Introduction
Life in Afghanistan is characterized by uncertainty to a horrifying degree. After over three decades of civil war, unrest and violence, the current state of partial democracy and relative security is a blessing from God for most Afghans and a breathing space for economic growth, infrastructure building and development of democratic political institutions. Though there is a sense of growing interest in improving the current state, in particular of Afghan political institutions, what matters most is to somehow and by some means maintain it for as long as possible. Will democracy, in whatever shape and format that it exists for now, survive in Afghanistan can be an interesting research question for those outside Afghanistan. For the Afghan people however, those who benefit from this partial democracy and relative security, this is a question that haunts them every morning and every night; a negative answer to this question is very much a matter of life and death.
Afghanistan has had a centralized administrative system for all its life, a characteristic that has rendered the introduction of reform by sources outside of the government extremely difficult. On the other hand, government’s ability to reform and introduce change has been challenged by underdeveloped economy, feudalist social structure, lack of education, politicized interpretation of Islam and conformist social codes of life, making it hard for any change to sustain in Afghanistan and rendering it essential to be based and driven by internal factors and sources and complimented with external support.
Contrary to the above, a major feature of post 9/11 democracy in Afghanistan is its lack of strong internal sources and its heavy reliance on external sources of support and legitimacy. Though social and political life in Afghanistan is rapidly changing, still, it is hard to imagine the survival of current political institutions and democratic norms without continued extensive external safeguarding. This is based on past examples which show that systems that have lacked popular support and legitimacy have not survived with reduced or diminished external backing; the particular example referred to here is that of Soviet backed Afghan regime of the Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan, PDPA in late 1970s to late 1980s.[1]
This short paper looks at post 9/11 democracy in Afghanistan and the Constitution of 2004 with an eye to analyze its sustainability in future given the current conditions and against the Dahl’s model of large scale democracies. This attempt at understanding the nature, durability and prospects of Afghan democracy is made through conducting a rather brief review of the democratic elements of previous and current constitutions and a brief look at history of explicit or implicit steps to promote democratization in Afghanistan, dating back to early 20th century. Dahl’s definition of modern large scale democracy is based on six features which are: elected officials, free, fair and frequent elections, freedom of expression, alternative source of information, associational autonomy and inclusive citizenship.[2]
Democratization: What does History Say?
Democratic or undemocratic by our modern definition of democracy, governments and rulers in Afghanistan have realized the importance of legitimacy in the eyes of the governed or ruled and have sought means of securing that throughout history. Loya Jirga which means Grand Assembly or Grand Council is one form of achieving this legitimacy, a forum convened for a range of purposes including but not limited to choosing a king, appointing officials, deciding over matters of importance or urgency and resolving disputes, traditionally with the participation of male elders. Ahmad Shah Abdali, to whom historians believe, Afghanistan owes its emergence as an autonomous and recognizable political entity was chosen in a Loya Jirga in 1747 in Kandahar, Afghanistan.[3] The more recently held Loya Jirga included female participants, which was convened by Hamid Karzai in June 2010 as an attempt at gaining legitimacy for the government’s efforts towards reconciliation and peace with the Taliban. Loya Jirga thus is the most deep rooted institution in Afghanistan that ensures consultation and participation in decision making, as a primitive form of participatory governance.
Afghan Monarchy and Constitutionalism
A review of the Afghan Constitutions since early 20th century reveals a positive trend: there has been gradual endorsement of democratic principles in a piecemeal fashion over a period of almost a century instead of sudden imposition of total democracy with all ideal features listed by Dahl. The Constitution of 1923 inspired by the modernizing decrees of Ataturk of Turkey was promulgated by King Ammanullah Khan.[4] This constitution took a number of baby steps towards democratization of governance in its Article 11 where it gave and protected the right of publication and press to Afghan citizens, Article 12 which protected the citizens’ right to form companies, as a form of association for the purposes of commerce only and Article 8 which guaranteed, though in an ambiguous way by using the word “persons” inclusive citizenship to the subjects of the Kingdom of Afghanistan.
