During the Late Middle Ages Albania gave rise to a number of separate administrative units. Some of these, in the highlands, were tribal and were ruled by chieftains. Other units, mostly on the littoral and not far from it, underwent the feudal influences of the states of the Italian peninsula, which attempted to use Albania - only 47 miles from the coast of Italy - as a bridgehead for their expansion in the Balkans. Others, on the contrary, came under the feudal influences of the neighboring Serbian state which was stretching out toward the Adriatic and southward. Still other units, particularly in the south and more inland, had been under the influence of Byzantine feudalism.
These various brands of feudalism, however, did not remain static. When Charles I of Anjou dreamed of expanding in the Balkans, he landed in Albania and created in 1272 the "Kingdom of Albania." In the constitution he issued are mentioned "prelates, counts, barons … of Albania" who swore allegiance to the King, who received them, together with their "vassals" under his protection.[1] But the Angevine King failed in his enterprise to conquer Constantinople and, under Andronicus II (1282-1328), the Byzantines reached again the Adriatic. In parts of northern Albania Serbs of Raska spread their sway, coming into intermittent conflicts with the Angevines.[2] At the time of Stefan Dushan, the Serbs overran Albanian territory and, in their southward
march toward Epirus and Thessaly, helped the further expansion of the Albanians in Epirus, while relatives of the Serbian King became rulers in parts of Albania.[3]
These changes in political power on Albanian soil brought about also changes in the diffusion of Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. The religious split between East and West, which occurred in 1054, intensified the opposition between the Latin north and the Greek south. The Thema of Durazzo became its most active theater. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the political oscillations were accompanied by oscillations between Eastern Orthodoxy and Roman Catholicism. Both feudal lords and bishops led a religiously amphibious life.[4]
Albanian high nobility along the Adriatic was Catholic, but in the interior, toward Ochrida - even in Croya before the arrival of the Angevines - was under the domination of Greek influence.[5] When in 1319 an alliance of European Catholic rulers directed against the Serbian King, Uros II Milutin, a "schismatic," received the blessing of the pope, Albania was entangled in the net of papal politics. The heads of the important feudal families, as the Musachi and the Arianiti, were addressed in the papal bull as “dilectii filii” and “viri catholiki” they responded that "as Catholic men they will seize the opportunity to cast off the yoke of the true schismatic and enemy of the Christian faith, the perfidious King of Serbia."[6] In the north, even two zupani on the coast of Dioclea, the Albanian Catholic Vladislav Jonima (who in 1303 had lived in the court of the Serbian King),[7] and the still Orthodox Radislav, sided with the West.[8] But the Serbs thwarted their efforts and continued to hold firmly the northern part of Albania. Pressed by the Greeks to the south and still more strongly by the Serbs to the north, the Albanian feudal lords turned to the Angevines in Durazzo and Naples for protection.[9]
It will not seem strange then that the battle between the popes of Rome and those of Avignon was reflected in Albania, the former supporting the house of the Balshas in the north and the latter that of the Thopias, who called themselves “de domo Francie” [10] around Durazzo.[11]
Although Albania was the battlefield between Roman Catholicism and Eastern Orthodoxy, the struggle there never took a violent form. Owing to shifts in domination, the Catholic and Orthodox Albanians had acquired a capacity to adapt themselves to serve masters of opposing religious creeds, especially in the cities where the population was confessionally mixed.[12] Feudal lords, on the other hand, endeavored to be on good terms with both sides. Gjon Castrioti, the father of Skenderbeg, had Catholic clergymen and abbeys in his land, but he also sent presents to the Serbian Orthodox Monastery of Chilandar on Mount Athos.[13] Religious tolerance was also strengthened because many Albanian Catholic feudal families had kinship ties with Serbian princely Orthodox families, like the Brankovici and the Crnojevici, and some even with Byzantine emperors, as the Arianiti Comnen.[14] Also the fact that the feudal lords, in general, were small and divided rendered the constitution of two compact groups opposing each other impossible, preventing thus the rise of religious fanaticism.
Following the collapse of Stefan Dushan's empire, the number of Albanian local lords increased. There were not only the old feudal families, but also small ones emerged, the so-called "signoretti" in a Venetian document of 1461.[15] There were disputes and fights among them. It was one of the prominent feudal lords. Charles Thopia, who in 1385 called the Ottomans to his support, because he had no faith in Venice and feared the Balshas.[16] The latter had become very powerful, owing primarily to the fact that, by breaking away from the Orthodox Church and joining in 1368 the Catholic Church, they identified themselves with Roman Catholic Albania.[17]
Charles Thopia's invitation to the Ottomans was not an isolated phenomenon for the times. Already in 1352 the Ottomans had landed at Zympe, near Gallipoli, upon the invitation of John Cantacuzenus, the rival of the Palaeologi.[18] A coalition of Albanian lords, formed under Balsha II in order to oppose the enemy, was beaten at Savra, near the Vijosa (Voioussa) River, and Balsha II fell.[19] in Ottoman chronicles, this expedition bears the name of “Karlili”," that is, Charles' land (that is, Charles Thopia's).[20] It appears that after this Ottoman victory the principal Albanian lords recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan.[21]
However, the situation in Albania did not alter substantially. As vassals, the Albanian feudal lords were allowed to preserve their possessions and positions, on condition that they paid the tribute (harac), sent their sons as hostages to the Sultan's court, and furnished auxiliary troops.[22] Albanian forces, under the command of Coia Zaccaria, Dimitri Jonima, George Dukagjini and Dushmani, participated in the battle of Ankara in 1402.[23] The real change came with the next step. The true conquest was the establishment of the military fiefs, granted by the Ottoman state, but as a rule to be held and not possessed, the so-called timars.[24]
