Introduction
Since its inception in 1920s, the meaning, presentation and representation of Islamic fundamentalism has been an ever changing phenomenon in Afghanistan not on the account of internal factors alone though; international meddling from different sides has played a significant role in helping shape, transform and evolve fundamentalism in Afghanistan. Beginning with a movement against modernization and King Amanullah’s reform in 1928 and King Daud’s reforms of 1975,[1] Islamic fundamentalism of late 1970s and 1980s evolved into a movement of national liberation and Jehad in the Name of God. Afghanistan of 1990s remembers brutal and belligerent Islamic fundamentalism. Today, Islamic fundamentalism means Terrorism. As far as the representation of the movement is concerned, the present world recognizes the Taliban and Gulbudin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami as faces of Afghan Islamic fundamentalism, while a larger collection of groups represented this political movement in 1970s to 1990s. The evolving nature of Islamic fundamentalism while on one hand makes predicting its future possible, on the other, raises serious concerns about the intensity and measure of violence with which it has continuously identified itself, an intensity that has been on a rise since the beginning.
This short paper explores the evolution and as a result, the strategic and operative shift that the movement has undergone since its inception, an evolution that transformed Islamist Movements to Islamic Fundamentalism and which has been characterized with increased involvement of international superpowers such as Soviet Union and United States and their regional allies in Afghanistan in the late 1970s.
I. Preface to the Shift
a) Opposition to Reform:
Amanullah Khan was a different king. He believed in an Afghanistan of twentieth century and was determined to let no stone unturned in achieving that.[2] No doubt with good intentions, he paid a huge price for his movement of administrative, economic, social and educational reforms. Besides the articles of the Constitution of 1923 that restricted the powers of religious judges, his westernized model of women liberation, introduction of compulsory education and co-education infuriated Islamist conservatives. This led to the Khost rebellion of 1924, one of the initial signs of Islamic conservatist reaction to reform. His 1927 tour of European capitals was not so well received in Kabul where pictures of Queen Soraya in western dresses were circulated. On his return he announced a series of reforms one of which was the separation of religious and state power; he was immediately perceived to have “turned against Allah and Islam.”[3] The high price was inevitable after the November 1928 incident where Pashtun tribesmen burnt his winter palace in Jalalabad. This incident marked the beginning of the end for King Amanullah.
b) Student Politics at Kabul University:
Inspired by Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al-Banna the founder of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and Abul Ala Maududi, the creator of Jamaat-e-Islami in the Indian subcontinent, Organization of the Muslim Youth (OMY) was established in 1969 by Kabul University professors and students. OMY among others, included some of the – later to be known - major faces of anti-Soviet Resistance such as Burhan-U-Din Rabbani, Abdul Rab Rasoul Sayyaf and Gulbudin Hekmatyar.[4]
The activities of the Organization of Muslim Youth were limited to student protests and speeches. Daud Khan, a reformer himself, feared religious conservatist opposition. His fears transformed into concrete reasons calling for government response after the Pakistan backed coup of December 1973. Fearing conspiracies against his rule as a President, who had himself reached to the throne of Kabul by toppling King Zahir after a bloodless coup in 1973, Daud carried out a crack down on the OMY in 1974 that took the lives of more than 600 Islamist intellectuals. The remaining members of OMY escaped to Pakistan where they were welcomed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, for whom OMY elements presented a reasonable opposition against Daud’s persistent claims on a revisit to the issue of Durand Line and greater Pashtunistan, and for whose military, OMY meant a group with shared Islamic values and beliefs. Daud crackdown of 1974 marks the beginning of the process of shift to fundamentalist violent insurgency which was helped take shape by Pakistani military as well as civilian government of Bhutto.[5]
II. The Shift
Oliver Roy makes an interesting differentiation between what he calls “traditional fundamentalism” and “Islamism” where the former represents the “will to have the Sharia and only the Sharia as the sole law,” while the later is a “perception of Islam more as a political ideology than as a mere religion.” Roy assigns a strong political character to “Islamism” and believes that Islamists use Sharia “as just part of the (political) agenda.”[6] I agree that this shift is marked by political agenda and drive towards achieving political power; however it is also characterized by violence and armed struggle as means of achieving political goals. What Afghanistan and the people of Afghanistan know of “fundamentalism” is no more mere conviction to religious fundamentals. It has, based on the experience of recent years of civil war from 1992 to1996, evolved into a notion that can no more be defined as mere belief in the fundamentals of Islam. Today and for the coming generations of Afghans, it represents anything and everything that engages in violence in favor of values that reflect extremism, anti-modernization, anti-women, anti-democracy and anti-civilization.