The Constitution of 1931 was somewhat similar to the 1923 Constitution in maintaining the modernization spirit of King Amanullah, with however added religious flavor, the inspiration for which came from the 1906 Iranian Constitution as well as internal pressures from religious conservatist elements who dethroned Amanullah.[5] In an attempt to maintain power, Nader Shah co-opted with religious elements, giving them financial bribes in the form of payrolls for mosque imams and power to influence decision making and legislation through the right to denunciate whatever they considered against the principles of Islam.[6] Therefore, this constitution was basically a means to conveying the throne to Nader Shah and his family through a marriage of autocratic monarchy and religious conservatism.
This religious conservatism was challenged by Daud Khan who became Prime Minister in 1953. After careful testing of waters for introduction of reforms he embarked on his plans for emancipation of women beginning with challenging the isolating traditional Purdah System. He did so not through a decree or piece of legislation, but by presenting the difference itself embodied in royal women, wives and daughters as models of modernity at the 40th celebration of Independence on August 19, 1959.[7] The reaction was not very pleasant; however, Daud was shrewd enough to have thought of ways of tackling that. He had ensured, prior to taking a practical step towards abolition of Purdah System, that there was no way of justifying reactions to his plans on the basis of Islam. Besides, his response to religious clerics who continued to oppose him despite failure to base their opposition on religion and faith was that of arrest and suppression by force.[8] His strategy was successful in short term, but not so successful in long term; as Loius Dupree suggested, there were rather more entrenched consequences of those policies for the entire society.[9] The opposition reaction to secular ideas with regards to governance and education, emancipation of women and land reforms became more sustained than the actions themselves, the reflection of which was to be felt and is being felt even today.
An Experiment with Democracy 1963-1973
This era is marked by the promulgation and enforcement of the Constitution of 1964, upon which the Constitution of 2004 is primarily based. Not just the constitution, the Loya Jirga of 1964 was also a model followed by Karzai throughout his reign as President since 2002.
The Loya Jirga of 1964 was a species of different nature. It was a mutation of ancient male and elderly dominated traditional institution for participation and decision making into a modern forum for discussion and debate with absolute inclusive participation given to representatives from all walks of life, sexes, ethnic groups, ages, professions and minorities as opposed to past pattern of male elder participation only. To ensure active participation of delegates who could neither read nor write, Radio Afghanistan was used as a medium of introducing and explaining the articles of the proposed constitution.[10]
The draft constitution brought a number of revolutionary changes such as formation of political parties, placing law above the religion in Article 69, and almost fully elected parliament with the exception of 1/3 of the upper house of the parliament to be appointed by the King, besides guaranteeing the freedom of expression and inclusive citizenship. The Press Law of 1965 opened the doors to the establishment of political parties and news papers. Two elections were held under this constitution (1965 and 1969) with a third to be held in 1973, which was never conducted following the bloodless coup of Daud Khan.[11]
There are different interpretations of the nature of the 1964 Loya Jirga and the Constitution. Martin Ewans draws a less idealistic picture of the 1964 events, indicates towards the close to minimal representation of women-4 out of total 452 participants- and goes to the extent of calling it “nothing but a rubber stamp.”[12] Revolutionary or not, the 1964 Loya Jirga and Constitution was far from fulfilling Dahl’s criteria for large scale democracies; in any case Afghanistan was not claiming to be a democracy at that stage; it was still a Constitutional Monarchy, in which case, that feat could qualify to be exceptional.