Skenderbeg, even early in his youth, could not help being aware of the political and religious complexity of Albania. Originally, his family was not among the most eminent in the country. His father, Gjon Castrioti, had succeeded in extending his domains around Tirana, Mati, Dibra, Mirdita, and as far as Prizren.[25] In the feudal manner, he had reinforced his position by marrying off his daughters to neighboring Albanian and Serbian rulers, regardless as to whether they were Catholics or Orthodox.[26] His son-in-law, Stefan Crnojevic, the ruler of Zenta (Montenegro), remained Orthodox and a defender of Orthodoxy, even when Venice appointed him its captain for Zenta.[27] In 1410, Yigit pasha of Uskub (Skopje) forced Gjon Castrioti to recognize the suzerainty of the Sultan.[28] On January 11 of the same year he informed the Venetian Senate that the Sultan was exerting pressure on him to give his son - which one is not specified in the document - as a hostage and permit his armies to pass through his territories to attack Venetian possessions.[29]
Barletius' statement that Skenderbeg was taken to Murad II’s court as a hostage when he was nine years old is not convincing. F. S. Noli has pointed out its many contradictions.[30] He seems to have been sent to the palace of that Sultan after 1426, for in that year Gjon Castrioti with his four sons, among whom George (Skenderbeg), donated to the monastery of Chilandar two villages,[31] while between 1426 and 1431 the name of George is again mentioned in connection with the purchase he made of the St. George tower and four brotherhoods in the same Serbian monastery.[32] As a consequence, the Albanian hero could not have been a child but an adult when he was taken as a hostage to Murad II’s court and began to live in an Ottoman environment. Although converted to Islam, he could not have forgotten his Christian religion; most probably he was a Crypto-Christian. At the same time he was too old to pass through the long education of the pages of the palace (ic oglans),[33] but he must have received a good military training, for he distinguished himself as a commander.
Skenderbeg's absence from Albania as a hostage at the Sultan’s palace has been recently questioned. Bishop F. S. Noli maintains that in 1428 Skenderbeg was probably in Albania, although serving in the Ottoman army, because in a letter from Venice it is implied that he received orders from his father rather than from the Sultan.[34] The interpretation given to the letter by the Albanian bishop is rather
subjective. From this letter (17 August 1428) it is learned that Gjon Castrioti, in addition to requesting the Venetian Senate that he be allowed to cross the frontier together with his family, in the event of an Ottoman invasion, begged them that they did not regard responsible his son, "el qual e fato turco e Mulsaman," if he invaded the possessions of the Republic upon order from the Sultan.[35] Because the Venetian Senate expressed the opinion that the father (Gjon Castrioti) could order his son [to refrain from invasion],[36] F.S. Noli jumps to the conclusion that "Skenderbeg was living at home in Albania, that he was sent by his father occasionally to serve with Albanian contingents in the Turkish army and that his father could order him to disregard the Sultan's orders."[37] Such a conclusion is unwarranted. Skenderbeg, as a commander of the Sultan's army, could very well be ordered, no matter where he was stationed at the time, to accompany the Ottoman army in its invasion of Venetian territory in Albania. The Albanian bishop holds further that it is not necessary to assume that the Albanian hero was converted to Islam at Murad IIs court, but rather "under the gentle persuasion" of his father, who became a Moslem, together with his sons, after the defeat of 1430, in order to weather the storm and salvage whatever he could.[38] This hypothesis, however, derives from the previous unsound conclusion. Scholars - and recently the late Franz Babinger - have been of the opinion that Skenderbeg was taken as a hostage to Murad II’s palace and there converted to Islam and called Skenderbeg.[39] It is relevant to mention in this connection that in a Venetian document of July 1448 the Albanian hero is referred to as “l’Ottomano,” a name which the Albanian lords had attributed to him,[40] implying that they regarded him, more than any one among themselves, as having been linked with service to the Sultan.
The timar system, which brought about an important change in Albania, seems to have been first introduced during the reign of Sultan Bayazid, following his 1394 campaign, at the outset in the southern part of the country, which had come under direct Ottoman control.[41] Later other conquests were made and by 1415-1417 the province of Albania, Arvanid-ili or Arnavud-ili, was constituted.[42]
But it was after 1430, when Salonica was captured from the Venetians and Janina fell after the death of Carlo Tocco (1429), that Murad II ordered a new registration of the timars in Albania, completed in 1432 as the record-book of the sandjak of Albania (Suret-i defier-i Sancak-I Arvanid, ed. by H. Inalcik, [Ankara, 1954].) At this time the province of Albania, under direct Ottoman rule, comprised the lands from Croya (Akcahissar) to the north as far as Philates to the south. The timars in it were not held exclusively by Moslems; a considerable number of them had been granted to Christians. Out of 335 timars 56 were assigned to Christians, that is, 16 percent, the rest being held by Albanian renegades or Moslems transferred from Anatolia. Most of the Christian timars were around Berat, 17 of them; 11 of them were located in the district (vilayet, in the old meaning) of Pavlo Kurtik, south of Tirana; 7 were around Croya; and the rest dispersed. In addition, the Ottoman state granted a timar to the Metropolitan of Berat and a timar to each of the bishops of Kanina, Croya and Cartalos (the region between Elbasan, Berat and Tomorice). A number of these Christian timars - nineteen - are referred to as "ancient" (kadimi), accompanied sometimes by the mention: "He has been in possession of it for a long time" or "He is in possession of a decree (berat) of the late Sultan."[43] This record-book of timars in Albania proves that it was not necessary to be a Moslem in order to hold a timar. Of course, a timariote would be favored if he espoused Islam.