a) The PDPA Coup of 1978 – the Beginning of Armed Struggle
People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) was formed in 1965 by a group of left intellectuals. Following Soviet concerns over Daud’s perceived leaning towards the United States and the intensified conflicts between Daud and the PDPA in the spring of 1978, PDPA leaders Noor Muhammad Taraki and Hafizullah Amin staged the successful coup of April 27, 1978. Aleksandr Puzanov, the then Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan rightly confirmed the “sympathies” of the new regime towards the USSR and called it a good omen for future Soviet role in the region. However, the new regime was nothing but an even worse version of previous corrupt and administratively failed regimes of King Zahir and Daud Khan with the added flavor of increased Soviet involvement in Afghanistan affairs.[7]
Internal divide and factionism characterized PDPA, where the Khalq and Parcham factions continued to remain hostile towards each other, a hostility that was intensely reflected in the regime structure, its cabinet and the military leadership. With the apparent goal of maintaining a “political balance,” PDPA regime was in practice a couple of what Westad calls “mini governments” within one government at all levels. These mini-cabinets held separate meetings, were distinct and continuously in conflict.[8]
PDPA factional disputes translated into inefficient government performance, leading to increase in public dissatisfaction with the regime bringing ideological gains for the Islamists, who by now were beyond mere a source of concern for the government, had developed close relations with local power holders, learned the technique of coordination and had evolved into a full fledge political force. Their alternative model of Islamic governance promised better future than what the PDPA offered in present, thus gaining them wider popularity. In addition to their ability to manipulate religious beliefs and sentiments of the people, Islamists had better offers to make to local power holders; weapons and arms from Pakistan.[9]
The first organized armed encounter known as the Herat Rebellion was a successful demonstration of increased support for the Islamists and a proof of possession of weapons and ammunitions, the source to which was perceived to be Pakistan. On the morning of March 15, 1979, a group of townsmen, local power holders and Islamic fundamentalists fought for four days, resulting in 5000 deaths, mainly due to the bombing of Herat city by Soviet helicopters on the orders of the PDPA regime.[10] Though the PDPA regime suppressed the rebellion, it was anything but a defeat for the Islamic fundamentalists. It was a demonstration of improved strategic and operative ability, increased confidence and enhanced local support. Islamic fundamentalists had no strong holds in rural areas of Afghanistan thus failing in organizing peasants against Daud. However, the PDPA coup and the consequent Soviet intervention in Afghanistan helped political mobilization of rural masses in favor of fundamentalists.[11]
Added to the inspiration that came from the Iranian revolution of 1979, the force that gave a successful ride to Islamic fundamentalists was many-fold: extensive use of violence against opposition by the PDPA regime, internal factionism of the PDPA both as a political party as well as a government, divided and dissatisfied national army, Soviet failure to realize and internalize the nature of Afghan resentment with foreign power and offer of extended support from General Zia in Pakistan. As Westad rightly points out, a “full scale civil war” had begun by this time. [12]
b) Soviet Invasion – From Covert to Overt!
Afghanistan has served as a buffer zone for a large part of its life, recently between the Russian and British Empires and most recently between Soviet Union on one hand and its ideological rival the United States and its regional allies, Pakistan and Iran on the other.[13] Soviet Union took interest in Afghanistan immediately after King Amanullah Khan declared Afghanistan a sovereign nation and demanded for the formal recognition of Afghanistan’s sovereignty by the British Empire and the Viceroy of India in 1919. The country did receive a formal recognition, but not from those to whom the demand was made; Lenin recognized Afghanistan, a friendly gesture that led to the Treaty of Friendship between Soviet Union and Afghanistan on Feb 28, 1921.[14] This treaty marked the beginning of “friendship” between Soviet Union and Afghanistan, the end of which was marked by the Soviet invasion of 1979.