The piecemeal introduction of Afghan society to democracy is evident in this experience again, which could have been expected to have led to a more durable form of democratic governance in the country. However, despite all the hype that historians have attached to this experiment and I as an optimist Afghan and believer in democracy would like to attach to it, the Loya Jirga as well as the Constitution, both were the consequences of a movement led by a minority of educated Afghans, who only thought that they represented vast majority of Afghans, and perhaps didn’t in reality. Besides, it is very true that every action has a reaction and democratic reform “often produces counter action (by) threatening certain forces” in society.[13]
There was one other factor that may have caused the backlash and which is very relevant to the current circumstances in Afghanistan. One of the elements of the era of democratic experimentation was the introduction of state sponsored education with foreign help. As a result of this initiative, high schools, colleges and universities were established with European, American and Russian assistance. These educational institutions awarded their best students with scholarships to attend some of the top world universities for higher education. The expanded Kabul University’s departments began affiliations with world renowned universities throughout the globe, including universities in the United States, Soviet Union and the ancient Islamic University of Al-Azhar in Cairo. It was either not calculated or mis-calculated, but this exposure led to what Rasanayagam calls a “substantial explosion in student population”[14] with technical expertise, higher education as well as conflicting “ideological baggage,” a combination that can very much share the credit for the active student movements of 1960s and 1970s and the subsequent politics of Afghanistan as well as the blame for the rise of Islamic fundamentalism of yesterday and terrorism of today.
PDPA Regime - Rule by Decree
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed in 1965 by a group of left intellectuals, came to power through a coup on 27 April 1978 and stayed in power after Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Internal documents of Afghanistan Liberation Organization, a radical Maoist group make note of strong PDPA leaning towards the Soviet Union since the beginning, indicating towards their lack of independence in decision making and intentional choice of going by Soviet dictates, something so obvious that had become a joke in left circles in Afghanistan; “PDPA members keep their umbrellas ready in Kabul when it rains in Moscow.”[15]
Internal divide and factionism characterized PDPA, where the Khalq and Parcham factions continued to remain hostile towards each other, a hostility that was intensely reflected in the regime structure, its cabinet and the military leadership. With the apparent goal of maintaining a “political balance,” PDPA regime was in practice a couple of “mini governments” within one government at all levels. These mini-cabinets held separate meetings, were distinct and continuously in conflict.[16]
PDPA factional disputes translated into inefficient government performance, leading to increase in public dissatisfaction with the regime. In such conditions, PDPA could only rule and not govern. Their strong connection to Soviet Union negatively affected their reform program, rendering it completely disowned by a majority of Afghan people, conservative or liberal. PDPA not only could not win hearts and minds of people in support of their reforms, they brutally suppressed opposition from both fundamentalists as well as other left or democratic forces. The bombing of Herat city following a rebellion by townsmen and local elders in March 1979 was one such example that led to over 5000 deaths.[17]
From 1979 to 2001, Afghanistan’s history on democracy is nothing but dead silence. This period led to the promulgation of two Constitutions in1987 and then in 1990 which were nothing short of a political gimmick. 1992-1996 engulfed Afghanistan in a civil war that destroyed whatever was left of infrastructure, economy, political institutions or culture and civilization, followed by the Taliban take over in 1996 which took us back to an age from where it is hard to believe Afghanistan of 1960s ever did exist at all.
The Constitution of 2004 and its Contribution to Democratization
The Constitution of 2004, compared to earlier constitutions, is the most democratic and therefore does a pretty good job on Dahl’s model of modern large scale democracies. It ensures inclusive citizenship (A22) associational autonomy (A35) alternative source of information (A34) freedom of expression (A34) and free, fair and frequent elections (A61, A83, A138, A141, A156) whereas only falling short of elected officials in case of provincial and district governors and deputy governors at sub national levels.