Were these Christian timariotes Orthodox or Catholic? It is hard to speak with certainty. However, taking into account that their timars fell within the wedge Ochrida-Croya-Valona and more to the south, one would be inclined to believe that they were in the majority Orthodox.[44] The lands to the north of Croya were in the hands of Catholic Albanian lords who had recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan. In 1416 the Castrioti lands (Yuvan-ili) are referred to as belonging to a vassal. The Ottomans supported these vassals, as for instance Balsha III, in their conflicts with the Venetians. According to the record-book of 1432, the Ottoman population of the Sandjak of Albania was composed of the military and religious personnel, while the timariotes together with their men did not surpass 800. The rest of the population, that is, the great masses, were Christian.[45]
One might wonder why the Ottomans, who were so harsh on the Bulgarian and Serbian aristocracies, were so conciliatory with the Albanian nobility. In the first place, the Albanian feudal lords did not fight against the Ottomans, as the Bulgarians and Serbs, in an orderly battle, with united and compact forces. In that country the Ottomans were confronted by small local rulers, independent the ones from the
others and ready to come to terms with the conqueror in order to maintain their positions, either by accepting to become vassals of the Sultan or change their status into that of timariotes.[46] Other local considerations contributed as well. The Albanians were inclined to rebellion and their land was well protected by mountains. Venice, a potential enemy, occupied an important part of the littoral, and the
Adriatic could be freely used for agitation and support from Italy. Being a warlike people, the Albanians would be ideally suited for a military state like that of the Ottomans. Besides, it should not be difficult for the feudal lords to espouse Islam, for in pre-Ottoman Albania there was the tradition of wavering between Roman Catholicism and Greek Orthodoxy. The propagation and the establishment of Islam in Albania seem to have been primarily due to the participation of the local nobility in the timar system and in the affairs of the state.[47]
The registration of the timars may be regarded as the starting point of the Albanian resistance in the next decades. At the outset, some villages, especially in Kurvelesh, refused to be registered, obviously for fear of taxation. In other localities, the peasants murdered the Ottoman timariotes. Big Albanian feudal lords, who had been deprived of parts of their lands by the Ottoman state in order to distribute them as timars to Ottoman Sipahis, were dissatisfied. George Arianiti Comnen was the first to revolt and kill numerous Ottoman sipahis, while Thopia Zenebessi laid siege on Argirocastro. The insurgents were joined by other feudal lords, and in the winter of 1432-33 they inflicted a crushing defeat on the Sultan's army in the valley of the Shkumbi River, near Berzeshta.[48] Encouraged by these developments, Christian lords of the center and the north joined the rebellion, which took the Ottomans two years to put down. The latter employed all the armies of Rumelia, because they were afraid that the success of the revolt could arouse hopes for a new crusade in Hungary.[49]
Although the insurrection of 1432-33 was primarily that of vassals and timariotes for their own interests, it was at the same time a war of Christianity against Islam, for the leaders were Christian and so were the people who followed them. The Christian West hailed the victories of George Arianiti Comnen. His reputation would have attained greater heights had it not been overshadowed by that of Skenderbeg.[50]
It is natural to ask now: Where was Skenderbeg at this time? There is no information in Western documents - perhaps because he was not in Albania or he was not well-known - and no light has been shed as yet from the Ottoman archives. Until 1438 we are in the dark. In that year, the Albanian hero had been appointed governor of the district of Croya (subasi, in Turkish), but in 1440 his appointment was revoked. H. Inalcik, however, who has given this bit of information, does not account for the revocation. He only adds that Skenderbeg wanted then to seize Croya and all the lands of his father, holding them not as a timariote but possessing them as a vassal.[51] Skenderbeg's life becomes known, thanks to Western archival material, after his return to Croya in 1443, following the defeat of the Ottomans near Nish by the Christian forces commanded by Janos Hunyadi.
Upon his arrival at Croya, the national hero returned to the faith of his forefathers. His move was not just diplomatic, as that of his father. His order to the Moslem settlers and the renegades was to choose between Christianity and death, declaring thus a religious war: the Cross against the Crescent.[52]
Until this moment, Skenderbeg's surroundings had been Albanian, though religiously mixed, and Ottoman. He kept a reminiscence of the latter until the end of his life: his name Skenderbeg. From now on his environment was going to be Albania, exclusively Ottoman and for the most part Catholic, and the Christian West. Because of the stress which Skenderbeg placed on religion, a question arises at this juncture
as to the attitude of the Albanian Orthodox toward the Council of Florence (1439) for the union of the Churches. Nothing seems to have been written about it. What is vaguely known is that the Archbishopric of Ochrida, on which several Orthodox bishoprics on Albanian territory depended, held a rebellious attitude.[53] Skenderbeg's importance on religion may be explained politically by the consideration that in a war against the Ottomans Christianity could serve as a link among all the Albanians and that the only external assistance he could expect would come from the Christian West.
