Rueschemeyer makes a lot of sense, yet again! He makes the reader swim in a pool of conflict driven yet complementing economic, social and political factors. There seems to be no escape from his analysis based on internal power relations and the impact of economy and transnational powers on them. He considers the consolidation of state power significant in terms of the impact that it has on stability and democratic development, but he does not disregard the role of economic development in shaping the political articulation of subordinate classes and the degree of state autonomy from economically dominant classes. He emphasizes on economic development as a factor that strengthens democratic forces and processes, whereas economic depression strengthening anti democratic elements. His favorite class is the working class, but he doesn’t allow you to conclude that middle class stands nowhere. While the size of the working class and the degree and nature of their mobilization and political articulation is more vital to democratic development than middle class, the leadership role of middle class remains to be a key factor specially when it comes to the nature of the alliances that they build with either the working class or the elite and military. A radicalized working class scares the middle class away, leaving it to join hands with the elite or even involve the military against inclusion of subordinate classes leading to authoritarian rule. On the other hand, the same middle class may join hands with the working class and push for inclusion. What binds the two extreme behavioral patterns of the middle class is their interest, which is the only attraction for them and our easy way of predicting their behavior.
There could be parallels drawn between Brazil, Pakistan and Turkey on the issue of military involvement in politics either with or without the consent of the leading middle class or political elite. Brazil oscillates on a cycle of democratic collapse and attempts aimed at re-democratization between 1930s and early 1980s, where the 1930 revolution installs Vergas, 1961 marks the creation of a parliamentary system, 1963 enhances presidential powers and ends parliamentary system, 1964 marks the deposition of president through military followed by the five institutional acts that gradually empty Brazilian system of government of its democratic pillars, ending with a step ahead in 1985, the Nova Republica. Pakistan, right from its initial years of inception goes through the cycle of military coups and elected parliaments between 1958 and 2008; General Ayub lays the foundation of martial law in 1958 which continues for 15 years ending with the election of Zulfiqar Bhutto in 1973 as prime minister. But the story doesn’t end here. General Zia takes over through another military coup in 1977, executes the prime minister in 1979 and rules for 11 years, a term that ends only with his mysterious death in a plane crash. A series of parliamentary elections and army backed presidential removals of parliament and prime minister continues till General Musharaf takes power through another military coup in 1999; his rule continues till 2008 when he is forced to step down both as president and head of army due to a judicio-constitutional crisis and unrest. Ataturk of Turkey forces democracy and secularism through dictatorial rule and brutal suppression of dissent, a pattern that continues to date. Military stays away for as long as there is single party rule but joins politics when politics becomes multi-party based. What follows then are military coups in 1960 and then in 1980, between which military remained actively involved in politics in the form of military advisory committees on the government that influenced politics significantly despite apparently bowing out to civilian rule in 1965. What should be noted in the above cases is the cycles of democracy and democratic collapse that seem to be unending.
However, not all countries follow this cyclic pattern; some countries show no significant signs of going back to democratic collapse. The instances could be Japan and Scandinavian countries on the edges of Europe. What I am trying to understand here are the reasons or the reason that prevents this cycle. What seems to be pretty convincing in the cases that I mention here is the degree of economic development in these countries, which has reached a level where there is no going back against political development towards democracy in true sense. This brings me to another argument made by Rueschemeyer which suggests that political institutions are based on economic structures; Japan and Scandinavian countries are not following the cycle because their levels of political and economic development match each other; Pakistan keeps falling back and may fall back yet again despite their recent constitutional reforms in favor of parliamentary system of government because the underdeveloped economic structures pull the developed political institutions down.
There is a difference in the cyclic pattern in Turkey and Pakistan though, which is marked by the impact of the transnational powers on national politics and economics and the nature and degree of dependence of Pakistani economy on international financial support. Rueschemeyer holds true yet again. Turkey is stable because its economy is less dependent on international support, while Pakistan continues to be unstable because of depended economic sector on international -mainly US- support and transnational middling in political affairs.
So, whither Afghanistan? Democracy did not hold in Afghanistan when it was pushed from within by Amanullah Khan in 1919. Will it hold now when it is pushed from outside following the end of Taliban regime in 2001? Afghan middle class elite is corrupt and brutally extremist, subordinate classes are mainly rural farmers who are too poor and devastated to think of political mobilization and Afghan economy is non-existent, and if does exist, it is anything but independent. Its political scene is a mess, governance is highly centralized, but central government is very weak, literally every country in the region and most countries outside the region have to do something with politics in Afghanistan, and civil war is looming large if international forces withdraw as per plans.
The picture is too bleak, but I still think YES! And my only hope and base of saying yes is the new generation of educated young Afghans who are surely into turning things around. We may also follow the cyclic pattern, but eventually we will be there.