However, what determines the true spirit of democracy is the degree by which Constitution on paper is implemented and enforced in practice. The Constitution guarantees equal rights for both men and women, but tradition and strict social code of life as well as lack of education and rising insecurity prevent or hamper women participation in elections, in governance, economy and other spheres of public life. The Constitution also awards and protects the right to associational autonomy, however, politics in Afghanistan and elections in particular are conducted through a political competition process where political parties, as the main channels of communication of public interest and as the main means of political organization of these interests, fail to perform their function effectively.[18]
Furthermore, the Constitution guarantees free, fair and frequent elections. However, its frequency is a huge burden on the weak national economy and is threatened by its absolute dependence on external financial resources. Besides, despite international and national efforts and people’s unbelievable and promising commitment and belief in democratic norms, elections in Afghanistan have been far from free and fair. Electoral violations have been noted, reported and addressed in some cases at all levels, a major contributor to which are the absence of a level playing field and the weakness of the judicial system and law enforcement agencies in taking punitive action.
Lack of Afghan ownership of the post 9/11 democratization process and it being seen as an imposed phenomenon, increasingly worsening security situation due to exclusion and isolation of certain groups and lack of support for the implementation of democratic principles, in particular when it comes to women’s position in society are considered to be amongst the barriers to democratization in Afghanistan. A review of these impediments reveals their connection to the manner in which the Bonn Agreement was made and the Bonn Conference was structured and conducted. Like it or not, Bonn Agreement was the result of a foreign led process that helped some groups achieve power at the cost of exclusion and marginalization of others. The special commission to draft the Constitution of 2004 was established by the Bonn Agreement, a decision that is believed to have contributed towards the Constitution and its women liberating spirit being less owned by Afghans. [19]
Its crude, but it is simple: Afghanistan became a democracy like a family adopting a child out of sheer helplessness of having nothing. Following the brutalities of three decades of war by Soviet communists and US backed Islamic fundamentalists, Afghans leaped at the first opportunity they were provided with; they welcomed Karzai government, participated in the 2004 presidential elections in an unprecedented way and hoped for the better. However and only after grabbing the opportunity they realized it felt more western than Afghan, in particular in the way it liberated women. The current perception of democracy held by majority of Afghans, excluding urban and educated intellectuals, only approves of the idea of democratization reflected in their ability to elect their government, for as long as it can be contained within the boundaries of Islam. Women emancipation for them is beyond those boundaries, and is a form of “unlimited freedom” and therefore, current state of democracy in Afghanistan is seen to be western and in conflict with Islam.[20]
Conclusion
President Obama, at least for now, seems to have made his mind to stick to his deadline of 2014 for withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. President Karzai proudly speaks of his government’s readiness to take complete charge and ensure a smooth transition from foreign to Afghan forces. And yet both of them know that transition will be anything but peaceful.
There is no doubt in the fact that democratization in a country may improve security by providing non-violent means of expression of opinion and grievances. However, it is equally true that security is a condition for democratization in Afghanistan, a condition that Afghan Government is in no position to help maintain. 2014 is less than four years away and only a Godly miracle can render Afghan government capable of this task, a situation that we should not realistically rely on. Media reports are full of countless examples of government failure to even secure itself, let alone providing security to the people.
While believers in democracy may be tempted to ignore the local perceptions of democracy in a country like Afghanistan and decide to focus more on infrastructure development and improvement of government systems, it is naïve to expect the centuries old and bitter-experience-based perceptions to change automatically and at the same pace as the infrastructure is built or government institutions are strengthened. Democratization in Afghanistan therefore, is not just a struggle for better economy, improved governance and service delivery and greater security. It is critical to realize that it is a long term battle with minds; it is a battle to change age old patterns of thought and a battle to correct misinterpretations of religion, where the line between them and the religion itself is a fine one.
However and having said that, it is critically important to distinguish this struggle for change from previous such attempts. When I say bitter-experience-based perceptions, I mean to refer to the educational, social, economic and political reforms that Soviets had initiated with the help of their friends in the PDPA. The way that process evolved and finally met its end was an ugly experience, more for the Afghan people than the PDPA itself. Modernization was enforced through brutal and coercive action, the reaction to which was equally brutal: Islamic fundamentalism. Though we may not possibly imagine what further worse can happen, what is certain is that increased violence from the government and its international allies will lead to a reaction equally violent in the years to come.