Though it was the Soviet invasion that sparked unprecedented local support for Islamic fundamentalists, 1979 in general, was a year that brought continued rise in local and international support for the Islamic fundamentalists. General Zia had taken over in Pakistan and was adamant in implementing Islamization in Pakistan and extending support to forces that shared the same values for Afghanistan. United States had grown wary of Soviet activities in Afghanistan by mid 1979 and had initiated their counter support to the insurgents through Pakistan.[15]
Locally, Islamic fundamentalists had continued to gain rural support and local power holders continued to join their ranks in return for nominal leadership positions in villages and districts, such as in the case of Ahmad Shah Masoud from Panjsher and Ismael Khan of Herat who joined the ranks of Jamiat-i-Islami, a political party led by Burhan-U-Din Rabbani, one of the founders of the Organization of Islamic Youth. All they wanted in return was continued supply of weapons and the tag of zonal commandership of the party in those provinces, which was an easy deal for the party leadership.[16] Easy access to weapons was a character that even drove left organizations such as the Afghanistan Liberation Organization, a radical anti-fundamentalist organization to join hands with Islamic fundamentalists in a United Mujahideen Freedom Fighters Front of Afghanistan against Soviets in June 1979.[17] With increased local and international support for Islamic Fundamentalists, the morale of the Afghan army was undermined further. By October and November 1979, the instances of Afghan army soldiers joining the ranks of the Islamic Fundamentalists with their guns were countless.[18]
The internal divide of the PDPA regime had by now taken the life of one leader by the other; Amin had executed Taraki on October 9th, 1979. The Soviet Union was not pleased by this turn of the circumstances in Afghanistan in favor of Amin, whom they thought could not be controlled. Their displeasure intensified when Amin, attempting to win Soviet support and feeling disappointed, desperately approached the United States, an act that showed Amin’s complete ignorance of the Cold War situation and raised the bar of concern for Soviets significantly. The plan to send troops to Afghanistan was finalized by late November 1979; the proposal to intervene was formally ratified in the Soviet Politburo meeting of December 12.[19] Soviets invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979. The decade to come marked Afghanistan’s strategic position in the world: history repeated its opposite for two superpowers, Afghanistan was turned into “Soviet’s Vietnam” and US made it clear to the Soviets that their military intervention in Afghanistan was their gravest mistake.[20]
c) What Factors Drove the Shift?
The shift in the nature of the Islamist movement could be associated with a number of justifying and supporting factors. Daud reforms and his initial support of the PDPA and other left leaning elements that drove Islamists to isolation were the first factors that justified such a shift.
However, the PDPA coup of April 1978 and their inability to broaden their power base and prevent the consequent exclusion of Islamist forces was the second and more important factor. An opportunity to make up for this inability was offered to PDPA right on 27 April 1978, the day the PDPA staged the coup against Daud, which they failed to see and invest in. Rasanayagam believes that there was widespread “confusion” about what was happening on the coup day. Presidential guards who fought to the last thought that the coup was staged by right conservative elements that were against Daud’s progressive reforms. They were not alone in their interesting perception of the nature of the coup. Someone close to Sebghatullah Mujadidi, one of the anti-Soviets Jehad leaders issued a press statement in Pakistan saying that “Islam loving” forces were behind the coup.[21] This “confusion” could have been cashed by the PDPA in their favor to broaden their power base, which they were blinded to see due to strong factional craze for power and absence of a united vision as one party.
The Invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviets in 1979 was the last nail in the coffin of Afghan-Soviet friendship and the third factor that justified a shift to violence and the evolutionary birth of Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan. It was too evident an act to be disregarded as ignorance of Soviets towards Afghan resentment of foreign presence and domination. The invasion was not just received as an attack on Afghanistan’s sovereignty, but also on Islam by an infidel force. Therefore, resistance to Soviets was not just a fight for national independence, but also Jehad in the Name of God and for the preservation of Islam as the only common thing that binds Afghans in a country where according to Oliver Roy, “state is seen as external to society.”[22]
The role played by the US and its regional allies was no less significant in this process. US financial, technical and advisory support to the Islamic fundamentalist parties was crucial in their development. It was CIA money which enabled Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan to distribute funds, arms and ammunitions to Islamic fundamentalists based in Pakistan.[23] Had it not been for US counter-involvement in Afghanistan affairs, history might have had a different turn for Afghanistan. Considering Afghan history, if one cannot, with certainty claim that Soviets would have succeeded in suppressing the resistance movement led by Islamic fundamentalists, what can be said with relatively higher level of certainty is that without US backing of fundamentalism, post-Soviet Afghanistan would have not had Islamic fundamentalist parties which are excessively armed, affluent in resources, trained in military operations and rich in international connections. Therefore, the highlight of the factors that supported the development of this shift to maturity was the unrestrained support given by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Iran and United States of America, where American aid reached Islamic fundamentalists either directly or through Pakistan.