Skenderbeg acted first in environment close to him. His swift success in acquiring the possessions of his father enhanced his prestige among the people and the Albanian feudal lords, who now thought that the opportunity had come to throw off the Ottoman rule and regain their lands. Hunyadi's conquests and rumors that the West was preparing a crusade raised their hopes. Thus, when the Albanian hero called for a
convention to be held at Alessio in 1444, all the feudal lords inland and along the coast from southern Epirus to the Bosnian boundaries attended it.[54] The League which was formed elected unanimously Skenderbeg as commander-in-chief of its army, each member of the League remaining free to determine the financial and military aid to be contributed.[55]
Venice was invited to the meeting, but it sent only observers to watch and report. The Serenissima did not want to expose itself because of its trade interests with the Ottomans. However, by permitting Skenderbeg to hold his convention at Alessio, which was under Venetian sovereignty, it appeared to encourage the Albanians against Ottoman domination.[56]
The relations between the Albanian leader and Venice had their ups and downs. Both parties seem to have been mistrustful of each other. Immediately after the victory of Torviolli (29 June 1444) over the Ottomans, Venice endeavored to render the League inactive, if possible to break it up. Perhaps it was afraid that with a strong Albanian League it might loose its possessions in Albania.[57] But on 12 February 1445 the Venetian Senate confirmed to Skenderbeg and his brother Stanisha the concessions it had granted to their father and recognized them as citizens of Venice, offering them shelter in case of need.[58] Again in 1447 relations between the Albanian League and Venice were at a low ebb, the latter supporting the house of the Zaccarias, an Albanian feudal lord of the north, in a dispute with the League. In the war which broke out against Venice, Skenderbeg seems to have been aided by the Serbian Despot Djuradj Smederevac, who saw in the strengthening of the Serenissima peril for the Serbian coast.[59] The Venetian Senate was so infuriated against him that on 4 May 1448 it accepted an offer by a prominent person - the name is not mentioned in the document - to assassinate him for a yearly pension of 100 ducats.[60] Venice tried hard to separate from Skenderbeg some Albanian lords and incite at the same time the Ottomans against him.[61] The Ottomans came to the assistance of the Venetians, but both were beaten in the summer of 1448. The treaty that was signed with Venice (4 October 1448) was a compromise, for Skenderbeg could not carry on war on two fronts.[62] Yet, a kind of undeclared war continued. Only six days after the conclusion of the treaty, Venice ordered its proveditor in Albania to urge the Ottomans to turn against the Albanian leader.[63] On the other hand, on 14 September 1453, the Venetian Senate thanked him for having maintained the pact with the Republic and tor his willingness to intervene for peace between Venice and the Serbian Despot.[64] But peace with Venice was really achieved in 1463, when it needed him as an ally in its war with the Ottomans. The Venetian Senate was glad to accept - while discussing with Mathias Corvinus of Hungary the war against the Ottomans [65] - Skenderbeg's offer (20 August 1463) to rise against Mehmed II.[66] It recognized then his son, Gjon, as a citizen and admitted him to the Venetian nobility with the right of membership to the Grand Council.[67] In 1464 there were rumors in Venice that Skenderbeg had come into an understanding with the Ottomans.[68] The Serene Republic had not much trust in its Albanian ally.
As long as his war against the Ottomans was successful, Skenderbeg had few troubles in the Albanian environment. True, the Ottomans managed at the outset to alienate, through intrigues, a few of the lords of the League and win them over to their side.[69] A division was also caused in the League by the quarrel between the Zaccarias and the Dukagjinis.[70] But the great troubles began with the Ottoman victory of Berat (July 1455). Many of the members of the League wanted to desert; they hesitated only whether to go to the Sultan's side or to that of the Doge. In 1456 Venice, which had been active in encouraging desertion, appointed George Arianiti Comnen, who in the meantime had become Skenderbeg's father-in-law, as the captain of Albania from Scutari to Durazzo.[71] On the other hand, Moses of Dibra, George Arianiti’s nephew, one of the ablest commanders of the Albanian forces, Nicholas and Paul Dukagjini, and Hamza Castrioti deserted to the Ottomans. Hamza, Skenderbeg's nephew, abandoned the Albanian leader allegedly because he had been deprived of his right to inherit the Castrioti domains; the Ottomans acclaimed him as the new ruler of Albania under the Sultan's protection.[72] However, in northern Albania and on both sides of Mount Tomor dominated Skenderbeg's faithful feudal lords and chieftains.[73] Gjon Musachi, who later fled to Italy, explains all these desertions of local lords as provoked by Skenderbeg's annexation of their territories. One would regard it natural for the Albanian leader to be as ambitious as any other local lord and try to increase his power, it was equally natural for him to free himself of those centrifugal forces, annex their territories, and unify the country against both the Sultan and the Venetians under the protection of Alphonse V of Naples.[74]
King Alphonse V dispatched Catalans to Berat who fought on the side of Skenderbeg. They witnessed that he “chome lion se messe fra quelli turchi."[75] The relations between the Albanian hero and the Aragonian-Neapolitan King seem to have started in 1447, when Skanderbeg was at war with both Venice and the Ottomans, their common enemies. Alphonse V, pursuing the tradition of his predecessors, cherished the ambition to expand in the Balkans and build a Mediterranean empire. Venice and the Ottomans stood in his way. On 14 December 1447 he commended Skenderbeg on his decisiveness in the war against the Sultan's armies and offered him and his family asylum, in the event of need, promising also future assistance.[76] The relations between the two grew closer when Mehmed II came to the throne in January 1451. The new Sultan had ambitions which ran contrary to those of Alphonse V. He considered himself successor to the Roman emperors and dreamed of capturing Constantinople and Rome. Albania was an obstacle to the realization of his dream. On 26 March 1451 a pact was concluded at Gaeta between the King of Naples and Skenderbeg, whereby the Albanian leader recognized the suzerainty of Alphonse V, who would grant him and his relatives any fiefs he might choose in his kingdom. Another condition of the treaty was that as soon as Skenderbeg recovered his lands from the Ottomans, with the help of the Neapolitan King, he would go personally and pay homage to him.[77] Such pacts of vassalship were signed with other Albanian lords. With this network of treaties, the League of Alessio was placed under King Alphonse V, with Skenderbeg as Captain General.[78] When Musachi Thopia was apparently reluctant to collaborate with Skenderbeg, the King of Naples reminded him in March 1455 that he should unite with the Albanian hero and should work in agreement with his own Vice-Roy in Albania, Ramon d'Ortaf.[79]
