Hi Tim, so what is the Sorites problem for processes?
1) Processes are composed of ultimate temporal parts that are not processes.
2) Successive temporal combination of non-processural things never gets you a process.
So if pn is 's1+s2...sn is not a process', we have pn implies pn+1.
We start with with an ultimate part p1 (s1 is not a process) and we know by induction that this is true for all n.
On the face of it 1 and 2 are contraries. But isn't it open to the process philosopher to dig their heels in and just deny 1 - i.e. that processes are composed of things that are not processural?
Point (1) was not a statement I made. The point was that processes can be measured because they are ontically given. It doesn't matter to me what they are made of.
Never mind. Let's assume that processes are made of parts that are either temporal or not.
This makes things much worse for our process philosopher.
Either:
1) The components of processes are themselves process, which doesn't explain what processes are. Question begging.
2) These microprocesses are also subject to the Sorites. Pushing the problem back a stage doesn't get rid of it.
Or:
1) She has admitted that processes are not the basic constituent of reality.
2) She is no longer able to explain time, since the actual fundamental constituents do not have temporal parts and thus are instantaneous or eternal.
3) For the same reason, causality is no longer explicable.
But by far the most difficult obstacle is this one, no matter which way you slice it:
The fundamental ingredients are also subject to the Sorites problem. How many of them constitute a "heap" or indeed a process? Nothing has been achieved whatsoever.
Being subject to the Sorites happens if you are ontically given, not because you do or don't have temporal parts.