose to stop in Dakar before leaving 
the summit of la Francophonie to Kinshasa. The first stop was to pay tribute to a "model 
country" for successfully for the second time a "democratic alternative" to evoke the 
colonial past of France with the promise of open archives concerning the massacre of 
Thiaroye and especially to do the opposite of the famous Dakar speech of Sarkozy in 2007.

In Kinshasa, where he delivered on 13 October for the summit of the Francophonie, Holland 
has also received the historic leader of the opposition Etienne Tshisekedi and paid 
tribute to the memory of Chebeya, activist human rights murdered by securocrats the Kabila 
regime. But this scene on the commitment to human rights in Africa has shown its limits in 
early December when Holland, after some hesitation, finally received a very official 
Idriss Deby, whose power was characterized over two decades, for repeated violations of 
human rights as reflected in the abduction and disappearance in 2008 of Mahatma Ibni Saleh 
by the men of his presidential guard. This policy of "two weights, two measures" appears 
even more clearly in the attitude of Foreign Minister Fabius, who during his first trip to 
Africa at the end of July was first visited Senegal, where he met the same group "Hits 
sick" which was spearheading the protests against former President Wade, then two 
dictators to legitimize French-African, Blaise Compaor? of Burkina Faso and Idriss D?by of 
Chad . In his suite, he even led this trip Loncle a parliamentary socialist Fran?ois 
'friend' Compaor? regime, and Pascal Canfin Minister "green" Managing Development. This 
will he longer than its predecessors, and Cot Bockel, or prefer he resign rather than 
swallow other snakes fran?africaines. In the meantime, when he announces official 
development assistance "more transparent" and "more efficient", we can see that the budget 
of his ministry is relative decline and the level of ODA should be achieved by 2015 only 0 
48% of GDP is well below the 0.7% threshold set in 1992 at the Rio Summit (source: 
Oxfam-France).

BASICALLY A RELATIONSHIP AND MAINTAINED LESS AND LESS OPERATING

What emerges beyond a few symbolic gestures and words still contradictory, especially 
regarding the colonial past of France (as we have seen with the recent episode of the 
visit to Holland in Algeria) is again , maintaining the status quo, lack of a real desire 
to break which should include the Socialists by questioning the tutelary figure of 
Mitterrand who bears a heavy responsibility in the perpetuation of this system 
Fran?african and its dire consequences as complicity with the genocidal Hutu in Rwanda in 
1994. In addition, we can see that this recognition (relative) of the colonial past always 
seems linked to some international balance of power and ulterior motives of the "economic 
diplomacy" (a euphemism for not saying "the service of large French companies "). For the 
rest, Africans queuing for a visa at the counter of French consulates are not probably no 
illusions about this change of personnel policy at the head of the French state. However, 
this system of Franco-African relations is permanently in crisis. It is perceived economic 
competition with emerging countries which penetrate markets and invest progressively in 
the countries of the franc zone, despite the presence of large firms still essential 
especially in the French infrastructure (Bollor?, Eiffage, Orange etc.. ).

Can be seen more openly with the political and military crises that shake the "backyard" 
Francophone CAR, C?te d'Ivoire and Mali in particular. France intervened directly in C?te 
d'Ivoire in 2010 to impose cannon a "winner" elections but we see that two years later, 
the situation is far from being standardized. In Mali, the reconquest of the North by a 
military operation conducted by ECOWAS forces supported by France is returned more 
indefinitely. Such difficulty involved is explained by the reluctance of some neighboring 
countries such as Algeria, but also indicates the profound nature of the French military 
in Africa used to maintain power (or reverse) of the African Heads of State rather than 
'to come to the aid of people in Africa fell under the sway of a few hundred Islamist 
fighters ...