Culture Matters, Edited by Lawrence E. Harrison and Samuel P. Huntington: Basic Books, 2000. 348 pages.
Culture Matters is a thoughtful collection in a world marked by extraordinary differences in the level of economic development and political and social stability. It explores progress and prosperity in relation to culture, and strongly supports the proposition that advocates for the significant role of cultural variation in determining the process, nature and degree of the - so far unachievable for most and achievable for few - economic progress and socio-political stability. It draws comparisons between economically advanced and underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America and reaches at an overarching conclusion that holds cultural values responsible for the difference in the level of prosperity between these extremes in human achievement and human failure to prosper.
An in depth review of the book brings out two overarching propositions: one that considers culture the prime factor driving or blocking growth, and other that counts additional factors to culture as well. In some cases culture is treated as secondary to those factors. We shall discuss both briefly before proceeding to reflections.
Culture makes All the Difference
Authors list a number of cultural attributes of underdeveloped and developed countries and compare their effects in the light of their current rates and stages of development. Underdeveloped countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America, jointly or partially share certain cultural values such as lack of trust on each other and on individual ability for creativity, lack of motivation for competition, unwillingness for hard work, lack of sufficient emphasis on education, lack of vision for a future that is within reach, too much reliance on dogmatic religious or traditional values that do not encourage entrepreneurship and enterprise, tribal culture, corruption, absence of rule of law, presence of military dictatorships, absence of a habit of saving, and chances of business development through political linkages. Lack of leadership to initiate a shift in these values can be vital in these societies’ attempts for prosperity, which is given by Porter, who takes this list a step further by emphasizing on the “direction” of hard work, the “productivity” of initiative, the “type” of education and its “productivity,” and the degree of “productive deployment” of savings.
While most authors mention all or some of the cultural attributes that contribute to lack of progress, Grondona lists twenty contrasting cultural factors that are perceived differently by different cultures depending on the nature of culture as resistant or favorable to progress. It is made clear that the responsibility of moving the status of a society from resistant to favorable lies on the leaders’ shoulders. He further proposes that these cultural differences in perception are linked to economic development of those cultures. These, in addition to those mentioned above, include perceptions of morality, wealth, distributive justice, pragmatic usefulness of ideas, rationality, source of power, perception of world and life, the nature of optimism for achievement, and notions of political representation.
Following the Weberian tradition, Fukuyama emphasizes on the role of social capital which cannot be produced if the society lacks habits such as “truth telling, meeting obligations and reciprocity,” and without which the civil society may not sustain useful existence in the long term. In agreement with Fukuyama, Lipset and Lenz emphasize on democratic traditions and importance of trust, and underline the dangers of dictatorial governments that nurture corruption and socio-political unrest. They add the value of “small family size” to the list of factors that drive economic development, to which Huntington adds discipline and organization, and Harrison adds secularism. The to-do-list of leaders in resistant cultures gets longer and longer by the end of the book.
Culture does not make All the Difference
Though the collective impression that the reader gets from the book favors the strong role of culture in shaping economic status and socio-political stability of countries, some of the authors support the undeniable role of other factors as well. For instance, Sachs, relieving leaders of some responsibility, considers geography to play a significant role with temperate zones of developed and tropical zones of underdeveloped countries. Glazer follows the precedent. He not only emphasizes on the “key role of education” in shifting cultural values irrespective of its original nature, but also treats culture as secondary to race, a link that makes a leader’s job more difficult due to existence of a certain degree of discomfort with cultural explanations of lack of growth.
Reflections
To suppose that the collective proposition is the closest to reality is one option; to suppose otherwise is another. Though one may easily feel intimidated by the amount of time, thought and effort that support this proposition, this review will attempt at offering space to both options.
This book overlooks one possible proposition and considers it unworthy of sufficient discussion: the possibility that culture may not have a significant role to play in mobilizing growth at all. Though Harrison offers some discussion of the opposing proposition in the introduction to the essays, there is definitely a lack of sufficient attention to possible counter arguments. Harrison begins his introduction to the book with figures and facts that would have easily proven earth to be a third universe planet if analyzed on the basis of the democratic majority-minority model. Our planet’s inferior status is obvious from the fact that over 4 billion of world’s population lives in countries of “low income” as given by the World Bank. And since 2/3 of the world population lives in underdevelopment, is it wise to be overconfident about the ability of world population to realize the significance of cultural attributes in growth mobilization? No doubt the realities of our world call for increased attention towards this shift, but the reality remains: shift is yet to come.
Harrison agrees to the impact that politics can have on cultural attributes. As discussed in class time and again, Singapore developed into what it is today by force of compulsory competition through political institutions and as a result of interplay between politics and culture. Can we say that their leaders avoided work, used a shortcut, and forced a shift in values?
The book falls short of sufficient discussion of the significance of the impact of foreign intervention of short or long duration as well. This impact is visible in Pakistan’s relative growth in comparison to Afghanistan. Pakistan was colonized, and as a result, inherited certain infrastructural support systems that facilitated their cultural shift. The British left behind their governance mechanism and legal procedures, which facilitated Pakistani population’s shift to English language. On the other hand, Afghanistan, under ill calculated leadership, fought 3 wars against the British Empire, felt proud of [empty] sense of independence, and lost access to useful mechanisms. The same argument could be made for Hong-Kong’s inheritance of British commercial and legal systems, American influence of South Korea and Japanese influence of Taiwan.
No doubt there is a consensus on the link between cultural values and prosperity, but the contributors of this book remain divided and indecisive on the question of how much it matters. They do not address the possibility that even a few handful exceptions to their list of 20 contrasting factors or 10 values could be a strong outlier, strong enough to alter the entire design. Is Singapore a model to follow is a question that I always ask myself, the answer to which strangely depends on my location. My answer is in negative in the beautiful city of Cambridge, and a strong yes when in Kabul: in the middle of absolute failure and nothing works at all. Cultural shift, if the right path, would take longer than any of us would live for, while forced competition, even at the cost of ending with a dead city, might be an option. Culture may determine the sustainability of success, but brightly led, though forced, institutional jumps might revolutionize culture. It may appear to be a work avoidance tactic, but didn’t it work in Singapore? Could it be that in some cases a short term shift in practices, strategies and policies would facilitate a sustainable value shift in the future? I think this may work for Afghanistan.
No one wants to stay backward, as Harrison says. Is there a link between values and progress? Yes there is, but it is not clearly obvious and definitely not easy to alter. It is complicated, again as Harrison says.
Should cultural attributes and their intended shift be part of development plans? Yes. But should governments primarily focus on cultural shift? No, because cultural shift will take longer than some nations would be able to wait for. Surprisingly enough and despite Protestant emphasis on patience, it is not just the underdeveloped countries that lack patience. The drive behind impatience for development results is most evident in the behavior of donor countries, all of whom are developed, progressive and prosperous. Unfortunately, many undeveloped countries are donor dependent, where all donors look for are immediate results, facts and figures that could be put on a power point presentation, strong enough to silence tax payers.
Prosperous countries were not born with the right values; they learned them, over time. Do they and their leaders have the courage to shift their values of impatience to patience, in order to allow for the underdeveloped world to learn their share of the right values, including the art of leadership?