Skenderbeg came in touch with the southern Italian environment when he visited Alphonse V in 1453, after the fall of Constantinople; but he really experienced it when the illegitimate son of his supporter, Ferdinand I (1458-1494), inherited the Kingdom of Naples. As this Kingdom was claimed by the French house of Anjou, a war of succession broke out. Ferdinand invited Skenderbeg to assist him against the
Neapolitan barons and the French pretender, Rene d'Anjou. Having patched up his differences with the neighbors he was at war (Venice, the Dukagjinis and the Ottomans), he set sail for Barletta, where he landed on 25 August 1461. He succeeded in freeing the besieged Ferdinand in the neighborhood of that city and harassed the obsolete cavalry of the condottiere Giacomo Piccinino. He also saved Trani that was about to fall in enemy hands. His blitz raids amazed those who witnessed them.[80] He fought his enemies, we are told by Francesco Sforza's Ambassador to the royal camp, "a mode suo," that is "he killed those who fell in his hands and did not make prisoners,”[81] This apparently was the method Skenderbeg used in Albania, where prisoners could be a great burden. It shocked the Italians of his time, who had not experienced the ferocity of wars. Among them, the wars carried on by mercenaries, were more or less "delle manovre incruenti," in which seldom the participants remained wounded or dead.[82] In January 1462, Skenderbeg received word from his wife that the Sultan's armies were approaching the frontiers; he left the next month. The war of the Neapolitan succession dragged for almost two more years, but Skenderbeg's arrival at Barletta marked a turning point.[83]
Skenderbeg's contribution to the Italian expedition has been dismissed by some historians, on the basis of Pius II’s Commentaries, as a fiction.[84] Bishop Noli has tried to vindicate it by referring to Barletius, Pontano and to the testimony of Ferdinand himself. Today we possess another testimony in a letter which Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan, addressed to Skenderbeg on 26 October 1461. He expresses his thanks to him for having come to Italy so well equipped to serve his King and manifest such great fidelity and affection by abandoning his own affairs in Albania. The King was deeply obligated to him. He states how useful Skenderbeg was at Barletta, and still is, inspiring great terror to his enemies. His arrival had contributed to the enhancement of His Majesty's reputation, for which he would be rewarded.[85] Even when he departed for Albania, Skenderbeg expressed the intention not to abandon the war in Italy but "retornare al bono tempo. " [86] King Ferdinand recompensed him later with fiefs in Puglia and an annual provision of 1,200 ducats.[87]
Taking part in the war in Italy, Skenderbeg demonstrated a sense of gratitude for the support he had received from the Aragonians of the Kingdom of Naples in the war against the Ottomans. Perhaps a present day historian of the period, F. Pall, does not exaggerate when, in contrasting the Albanian hero and the Italian environment in which he had been active, he writes: "E anche uomini di cosi calcolata avvedutezza, cosi astuti e cosi privi di scrupoli, in quell' ambiente quattrocentesco, accerbamente egoistico e di generale slealta, come erano lo Sforza e Ferrante d'Aragona, si mostrano-puo darsi addirittura per questo! - particolarmente sensibili di fronte a tanta liberalita d'animo ed a una cosi schietta lealta."[88]
Another environment Skenderbeg came to know well was that of the Papacy. From Eugene IV to Paul II all the popes took a deep interest in his anti-Ottoman war and they were generous not only with benedictions but with material aid as well. He fought mainly under the direct orders of the popes and, when he cooperated with other powers, he did so in as far as he was authorized by the popes themselves.[89]
The Papacy in the first half of the fifteenth century passed through serious troubles, which had shaken the Catholic Church; the Great Schism of the West ended but in 1417. The troubles continued with the Council of Basel (1431-49), which contested the supremacy of the pope over the Church Council. Such ideas were at the root of the Pragmatical Sanction of Bourges (7 July 1438), which gave rise to a movement for the creation of a French national church.[90] It was natural for the popes now to be concerned with the prestige of their institution and the consolidation of its power. When they turned their action against the Ottomans, they thought first in those terms – the threat which the Ottoman advance represented - and then about the salvation of Christianity from the domination of Islam.[91]
When in 1450 Skenderbeg, after a five-month siege of Croya, was able to push back Murad II, Pope Nicholas V (1447-1455), full of joy and enthusiasm, ordered that a part of the money collected from the indulgences of the jubilee year 1450 in the cities of Dalmatia and the Primorje be paid to the brave warrior of the Christian cause.[92] After the defeat of the crusaders in Varna in 1444, the Sultanas retreat from Croya was the first Christian success. The pope addressed letters to Ragusa and Cattaro that they deliver a part of the collected sum to Skenderbeg himself or men of his confidence.[93] The Senate of Ragusa asked that their city be exempted from the 1450 jubilee tax, taking into account its services to Christian causes, in particular the support given to Skenderbeg for whom it had but praises.[94] Cattaro, on the other hand, requested that of the 1,500 ducats assigned to Skenderbeg one-third remain as a subsidy for the Cathedral of the City.[95]