The Inspirational support came from the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The most radical elements of Afghan Islamic fundamentalists seem to have been deeply inspired by the ideals of Iranian leaders such as Khumaini, who believed that “there could be no mutual understanding between a Muslim Nation and a non Muslim Government.” [24] Islamic fundamentalists used Saudi and American financial and advisory support but followed Khumaini’s defiant Islamic resistance to the west.
Contrary to Iran’s position with regard to Soviets, the relationship between Islamic Fundamentalists and their international supporters US, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia was quite “mutual” and “understanding.” Of the eight major Islamic fundamentalist parties, four were radical in their approach towards national liberation as well as Jehad. Radical parties were favorites with United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan and had the greatest share of financial resources, weapons and advisory services at their disposal. This “mutual understanding” was based on the shared goal of throwing every single Soviet out of Afghanistan and leaving no space for Soviet military presence in any part of the country.[25] The goal was achieved, US did not wage a total war against Soviet Union, but gained a total victory; Soviet Union did not live into the 21st century.
Conclusion
There are two takeaways here, one historical, one strategic. Whether perceived threat of Islamic fundamentalism inspired by Iran and backed by the US and its regional allies led to Soviet invasion, or Soviet intervention in Afghanistan intensified and militarized Islamic fundamentalism is debatable. Westad argues that initial Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was technical and educational, while the military component was only added in early 1979.[26] However, to mark the start date is irrelevant; there is no doubt in the fact that the Soviet invasion intensified Islamic fundamentalist opposition and led to a shift in their nature which has marked history in bold characters and in the color of blood spilt on 9/11 and onwards. The historical takeaway is that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan began in 1920s with the Friendship Treaty and was based on Soviet’s idea of using Afghanistan as a buffer zone to ensure its own regional position, and later to further the cause of socialist revolution in Afghanistan, an idea that did not please others, in particular the US and Afghan fundamentalists. US had to counter the threat, therefore, means were made available and plan execution possible.
What went wrong was that Soviets overestimated the ability of an excessively unpopular PDPA regime to survive with foreign help, and underestimated the depth of Afghan resentment of foreign power, the intensity of US response and the extent of the radical nature of Islamic fundamentalism.[27] The strategic takeaway is for the international stakeholders involved in Afghanistan presently. A lot has changed, but many facts are still the same or even harsher. Afghanistan is still a country with many regional and international powers having a stake in, Afghans continue to resent foreign power and presence, Islamic fundamentalism has grown beyond imagination and into an octopus with connections worldwide, and worst of all and so unfortunately, Karzai government is as unpopular and corrupt as the PDPA regime, lacking in everything including broad local power base. Yes, there is no Soviet Union to make Afghanistan into American Afghanistan for the US and NATO allies, but efforts short of rendering Karzai Government reasonably bearable at national level would not help it hold for long, and a return to the Taliban rule or continued civil war and terrorism harboring would be no less a defeat for the international community led by the United States than the Soviet disintegration of 1990s.
[1] Oliver Roy, “Has Islamism a Future in Afghanistan?” in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, ed. William Maley, (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 199.
[2] Angelo Rasanayagam, Afghanistan: A Modern History, (London: I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd, 2003), 17.
[3] Rasanayagam, 20-22.
[4] Roy, 201.
[5] Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: The Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 301.
[6] Roy, 199.
[7] Westad, 302.
[8] Rasanayagam, 71.
[9] Westad, 307.
[10] Westad, 307.
[11] Roy, 205.
[12] Westad, 310.
[13] Westad, 300.
[14] Bhabani Sen Gupta, Afghanistan: Politics, Economics and Society, Revolution, Resistance, Intervention, (Colorado: Lynne Rienner, 1986), 7.
[15] Westad, 328.
[16] Westad, 307.
[17] Dr. Faiz Ahmad, Mash’al-e-Rehayi: Beacon of Emancipation, (Kabul: Afghanistan Liberation Organization Publications, 1981) 83.
[18] Westad, 315.
[19] Westad, 321.
[20] Westad, 328.
[21] Rasanayagam, 70.
[22] Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 30.
[23] Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan – The Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower, (Pennsylvania: Casemate, 1992), 81.
[24] Westad, 330.
[25] Westad, 376.
[26] Westad, 324.
[27] Westad, 326.