Bin Ali has left. But the revolution is yet to be institutionalized in order to pave way for a free and democratic Tunisia, a goal that faces three obstacles:
1. Ben Ali’s regime had suppressed Islamists and leftists alike: 8/13left political opposition parties were banned, 3/5 remaining were obstructed and harassed, with only two parties included in the system.[1] Despite common grounds for building alliances, political opposition could not stand united against the regime, which had the capacity to successfully alter the structure of contestation and keep the opposition divided.[2] This divide is not only reflected in the frequency of secessions of the left parties, [3] but also in the conflicting perspectives on the issue of building alliance with the Islamists. Lack of sufficient political will for building alliances, not only within the left movement, but also with the Islamists is the first obstacle.
2. One of the forces that can challenge the domination of ruling regimes over national governance mechanisms is a genuine civil society.[4] The Tunisian Constitution does not protect citizens’ right to information as a fundamental right, which paralyzes civil society by limiting its access to government information. Lack of a genuine civil society that can resist appropriation by the State[5] marks the second obstacle.
3. Tunisian Military is small, institutionalized and not patrimonial,[6] by virtue of which it does not threaten democratization on its own. However, the alliance between military and industrial stakeholders may endanger the principles of democratic governance such as transparency and accountability. Given the history of use of this military-industrial establishment as means of upgrading authoritarian rule,[7] this threat can seriously jeopardize Tunisian efforts for economic growth and equality, which many consider as a pre-requisite for democratization.[8]
The following strategies could be employed in order to address the obstacles identified above:
1. Constitutional Reform is the backbone of the drive towards the creation of a genuine civil society. Constitutional protection of citizens’ right to information is significant in ensuring transparency and accountability with the aim of combating corruption, as one of the main deterrents of investment and economic growth.[9] In addition, amending Articles 39 and 50, [10] seeking to limit the powers of the President and the number of terms, can increase bottom up accountability of the executive. [11]
2. Expanding the Boundaries of Alliance Building, seeking to include not only left parties, labor unions, but also Islamist parties is critical in decreasing the chances of another authoritarian regime replacing Ben Ali. The ability of the political opposition to grow from merely a “vent for criticism of the ruling regime” to a strong challenger depends on the political actors’ capacity in building alliances, despite conflicting ideologies. One of the key questions to ask could be about the degree of dependence of Ben Ali’s 24 years rule on his capacity to keep the opposition divided. [12]
Resistance to the above mentioned courses of action is inevitable for a number of reasons. Constitutional reform is a lengthy, difficult and challenging process. In addition, it can only be a beginning for change, not the change itself. This means that successful constitutional reform will have to be followed by steady efforts towards implementing and monitoring the change, a process that requires commitment, consistency and patience, in order to increase the chances of real success.
Developing the capacity of seeing the ally in an enemy is not easy. It requires the exercise of real leadership from both those with and without authority. The fact that the political opposition could not see common grounds for unity under Ben Ali’s persecution and harassment says much about their inability to predict the threat of a similar authoritarian rule now, in particular in the middle of celebrations right after the removal of Ben Ali.
However, there are also opportunities that could be explored. Langohr quotes Shadid’s argument indicating towards Islamist parties’ willingness in working in coalitions with secular forces. Though Langohr is doubtful of mutual willingness of secular forces towards building coalitions, a review of the characteristics of some of the left political parties such as FDTL, PCOT and PDP reveals that they are becoming more inclusive towards Islamists as political allies.
“A broad based alliance” of leftists and Islamists against authoritarianism could be Tunisia’s best hope for democratization. [13]
[1] PCOT, PSG, PTPD, CPR, PGM, PPLP, MPD and PLP did not have pre-Jan 2011 authorization for political activism. MDS, FDTL and PDP had legal recognition but faced obstruction and harassment. Only PUP and Ettajdid had legal recognition and inclusion in the system.
[2] Ellen Lust-Okar, Structuring Conflict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents and Institutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 66.
[3] PSG from PCOT, FDTL from MDS and MDS and PUP are breakaways from Neo-Destour.
[4] Mustapha Kamel al-Sayed, “The Concept of Civil Society and the Arab World,” in Brynen, Korany, and Noble, eds. Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World: Theoretical Perspectives, Lynne Rienner 1995. P. 141.
[5] Steven Heydemann, “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World,” Saban Center Analysis, Number 13, October 2007.
[6] Eva Bellin, Stalled Democracy: Capital, Labor and the Paradox of State-Sponsored Development (New York: Cornell University Press, 2002), 149.
[7] Steven Heydemann, “Upgrading Authoritarianism in the Arab World,” Saban Center Analysis, Number 13, October 2007.
[8] Charles Kurzman, “Not Ready for Democracy? Theoretical and Historical Objections to the Concept of Prerequisites,” Sociological Analysis, December 1998.
[9] Kate Gillespie, “The Middle East’s Corruption Conundrum,” Current History, January 2006.
[10] Para 5 of Article 39 of the Constitution renders the President of the Republic “re-electable.” Article 50 of the Constitutions gives the power of appointing the Prime Minister and other members of the government to the President.
[11] Martha Pripstein-Posusney, “Multi-party elections in the Arab world: Institutional engineering and oppositional strategies,” Studies in Comparative International Development, vol. 36, no. 4, December 2002, p. 53
[12] I. William Zartman, “Opposition as Support of the State,” in Giacomo Luciani, ed. The Arab State, (New York: Routledge Press, 1990), pp. 240-245
[13] Vickie Langohr, “Of Islamists and Ballot Boxes: Rethinking the Relationship between Islamists and Electoral Politics,” International Journal of Middle East Studies, November 2001, p. 608