Skenderbeg visited Rome for the first time in the same year he visited Alphonse V, when the capture of Constantinople shook Europe and especially Italy.[96] It was not a completely new environment for the Albanian hero. In his homeland he had been surrounded by Catholic clergymen as advisers and friends. Pope Nicholas V was thinking at that time of the defense of Hungary, Bosnia and Albania.[97] On 30 September 1453 he promulgated the solemn Crusade Bull, setting as an immediate goal to clear the way for the constitution of a Christian anti-Ottoman bloc by eliminating the discords among the Christian powers, particularly those of Italy.[98] In Albania, he intervened in the conflict between Skenderbeg, on the one hand, and Nicholas and Paul Dukagjini, on the other. The Dukagjinis had turned against the Albanian leader and had come to an understanding with the Ottomans, to the detriment of the Christian cause. Pope Nicholas V, we are told in a document of 22 August 1454, issued an interdict which compelled them to break with the Ottomans and make peace with Skenderbeg.[99]
Following the death of Nicholas V (25 March 1455), his successor, Callistus III (1455-1458), took over the Crusade as his principal mission. He confirmed and amplified the Bolla Crociata with his own bull of 15 May 1455. When he started to put his project into application, he reconfirmed as nuncio for the Crusade in Albania the active and influential Paolo Angeli-Dushi, Archbishop of Kraja, who would act in understanding with Skenderbeg. The Archbishop's duties were extended also to Dalmatia and Serbia, perhaps in order to collect subsidies for Albania in the former and in order to sustain the vacillating position in the latter, which represented a menace to that country.[100] Callistus was negotiating with Alphonse V, who was dissatisfied with the conduct of Venice,[101] about the commander of the Christian armies in Albania.[102]
Although Mehmed II in the spring of 1457 invaded Albania, laying siege on Croya and devastating the countryside, Callistus III's confidence in Skenderbeg did not decrease. He wrote to him on 9 June 1457: “Noi, diletto figlio, abbiamo sempre avuto un' ottima opinione della Tua Nobilta . . . ne piccola e presso i Cattolici la tua gloria, illustrata da tante ben condotte imprese e da una certa perpetua fortuna vittoriosa.”[103] On 10 September 1457, the pope ordered that the tithe (decima) collected in Dalmatia be divided in three equal parts: one for the King of Hungary, the second for the King of Bosnia, and the third as soon as possible for Skenderbeg, whom the Ottomans had surrounded from all sides.[104] A day later, he urged Skenderbeg to hold heroically against the Ottomans. At the same time he ordered that a part of his fleet sail to the Albanian leader's assistance.[105] On 17 September 1457, Callistus went further and informed Skenderbeg that he had ordered the collector Giovanni Navarr to give all the amount collected for the Crusade to him, as defender “of the Catholic faith.”[106] The pope called Skenderbeg “atleta di Dio,” multiplying his praises, when he became aware with time that the rulers of Europe had only promises but not actions. When he solicited money for the crusade, toward the end of his life, Albania held the first place in his heart.[107]
Callistus III bequeathed to Pius II (1458-1464) the idea of a great crusade to be organized with the united forces of Europe and to the carried out through Albania. With the Congress of Mantua in 1459, the new pope made the first attempt for the promotion of a general crusade against the Ottomans. Francesco Sforza, the Duke of Milan, took also part in it, promising military contribution. He was a good friend of Skenderbeg, ready with promises but rather thrifty with actions. It is true, on the other hand, that Sforza had no direct interest in the East, and this accounted for his indifference in the anti-Ottoman wars.[108] On 14 January 1460, we are informed, Pius II emanated with a special document the resolutions of the Council of Mantua.[109] As Skenderbeg had difficulties with Lek Dukagjini and his brother, the pope ordered them that if, within fifteen days they had not broken all connections with the Ottomans, they would be excommunicated.[110] Preparing himself for a decisive battle, Pius II relied, besides other powers, on Skenderbeg, to whom he alloted Macedonia in his partition plan of the Ottoman State. [111]
On 22 October 1463, Pius II called the Christian world to arms against the Ottomans. But the effect of his bull was very weak. Europe of that day was greatly split and its rulers and the Italian republics engaged in their own particular interests. Under such circumstances, the anti-Ottoman war occupied a secondary place.[112] On 18 November 1463, it was communicated to the Duke of Milan that in the papal Curia Cardinal Pavia had proposed that the Christian Armies be assembled either in Albania or in Ragusa. The pope seemed to agree: “Sua Santite dice, che it paese de Albania e forte e quando pur tutto lo sforzo del Turco se venesse, chi non potesse cossi presto andare in dentro . . .”[113] When Skenderbeg, in April 1464, asked for assistance against the Ottomans, the pope comforted him with the promise that the beginning of the crusade was imminent and that he himself would escort the fleet to Dalmatia. He hoped to land at Ragusa and then meet with the troops of Mathias Corvinus and those of Skenderbeg.[114] But on 14 August 1464 Pius II died in Ancona and his crusade collapsed.
His successor, Paul II (1464-1473), in September or October 1464, had worked out a project for another Crusade against the Ottomans. Apart from the Albanian hero, he hoped to receive help from the Sultan of Caramania.[115] The Moslem world, too, was divided and had its troubles. In November 1465 the Caramanian ruler had dispatched an envoy to Venice to conclude an anti-Ottoman pact.[116] Already some
years before (1456?), he had sent to the pope a project of how the Ottomans could be expelled from Europe. For him, the Hungarians and the Albanians under Skenderbeg were going to play the most significant role. When the Hungarians would cross the Danube and the Caramanians would attack in Asia Minor, Skenderbeg, reinforced by armies from Italy, should march toward Greek territory occupied by the Ottomans.[117] But Paul II failed also in starting the Crusade war. The time had passed when Pope Urban II (1088 1099) appealed for a crusade and masses of people left for the Orient.