As mentioned earlier, Afghanistan has undergone a process of gradual democratization with literally one baby step at a time. Considering that one might expect today’s Afghanistan to be ready for a modern democracy that qualifies on Dahl’s criteria. Such an expectation, I believe would have been possible only if the time between late 1970s to early 21st century could have been erased somehow. This period deserves to be called an era of dead silence in terms of democratization, not just because of its impact on the lives of people and institutions of government, but and most importantly because of its impact on the future, on Afghanistan of today. The fall of the PDPA regime and the withdrawal of Soviet forces marked a victory for the nation, but it also marked the beginning of the dark most era of its life ever. In a span of almost ten years, Afghanistan went centuries back. This is why democratization in Afghanistan has to begin all over again, Afghan society has to be treated as an early 20th century society and advocates of democracy have to be unbelievably patient with regards to results and achievements. Afghan people, as evident from AREU research, have only begun developing a liking for the idea of democracy. Developing support for its manifestation will require the building of a new foundation upon which Dahl’s six features may rest and which is going to take a long time.
Afghanistan is not an easy case, definitely not a case of short term intervention with expected immediate results. Democratization has to start from scratch, and democracy needs to be given the chance to be born in Afghanistan and not adopted.
To quote Chris Alexander, the ex-Deputy Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General for Afghanistan and Former Canadian Ambassador to Afghanistan, “In the streets of Kabul, it is difficult not to be inspired by the determination of ordinary Afghans to seize today’s opportunity. They are skeptical, even dismissive, of their government-yet demand its services with fervor. They criticize the international community’s performance but not its presence.”[21]
Afghans are wary of being robbed of their tradition and beliefs, as they have been robbed of their peace, security, land, beauty and freedom. This fear drives their reluctance in embracing democracy which they see as a stranger for now. But if given time, they can and will help a rebirth of democracy, an Afghan democracy. They have been betrayed too many times to be able to easily trust even themselves, let alone foreigners. Time is all they need and time is all democracy needs to return to Afghanistan.
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[1] Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: The Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 326.
[2] Robert A. Dahl, On Democracy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), 85.
[3] Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2003), xiii.
[4] Rasanayagam, 20.
[5] Donald N. Wilber, “Constitution of Afghanistan” Middle Eastern Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1965, pp,219-225, http://www.jstor.org/stable/4323852
[6] Rasanayagam, 23.
[7] Rasanayagam, 34.
[8] Rasanayagam, 35.
[9] Quoted in Rasanayagam, 35.
[10] Rasanayagam, 38.
[11] Bhabani Send Gupta, Afghanistan, Politics, Economy and Society: Revolution, Resistance, Intervention, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1986), 13.
[12] Martin Ewans, Afghanistan: A Short History of Its People and Politics, (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 2002), 120.
[13] Alex Keyssar, final comments in last class, December 2, 2010.
[14] Rasanayagam, 43.
[15] Self translation of Internal-claimed to be educational-documents used by Afghanistan Liberation Organization in their political courses taught to young recruits; I have attended a couple of these courses, but I do not have them here with me, so I cannot cite the exact page numbers.
[16] Rasanayagam, 71.
[17] Westad, 307.
[18] Anna Larson, “Afghanistan’s New Democratic Parties: A Means to Organizing Democratization”, in Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Briefing Paper Series, March 2009, http://www.areu.org.af/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39&Itemid=73
[19] Anna Larson, “Exploring the Future of Democratization in Afghanistan” (Podcast of Public Lecture, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Library, Kabul, Afghanistan, August, 2010).
[20] Anna Larson, “Exploring the Future of Democratization in Afghanistan” (Podcast of Public Lecture, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit Library, Kabul, Afghanistan, August, 2010).
[21] Christopher Alexander, foreword to Afghanistan: Transition under Threat, ed. by Geoffrey Hayes and Mark Sedra, (Canada: The Center for International Governance Innovation and Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), viii.