In the meantime, the Ottoman offensive, particularly in 1466 under the command of Balaban pasha, an Albanian renegade, proved destructive. The whole of Albania, except Croya, was in Ottoman hands. The situation was so grave that Skenderbeg had to leave in distress for Italy to solicit support. He went first to Rome (12 December 1466).[118] The assertions of Barletius that in Rome the Albanian leader obtained easily from the pope and the cardinals all the assistance he needed and was satisfied are contradicted by new documents.[119] Although the cardinals met to consider the aid to be accorded to Skenderbeg, no effective support came.[120] “Desperate,” as he arrived in Rome, so hedeparted from it, after a stay of more than two months.[121] The environment of Rome had disappointed him deeply this time. He would remark ironically, we are told in documents, “Nante voria fare Guerra alia ghiesa che al Turco,” or that he had not believed “se potesse trovare la mazore crudelitate al mondo cha in quisti preti!”[122] From Rome Skenderbeg went to Naples, where he visited King Ferdinand. His assistance was not substantial, but it was all he could get.[123]
Upon his return to Albania, in the beginning of April 1467, Skenderbeg resumed the war against Balaban pasha successfully. Soon after, however, the devastating campaign of Sultan Mehmed II followed. Paul II, partly under the influence of the atmosphere of panic created in Italy, dispatched twice subsidies to Skenderbeg.[124] On 8 July 1467, Ferdinand II was advised that a great part of the population of Durazzo and the surroundings had left for Italy;[125] eight days later the court of Milan was informed of their passage to Puglia.[126]
On 17 January 1468 the Albanian national hero died in Alessio and was buried in the Cathedral of St. Nicholas of that city, which he had rebuilt a few years before.[127] For 24 years he opposed in his own environment the preponderant Ottoman forces, delaying their expansion to the West. Ragusa had several times offered refuge to Skenderbeg's family on its islands, particularly on Mljet (Milete),[128] but his widow and son expressed the desire to go to the Kingdom of Naples. Ferdinand I entrusted Ieronimo Carvino, one of his intimates, to visit and invite them on his part to come and settle in his Kingdom, where he would receive them “come si accoglie una madre ed un figlio” and that he would leave them not only the possessions he had donated to Skenderbeg but would also assign others to them.[129] They left for Italy, where they settled in the Kingdom of Naples, to be followed later by waves of other emigrants.
NOTES
1. Cf. G. M. Monti, "La dominazione napoletana in Albania: Carlo I d'Angio, prime re degli Albanesi," Rivista d’Albania, I (1940), 50.
2. Ibid., 55.
3. M. Sufflay, Srbi i Arbanasi, (Belgrade, 1925), pp. 78-79; L. v. Thalloczy, “Di albanische Diaspora," in Illyrisch-Albanische Forschungen, ed. by L. v. Thalloczy, (Munich and Leipzig, 1916), I, p. 332; C. Jirecek, "Albanien in der Vergangenheit,” in ibid., pp. 73-75.
4. M. Sufflay, op. cit p. 94.
5. Ibidem.
6. See ibid., pp. 40-41 and 95.
7. Ibid., p. 122.
8. Ibid., pp. 40-41.
9. Ibid, p. 41.
10. Ibid. p. 98.
11. C. Jirecek, Geschichte der Serben (Gotha, 1918), II, 1, p. 109.
12. Cf. M. Sufflay, "Die Kirchenzustande im vorturkischen Albanien. Die orthodoxe Durchbruchszone im Katohschen Damme,” in Illyrisch- Albanische Forschungen, I, pp. 190 191.
13. C. Jirecek, op. cit.. p. 143.
14. M. Sufflay, Srbi i Arbanasi, p. 95. For the various sources dealing with Albanian feudal families, see F. Babinger, Das Ende der Arianiten (Munich, 1960), pp, 6 n. 2, 12 n. 2, 13 n. 2.
15. F. Pall, "I rapporti Italo-Albenesi intorno alla meta del secolo XV" (Documenti inediti con introduzione e note storico-cntiche), Archivio Storico per le Province Napoletane, Terza serie, IV (1965), Doc. X, p. 169.
16. The origin of the Balshas is controversial. Some scholars think that they were Serbs (M. Sufflay, Th. Ippen), others Albanians (F. S. Noli), others Rumanians (N. Iorga), and still others Vlachs related to Albanian nobility (C. Jirecek).
17. See F. S. Noli, George Castrioti Scanderbeg (1405-1468), (New York, 1947), p. 9; Th. Ippen, "Contribution a l’histoire de l’Albanie du XllIe au XVe siecle (1204-1444)," Albania (Paris), IV (1932), 32.
18. G. Ostrogorsky, History of the Byzantine State, (New Brunswick, NJ., 1957), p. 473.
19. N. Iorga, Geschichle des osmanischen Reiches, (Gotha, 1918), 1, p. 255.
20. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," The Encyclopedia of Islam. (Leiden and Lon-
don, 1958), p. 674.
21. N. lorga, op. cit., I, p. 261.
22. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens en Albanie au XVe siecle, d'apres un registre de timars Ottoman," Mitteilungen des Osterreichischen Staatsarchivs, IV (1952). 120.
23. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 674.
24. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens ...,” 120.
25. See F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 21; Th. Ippen, op. cit., p. 34.
26. F. S. Noli, ibid., p. 21.
27. See in the yet unpublished documents from the Venetian State Archives by G. Valentini, 1453, Xl, 5, Sen., Mar., Ro5, C.ll (10) t.
28. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 674.
29. J. Radonic, Djuradj Kastriot Skenderbeg i Albanija u XV veku (Srpska Kraljevska Akademija, Spomenik XCV, drugi razred 74) (Belgrade, 1942), Doc. No. 1.
30. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 29.
31. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 3.
32. Ibid. Doc. No. 4.
33. Cf. A. E. Vakalopoulos, Historia tou Neou Hellenismou, (History of Modern Hellenism) (Thessaloniki, 1964), II, pp. 56-58.
34. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 30.
35. J. Radonic, op. cit.. Doc. No. 5.
36. Ibid.
37. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 30.
38. Ibid.
39. F. Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer und seine Zeit, (Munich, 1953), p. 55.
40. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 20.
41. Cf. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens . . . ," p. 122.
42. Cf. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675 and 'Timariotes chretiens . .. ,"p. 122.
43. Ibid, pp. 118-120.
44. Cf. M. Sufflay, "Die Kirchenzustande ...,"p. 189.
45. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675.
46. N. Iorga, op. cit., p. 270; H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens . . .,"p. 124.
47. Cf. ibid. p. 131.
48. Cf. H. Inalcik, "Timariotes chretiens . . .” pp. 128-129 and "Arnawutluk," p. 675; C. Jirecek, Geschichte der Serben, 11, 1, pp. 154 and 171.
49. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675.
50. F. Babinger, Das Ende der Arianiten, p. 9.
51. H. Inalcik, "Arnawutluk," p. 675. The authors of Historia e Shqiperise Vellim i Pare (Universiteti Shteteror i Tiranes, Instituti i Historise dhe I Gjuhesise), (Tirana, 1959), writing about Skenderbeg in the period 1438-1440, mention "new documents discovered recently testify" (p. 271), they do not give the slightest explanation as to the documents themselves. It is evident that they refer to H. Inalcik and to F. S. Noli's work (p. 31), the latter being questionable.
52. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 35-36.
53. See A.-P. Pechayre, "L’archeveche d’Ochrida de 1394 a 1767. A propos d'un ouvrage recent," Echos d'Orient, 39 (janvier-mars 1936), p. 188. The work reviewed is by I. Snegarov, Istorija na okridskata arkiepiskopija-patriarchija (1394-1767), (Sofia, 1924).
54. F. Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer, p. 56, See for the names of the lords who attended it F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 36-37.
55. Ibid, p. 37.
56. lbid.
57. Ibid. p. 39.
58. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 12.
59. Cf. C. Jirecek, Geschuhte der Serben, 11. I, pp. 188 189; J. Radonic, op. cit., p. III.
60. ibid., Doc. No. 17. F. S. Noli has misinterpreted the document by saying that the Venetians "after trying in vain to find an assassin who would murder Skenderbeg for an annual pension of 100 ducats"(p. 40) for the offer was made by the would-be assassin.
61. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 18.
62. See for conditions ibid., Doc. No. 22.
63. Ibid., Doc. No. 23.
64. Ibid., Doc. No. 69.
65. Ibid., Doc. No. 247.
66. Ibid., Doc. No. 248.
67. Ibid., Doc No. 253.
68. Ibid., Doc. Nos. 273, 274; F. Pall, op. cit., p. 135 and note 49.
69. F. Babinger, Mehmed der Eroberer . . . , p. 162.
70. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 39-40.
71. F. Babinger, op. cit., p. 162.
72. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 51-53.
73. F. Babinger, op. cit., p. 162.
74. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 52.
75. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 141 and Doc. 11.
76. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 16
77. Cf. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 38.
78. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 49.
79. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 91 and 92.
80. Cf. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 57-59; F. Pall, op. cit., pp. 148-149; J.Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 195, 196, 197, 198-200, 207-220, 221
81. F. Pall, op. cit., Doc. XV11: "Et vole fare la guerra al modo suo, cioe amazare chi gli venue alle mane et non fare present."
82. Ibid., p. 149.
83. F. S. Noli, op. cit., pp. 59-60.
84. See ibid., pp. 60-61. The passage in the Commentaries which has been used as a basis is the following description of Skenderbeg’s army: "... lightly armed cavalry, swift horsemen, good for looting and plundering, but useless for warfare according to the Italian style, and helpless against our spears" (F. S. Noli, p. 60; the original in Pius II, CommentaryRerum Memorabilium,[Rome, 1584], p. 302). But the Commentarii were written partly by Pius II.
85. F. Pall, op. cit., Doc. LIII.
86. Ibid., p. 150 and Doc. XIX.
87. Ibid., pp. 132-133.
88. Ibid., p. 150.
89. F. S. Noli, op. cit., p. 73.
90.See 3. Radonic, op. cit., p. IV; M. Sciambra, G. Valentini, 1. Parrino, "L’Albania e Skanderbeg nelpiano generate di Crociata di Callisto III (1455-1458)," Bolletino della Badia greca di Grotta-ferrata XXI (1967), 84-85 and note 6.
91. J. Radonic, op. cit., p. IV.
92. Ibid. and Doc. No. 40.
93. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 40.
94. Ibid., Doc. Nos. 36 and 60.
95. See in the yet unpublished documents from the Venetian State Archives by G. Valentini, 1451.XII.3, Sen., Mar, R°4, C.96 (95) t.
96. Cf. M. Sciambra and others, op. cit., p. 106.
97. Ibid., p. 105.
98. Ibid., p. 106.
99. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 138.
100. Cf. M. Sciambra and others, op. cit., pp. 107 and 109.
101. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 105.
102. Ibid., Doc. No. 102.
103. M. Scimabra and others, op. cit., p. 114 and note 148.
104. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 150.
105. Ibid., Doc. No. 151.
106. Ibid., Doc. No. 152; Sciambra and others, op. cit., pp. 116-117.
107. Ibid.. pp. 118-121.
108. Cf. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 127.
109. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 193.
110. Ibid.. Doc. No. 174.
111. F. Pall, op. cit., p. VI.
112. Ibid., p. 140; J. Radonic, op. cit., p. VI.
113. Ibid., Doc. No. 257.
114. Cf. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 133.
115. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 285.
116. Ibid., Doc. No. 307.
117. Ibid., Doc. No. 130.
118. Ibid., Doc. No. 340.
119. See F. Pall, op. cit., p. 143.
120. Ibid., pp. 143, 145-146; J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 344, 349.
121. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 143.
122. Ibid., Doc. LXXVII and LXXVIII.
123. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. 353.
124. F. Pall, op. cit., p. 147.
125. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. No. 367.
126. Ibid., Doc. No. 369.
127. F. S. Noli. op. cit., p. 70.
128. J. Radonic, op. cit., Doc. Nos. 204, 314.
129. Ibid., Doc. No. 389.
The Italian version of this paper was published in Atti, V Convegno Internationale di Studi Albanesi, Palermo, 1969, pp. 83-105. The translation appears here for the first time.
